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The study reveals how the Singaporean English daily newspaper The Straits 
Times (ST), the Indonesian English language daily The Jakarta Post (JP), the 
Malaysian English language daily newspaper New Straits Times (NST) and the 
Indonesian English language version of the weekly magazine Tempo have framed 
news to establish an understanding of the arrests of suspected terrorists in Malaysia 
and in Singapore as well as to report the high profile bombings in Indonesia during 
the period 2002 to 2005. These bombings are the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 
Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali 
bombing. 
The study aims to understand the construction of terrorism in addition to 
providing alternative perspectives on the issue. The analysis of news media presented 
here stems from a critical constructionist media theory approach. Within this 
framework, a comparative and relational analysis of the press coverage of cases of 
terrorism has been conducted. 
The findings show the relationships between types of labels chosen, media bias 
and the influence of the official sources of information on the news framing of 
terrorism. The limited coverage of alternative perspectives has contributed to a 
reduced understanding of the reasons why political dissidents or criminals look for 
violence as a way to express their dissatisfaction. 
The global discourse on the ‘war on terror’ provided the larger frame for the 
reporting, with the publications tailoring and politicizing the content within each 
country’s or group’s interest. The tenets of journalism in the sense of “constructive 
 xi
cooperation or partnership with government in nation-building” (Xiaoge, 2005:65) 
were heavily used in The Straits Times and New Straits Times while The Jakarta 
Post’s reporting was highly influenced by economic interests. 
Terrorism was framed in the press as a threat to economic development because 
the bombings affect the tourism industry and undermine investor confidence. The 
Jemaah Islamiyah network was framed as a threat to existing state power. Public 
policy initiatives regulating and organizing citizen’s lives were put in practice in the 
name of national security. The media constructed a perceived emergence of terrorism 




Chapter One: Contextual Review 
1.1 Introduction 
News is part of our everyday life. We take it for granted without asking questions 
about how information is gathered, the social influence on news reporting or the 
forces behind news organizations. Yet, we consume news with a strong appetite, 
particularly news on violence. Some acts of violence involving death and destruction 
make headlines. However, not all acts of cruelty make news. Violence and pain in the 
news carry political significance especially when caused by acts of terrorism.  
The terrorist events in Washington and New York on September 11, 2001, 
televized repeatedly, derailed an American-led fight against Islamic radicals. The 
Bush administration declared Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born militant who fought 
the Soviets in the Afghanistan war (1979-85), as the personification of evil. Bin 
Laden and his al-Qaeda group, formed by Muslim fighters who had joined the largely 
United States and Pakistani funded anti-Soviet resistance movement, were identified 
by the US as responsible for the terrorist attacks on American soil.  
Following the events of 11 September and the US declaration of ‘war on terror’, 
the United States extended its fight against radicals in Afghanistan to “radical Islamist 
groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore”1. The Bush administration identified the region as the second front in 
the ‘war on terror’. 
                                                 
1 Congressional Research Service, updated 2004, Report for Congress, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, 
US State Department Code RL 31672. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35795.pdf 
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The perception that the region is a cradle for terrorism was reinforced by the Bali 
bombing in 12 October 2002. The event was the first major terrorist attack after 11 
September, 2001, and the worst act of violence against tourists in Indonesia.  
Other bombings against foreign targets happened in Indonesia in 2003, 2004 and 
2005. Foreign governments such as the United States, Australia and Singapore 
attributed the bombings to Islamic radical militants based in Indonesia. Those 
responsible for the attacks were identified as members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
group with links to the al-Qaeda network. Government officials and terrorism experts 
within and outside the region claimed the JI group aimed to create an Islamic 
caliphate encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the south of the 
Philippines.  
The Southeast Asia region with its complex ethnic, cultural and religious richness 
offers a unique setting to study the implications of the global fight on terrorism. The 
region has the largest concentration of Muslim followers in the world. Writers such as 
Banlaoi (2004: 21, 35) claim that “Indonesia serves as the major hub of terrorist 
activities in Southeast Asia”; that “Malaysia is the place where terrorists from Asia 
and their al-Qaeda backers can meet”; and that “Singapore also played an important 
role in al-Qaeda’s fund-raising activities in Southeast Asia through JI cells in the 
city”. This stereotyping of the region has an influence on local media reporting on 
terrorism. 
The media function as a source of information for public and policy-makers alike. 
The media interpretation of events affects how history is written. Yet, the inter-
pretation it provides is value-laden. As in other parts of the world, the media in South-
east Asia function within some form of governmental, societal and economic 
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constraints. The media in the countries studied – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – 
are structured to contribute to nation-building and economic development. The study 
demonstrates that the news framing of terrorism reflects both historical and current 
prevailing interests, and within the backdrop of the ‘war on terror’. 
 
1.2 The thesis’ Aims 
This study seeks to understand the media construction of terrorism produced in the 
daily newspapers The Jakarta Post (JP), from Indonesia, the News Straits Times 
(NST), from Malaysia, The Straits Times (ST), from Singapore and the English 
language version Tempo magazine, from Indonesia.  
     The overriding goal of the dissertation is to comprehend the nuances of press 
reporting and framing trends over time and between publications within the complex 
social and political activities in the selected countries. The study attempts to provide a 
valuable understanding into contemporary news reporting on acts of violence labelled 
as terrorism in Indonesia. It contributes to the undertaking of framing analysis as a 
cultural phenomenon rather than a narrow perspective on media content or a form of 
media effects. It opens the ground for future research. Framing fits within the social 
constructionist approach, such as the work of Goffman (1974), Entman (1993), and 
other associates who infer that frames contribute to the interpretation and evaluative 
definition of the social world (Van Gorp, 2007:62). 
The reason for investigating the press coverage of the arrests of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) members and the bombings in Indonesia (the 12 October 2002 Bali 
bombings; the JW Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003; the Australian Embassy bombing 
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on 9 September 2004; and the 2 October 2005 Bali bombings) is to examine the 
connections, or lack of, which the stories make with the possible causes for the 
violence and to ascertain what are the implications with religion. 
The motivation for pursuing such an enduring task was a result of my interest to 
understand media and terrorism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As a journalist 
covering events in the region and the Asian reaction to the September 11, 2001 events 
in the United States, very often I came across statements saying the Western media 
was to be blamed for the labelling of Muslims as terrorists around the world. 
Therefore, I decided to investigate how the selected mainstream publications 
represented the bombings and what type of public discourses the publications created 
from the Asian perspective.   
Some of the limitations of the study centre on the fact that the research was 
limited to print newspapers and the period of two weeks from the first day of 
coverage of the events. This has been a conscious decision because after the first few 
days of the episode the news became more interpretative or the incident slid to inside 
pages. The study does not include views of analysts, experts or dissidents published 
after the two weeks period. Another limitation is that a broad range of books was 
published in 2006 on media and terrorism, but did not enter the literature review since 
the thesis had been submitted early in 2006.  
1.3 Literature Review 
This section looks at the definitional issue on terrorism which is followed by an 
examination of the regional context and a review of the literature on the media 
framing of terrorism. An overview of the media in Southeast Asia is followed by an 
introduction to the media in Indonesia, in Malaysia and in Singapore. 
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1.3.1 Terrorism: Issues with definition 
Terrorism has been in the limelight since the events of September 11, 2001 in the 
United States. The amount of academic and journalistic work on the various aspects 
of terrorism is voluminous. One of the problems with such an intense academic and 
media interest is that still there is not a single, clear and global consensus on what is 
the definition of terrorism (Atkins, 1992; Held, 1997; Nacos, 2000; Jenkins, 2003; 
Sorel, 2003). This lack of consensus has implications for the characterization or 
labelling of acts of violence (Alali & Eke, 1991; Venkat, 2004). The definition is 
clearly important when deciding whether the perpetrators are to be labelled 
‘criminals’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘freedom fighters’ (Alali & Eke, 1991; Jenkins, 2003). 
Despite the differences in the terms used, Atkins (1992) and Held (1997) argue that 
attempts to define terrorism are oriented around two concepts: the use of violence and 
a political aim behind the terrorist act. 
     As Laqueur (1987:72) points out “disputes about a detailed, comprehensive 
definition of terrorism will continue for a long time and will not make noticeable 
contribution towards the understanding of terrorism”. In his book The Age of 
Terrorism, considered a classic on the history of terrorism, Walter Laqueur (1987) 
suggests, 
    “Terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of  
      combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets… aims to induce a state of  
       fear in the victim, that is ruthless and does not conform with humanitarian  
       rules” (p.143). 
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      By contrast, Marta Crenshaw (1995) defines terrorism as,  
  “A conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and  
 behaviour of multiple audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the 
  attention of the many”2. 
     From the murder of Julius Cesar to the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorists 
have been the cause of many atrocities. Brutus, the assassin of the Roman emperor 
Julius Cesar was seen as a hero. To many, violent resistance to authoritarian regime 
was not a crime. The history on terrorism can go back as far as the killing of Julius 
Cesar (44 B.C.), to the Zealots in Israel (100 A.D.) who fought the Roman 
occupation, to the Assassins in Iraq (1100 A.D.), who fought the Christian Crusaders 
with suicide tactics, to the Thuggees in India (1300 A.D.), who kidnapped travellers 
for sacrifice to their Goddess of Terror, Kali, to The Spanish Inquisition (1469-1600), 
which dealt with heretics, to The French Revolution (1789-1795), which under the 
name of The Terror destroyed its opponents by guillotining them. A more recent form 
of terrorism was the Macedonian insurgency (1893-1903) that fought against colonial 
rule. 
      Every period of history has brought a different meaning to terrorism and its 
definition has appeared to fluctuate according to historical and geographical contexts 
(Sinclair, 2003). Nonetheless, Rapoport (2006:4) suggests that by the 1970s the media 
had corrupted the term by often describing identical persons in the same account 
alternatively as terrorists, guerrillas, militants and soldiers. In Rapoport’s views this 
inconsistency has also plagued academic accounts. The misunderstanding intensified 




when some former terrorists became legitimate political leaders. Such were the case 
of Nelson Mandela, who received a Nobel Peace Prize (1994), for his role in 
reconciling rival factions in South Africa and Yasser Arafat who was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize (1995) after signing the Oslo Accords. 
     Therefore, due to the complexity of designation of what terrorism is and the 
existence of several definitions, terrorism is understood and discussed here in terms of 
the publications’ own representations. The question of definition should not subsist in 
an abstract construction of the concept of terrorism but in its practical application to 
the various political and social circumstances as the following chapters demonstrate. 
 
1.4 ‘Unity in diversity’ 
Southeast Asia is characterized by ethno-cultural pluralism. The countries share a 
variety of complex issues in the area of geographic position, culture, religion and 
ethnicity. Scholars writing on the region have usually begun with a ‘unity in diversity’ 
approach, which relies on a consideration of the geographic and cultural elements 
general to the area (Acharya, 2000). Among the sources of diversity are the size of the 
countries, their cultures, races, languages and development experiences. In the region 
there are no fewer than thirty-two ethno-linguistic groups, and each state contains at 
least four major ethnic communities (Yao, 2001). Other sources of Southeast Asia’s 
diversity are found in the presence of most of the world’s major belief systems, that 
is, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity. In contrast, in this wide range of 
variety, Kadir (2004) argues that ‘modernization, Islamization and globalization are 
producing new tensions within the community, creating new or changing existing 
horizontal linkages between the community organizations”(p.358). 
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In this thesis, religion is not to be understood either as a matter of individual belief 
or a cultural system, but is reflected from the news stories in the publications as 
construed between violence and religion. As Franks (2006:79) points out, “religion 
can certainly play a major role in the generation of conflict”, it can be exploited by 
the political elites; it can function as fuel for violence. Nevertheless, brief aspects of 
Islam in Indonesia are incorporated in the literature review and any link between 
violence and religion in this study is drawn from the texts.  
 
1.5 Islam 
Beyond the complexity of the heritage, Southeast Asia is the geographic area in which 
the world’s largest number of Muslims is concentrated. Over two hundred million 
Muslims live in the region (Mitsuo, 2001). In many areas Islam has become 
intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated with folk religions, 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Esposito (1987:12) defines Islam as a brotherhood of 
believers based upon a shared faith whose identity, unity and solidarity is supposed to 
transcend all other loyalties, such as family, tribe and nationality. This sense of 
association is strong among Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia. Despite the general 
brotherhood assumption, scholars such as Kadir (2004) bring new elements to the 
understanding of Islam in the region by suggesting that, “specific to Southeast Asia, 
tensions between secularism and Islam are tied to the colonial experience and 
nationalist struggles in the early 20th century” (p.358). The point Kadir makes is that 
several issues on Islam, democracy and secularism remain unsolved in various parts 
of the region. 
  9
1.5.1 Islam in Indonesia 
Indonesia is considered to be the most populous Muslim country in the world. About 
88% of its estimated population of 241,973,879 are Muslims3. However Indonesia is 
not a Muslim state and Islam has not been adopted as a basis for national 
consciousness. As Greg Barton (2005) notes, in order to start to comprehend 
Indonesia it is necessary to recognize the pattern of the country’s history, the 
functions of Islam in society and the contemporary context. Sidel (2006:41, 42) 
claims that the Dutch colonial rule left Indonesia with a pattern of class relations 
unique in Southeast Asia: a blueprint in which political class, educational background 
and achievements figure prominently and problematically. 
     Sidel (2006:37) argues that religious identity, education and access to state power 
was established during the Dutch colonial period: “the division between enclaves of 
Catholics, Protestants and Muslims resulted in separate religious school systems, 
religious political parties, and a host of religiously orientated service agencies such as 
housing development, unions, newspapers, radio stations and hospitals”.  
     Sidel’s argument supports the views of Kadir (2004:106) that since the colonial 
period there has never been one Islam in Indonesia but versions of Islam in both 
theory and political contexts. Wanandi (2002) furthers his reflection on Islam in 
Indonesia with the suggestion that throughout Indonesian history there have been 
attempts to ‘purify’ Islam. Wanandi cites that one of such attempts had been made by 
the Muhammadiya organisation, which was established in 1912 to educate and 
modernize Muslims with the purpose of confronting Dutch colonialism; for that to 
happen, Islam had to overcome the animistic beliefs, which hampered modernization 
                                                 
3 http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcindonesia.htm 
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and development (p.105). In 1962, in a reaction to those efforts, the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) was established to respond to the challenge of ‘purification’ that would put an 
end to the role of local ulama’s or scholars. NU has caught up with modern Islamic 
thinking because, as Wanandi claims, many of its followers have received overseas 
training (p.106).   
Muslim organizations supported the establishment of the Suharto’s ‘New Order’ 
regime4 and many took an active part in the destruction of the Indonesian communist 
party, the PKI (Uhlin, 1997:63-83). There are two main Muslim organizations: 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.  
Nahdlatul Ulama members base their views on Islamic tradition as handed down 
by history whereas Muhammadiyah members represent the reformist or modernist 
wing of Islam in Indonesia. The modernists believe Islam should play a greater role in 
government. Crouch (2002) argues that Indonesia has experienced an Islamic revival, 
and that this could be partly attributed to the “emergence of radical groups, which 
have been very prominent in protesting against the American intervention in 
Afghanistan” (p.2).  
     It is necessary to recognise the functions of madrassah and pesantren in order to 
properly understand the position of Islam in society in Indonesia. Sidel (2006) defines 
madrassah as modernist Islamic schools whereas pesantren are considered to be 
traditional boarding schools. Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, had established a 
network of modern schools known as madrassah, which were intended to combine 
                                                 
4 Reading suggestion: Intel Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, Ken Conboy (2004). 
Jakarta:Equinox. 
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new forms of religious instructions with a kind of Western-style schooling (Sidel, 
2006:37). 
 
     Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926, in reaction to Muhammadiyah, aimed to 
defend the long-established system of rural Islamic boarding schools. In these 
pesantren (or pondok, surau, or dayah, as they are sometimes referred to), the method 
of learning is based on the vocalization and interpretation of the Qur’an, the holy 
Muslim book. The pesantren network was not a set of educational institutions from 
which students graduated and launched themselves into the world but rather a milieu 
within they accumulated cultural, intellectual, and social capital. Sidel (2006) argues 
that the pesantren retained more distance from the modern school system than the 
madrassah (p.38). In the 1980s Abdurrahman Wahid, as chairman of the NU, opened 
up the education system of the pesantren (religious boarding schools) with the aim to 
make them equal to public schools (Wanandi, 2002). 
 
1.5.2 Islam in Malaysia 
Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious society in which Islam dominates 
politically and culturally. The dominant ethnic group is the Malays, who make up 
about 60 percent of the population. Constitutionally, a Malay is a Muslim (Hitam, 
1996; Hassan, 2001). When Malaysia became independent in 1957, ending British 
colonial rule, Islam was enshrined as the official religion. It became a critical element 
in Malay cultural identity and a potent organizing force. Hamid (2002) is of the view 
that Malay-Muslim society has been polarized between those harbouring a desire to 
‘Islamize’ the conduct and operations of the state, and the moderate Malay-Muslims 
who regard the present developments as not necessarily un-Islamic.  
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Malaysia has embarked on its ‘Islamization race’ in 1981 when then Prime 
Minister Mahathir, who was also president of the ruling party UMNO- United Malays 
National Organization, came to power. The focus was on modernity, economic 
progress and material development. Some critics argue that the Islamization quest was 
a political initiative, rooted in the effort for the control and the representation of the 
Malay Muslim majority in the country.  
However, Peletz (2005) claims the revival of Islam in Malaysia is a consequence 
of dissatisfaction with the government’s commitment to modernity.  The New 
Economic Policy (NEP) sought to eradicate poverty among all Malaysians and to 
restructure society (p.245). The reactions to the NEP took various forms including 
active and passive resistance. The dakwah movement was a call for the “Islamic 
cause”. Peletz claims it is a home-grown association but also it has been inspired by 
Islamic groups and Islamic revitalization elsewhere (p.246). PAS- Party Islam Se 
Malaysia (the Pan Malaysia Islamic party) is the political opposition party to 
counterbalance UMNO, and has been a major contender in the Malaysian politics 
since its formation in 1951. Its basic objective is the establishment of an Islamic state. 
Much of its support derives from the rural areas that are said to have been 
marginalized or largely skirted by the state sponsored development and modernity 
(Peletz, 2005:268). PAS alleges that the ruling party, UMNO, has failed to safeguard 
the interests of the Malay community, especially with regard to Islam. In parallel, 
Farish Noor (2003:201) advocates that, 
  “The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 altered 
 the political fortunes of PAS for good. Worldwide the fear of ‘Islamic 
 militancy’ was used by a number of governments to demonize Islamist 
  13
 movements and parties in their own countries, and PAS was caught in  the 
 net as well”.  
1.5.3 Islam in Singapore 
Muslims comprise 15 percent of Singapore’s four million plus multi-ethnic 
population according to an official survey in November 2000 by the Census of 
Population Office of Singapore Department of Statistics, and cited in the International 
Religious Freedom Report of 2004 by the US State Department. Virtually all ethnic 
Malays are Muslims.  
     In Kadir’s (2004) view, “Islamic society in Singapore has not only evolved 
through different phases but also become increasingly more pluralistic and complex”. 
Kadir argues that the relationship between state and society can be characterized by 
attempts at centralization of religious authority and careful administration. 
Furthermore, emerging tensions between the state and Islam may not be about the 
infringement of religious rights of a minority Muslim community or about a 
marginalized Malay community but are a consequence of the growing complexities 
within Muslim society itself (pp.369-371). 
     Kadir (2004) also suggests that, “growing religious consciousness among Muslims 
in Singapore should not lead to an erroneous assumption of homogeneity brought on 
by the global Islamic revivalism. In Singapore, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, 
religious revivalism has not produced a homogenous Islamic identity” (p.360). 
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1.6 Political Violence  
Virginia Held (1997) suggests that terrorism usually has the purpose of creating fear 
or terror among a population whereas political violence may or may not have the 
purpose of causing fear among a populace (p.189). Held advocates the definition of 
political violence as acts greatly influenced by the actors’ beliefs about what is 
politically right or wrong, and that the actors’ beliefs were formed in contexts of their 
cultural influences. Held cites as examples of political violence the World Trade 
Center bombing in New York City on February 26, 1992; the assassination of Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995; the bombing of the Federal 
building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.  
Tuman (2003:12) suggests that the distinction between political violence and 
terrorism depends on how the words political and violence themselves are defined 
and used. Tuman argues that there are no wars that do not involve political 
motivations and gain; he also argues that virtually any individual act of violence 
toward the state, or toward another individual, may be considered terrorism. In 
parallel, Rapoport (2006) observes that in the 1930s terrorism referred to state 
activities, as the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union but in the 1960s, when non-state 
groups used violence for political ends, terrorism was associated with rebels (p.16). 
In the Indonesian context Nugroho (2006:207) identifies the conflicts in Maluku, 
Aceh, Sambas and Jakarta as political violence. To put it simplistically, the conflict in 
Aceh can be said to be one that “has moved from a problem of separatism, to 
religious, to disputes between military Acehnese and non Acehnese personnel over 
military involvement in prostitution, gambling and other activities that were seen to 
conflict with local standards” (Drexler 2006:168). Since the present study is not 
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directly concerned with the various acts of violence in Indonesia but rather the press 
representation of the bombings which have been labelled as acts of terrorism after the 
events of September 11, 2001, further consideration of these definitions are deferred. 
As Farid (2006) claims that “under the Suharto regime, it was fairly easy to 
understand most cases of large scale violence as state violence, […] However, once 
the Suharto regime disappeared from the scene, the major cause of political violence, 
the violence did not abate. Having only this paradigm of state violence, many analysts 
of Indonesian politics have been caught flat-footed in trying to understand recent 
cases of mass violence that have emerged from complex social conditions” (p.269).  
     Taking the examples above, it is problematic to establish a clear distinction 
between ‘political violence’ and ‘terrorism’. Some of the scholars cited above have 
defined the violence during the Suharto regime as ‘political violence’; by contrast, 
Atwood (2003:48) describes the mass killings in Indonesia as state sponsored 
terrorism. Moreover, critics could argue that the bombing of the World Trade Center 
in New York City in February 1992 and the bombing of the Federal building in 
Oklahoma City in April 1995 were acts of terrorism rather than political violence. As 
Held (1997:192) argues, “governments apply the label that better suits their foreign 
policy whether it is an act of violence, an individual or a group of terrorists”. 
Therefore, for the purpose of clarification of my own understanding of political 
violence it is here defined as actions taken for political purposes. These actions can be 
committed by nation states against other nations, such as the United States operation 
in Iraq; nations against groups that are alleged to be a threat, such as the al-Qaeda 
network and the violence committed by armed groups such as the Christian and 
Muslim groups.  
  16
The actions by nation states against their own population, such as the mass 
killings during the Suharto regime against alleged communists, the Khmer Rouge 
regime headed by Pol Pot in Cambodia during 1975-79 or Benito Mussolini’s use  of 
chemical weapon against Ethiopians, Saddam Hussain’s action against Iraqi Kurds  
are in my understanding state sponsored terrorism.  
 I could venture to include an act of violence that does not seem to present a 
rationale to society at large as terrorism. However, that is interpretative and therefore 
contestable. Furthermore, as Tuman (2003) argues, it is probably not easy for 
someone or a small group of individuals to take up bombs and go out to kill ‘x’ 
number of persons without having strong convictions of justifications (p.10).  
However, throughout the study I will adhere to the terms terrorism and/ or 
political violence in accordance with the news stories.  I will use the term ‘acts of 
violence’ as my own words to describe or comment on the events. Violence is often 
defined in varying terms, but for the purpose of this study, it is here defined as the 
intentional act that has caused physical harm to human beings or major damage to 
property. The discussion on what constitutes political, or violence, or physical 
aggression, or harm, within the sphere of terrorism can create a sense of political 
correctness but also can obscure the understanding of violence. 
     Nonetheless, every state in Southeast Asia has experienced at some stage a 
revolutionary organization whose explicit goal was the overthrow of the prevailing 
political order (Kingsbury, 2001). Prior to the discovery of Jemaah Islamiyah (White 
Paper, MHA, 2003) as a regional terrorist network, political violence associated with 
radical groups was considered an internal domestic issue. The radicals were called 
insurgents, separatists, bandits, gangs and so forth. In Malaysia, for example, 
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members of the self-styled Malayan Races Liberation Army were officially 
designated ‘communists’ in 1952, as a result of the efforts of the British government 
in Malaya to link the ‘bandits’ with international communists. The decision to do so, 
taken during a committee meeting, stated that “on no account should the term 
‘insurgent’, which might suggest a genuine popular opposition, be used” (Carruthers, 
1996).  
Since the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, radical groups in 
Southeast Asia are seen as advocates of a pan-regional movement intent on creating 
an Islamic state in the region. Thayer (2004) argues similarly as Chalk (2005:29) that 
“although there is as yet no concrete proof verifying the existence of an entrenched 
Islamic network dedicated to the creation of a transnational Southeast Asian caliphate, 
intelligence sources, both internal and external to the region, view such a 
development as a distinct possibility”.  
Additionally, in recent years there has been concern emerging about religious-
inspired militancy by radical groups (Salleh, 1995; Tan, 2002, 2003; Chalk, 2005). 
Indonesia has had periods of violence characterized by religious motivation; some of 
the examples are the anti-witchcraft campaign in Java and inter-religious conflicts in 
Central Sulawesi and Maluku in 1998-2001.  Sidel (2006: xii) suggests that each 
phase of religious violence in Indonesia over the past ten years has been associated 
with one of more religious hierarchies. He cites the example of the 1995-97 riots in 
provincial towns. Sidel asserts that these riots were followed by calls from members 
of the All-Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI) to push for new 
claims on a bigger representation of Islam in Indonesia. Also, in 1999 armed groups 
of Christians and Muslims in Ambon in the province of Maluku engaged in sporadic 
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attacks that left more than 4,000 dead over a period of two years. At the same period 
in Poso in Central Sulawesi armed members of the Dayak and Malay communities 
engaged in confrontations in March 1999 and early 2001 (ibid:2). 
 However, any discussion of Islam and its possible connection to terrorism is 
potentially open to misinterpretation. Nevertheless, several acts of violence in the 
region have been directly linked to Jemaah Islamiyah and to Islamic militants (Chalk, 
2005; Thayer, 2005). Esposito (2003) has observed that the use of sensationalist 
headlines about Islam and events in the Muslim world hinders the public’s ability to 
distinguish between the religion and the actions of extremists. It also reinforces the 
tendency to equate all Islamic movements with terrorism.  
 
1.7 Violence in Indonesia 
Levels of violence have shaken Indonesia since the monetary crisis of 1997 and the 
fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998. However, as Colombijn and Lindblad (2002) 
argue, violence has a long history in Indonesia, dating back to the struggle for 
independence, beginning in 1945, when groups such as Darul Islam and Permesta 
were involved in the post- independence movements. 
     The editors of Roots of Violence in Indonesia, Colombijn and Lindblad claim that 
the interest shown in violence in Indonesia after 1996 by the media, academics and 
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) brought about the dissemination of news of 
violence to all corners of Indonesia and internationally. Before 1996 most Indonesians 
relied on news from the state press and could easily be left unaware of the violence in 
the country. Erman (2002) argues that violence in Indonesia goes back to the colonial 
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period and cites as examples the use of violence against criminals in the Ombilin 
coalmines at the end of the nineteenth century. Barton (2005) notes that history 
reveals that the style of struggle seen in modern day resembles that performed in the 
19th century in parts of West Sumatra and the Darul Islam rebellions. They all had a 
focus on local concerns (pp.128, 129). 
Farid (2006) observes that the local circumstances of conflicts in Indonesia should 
be studied in their wider overall context without falling into the trap of thinking of 
them as separate incidents. Farid furthers his assessment by suggesting the direct 
involvement of the military in funding and ordering civilian militias to attack other 
civilians, as in East Timor in 1999, by provoking tension and conflict between groups 
or by exacerbating conflict, such as the armed militant groups in Maluku and Ambon 
(p.271).  
Sidel (2006:4) points out that conflicts involving armed paramilitary groups in 
Indonesia started to attract attention from journalists and academics, and as 
consequence, these conflicts were engulfed in the worldwide opinion of ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ (p.4). 
     By contrast, Smith (2005) argues that the growing terrorist threat in Indonesia is 
rooted in many ways in political movements that were once suppressed under 
Suharto. On the other hand, Zachary Abuza (2005) proposes that militant Islam is 
growing in the region because of economic dispossession, the lack of political 
freedom, the failure of secular education, and an increased number of religious 
students attending madrassahs (Islamic schools) in Middle Eastern and South Asian 
countries. The various interpretations only imply that there is no single answer, for 
that reason, the contribution offered by Carl Thayer (2005) is valuable. Thayer 
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suggests that to properly understand terrorism one must understand the specific 
context in which it occurs. Thayer argues that most specialists in terrorism tend to 
focus their analyses on the regional or international dimension rather than providing a 
deeper understanding of terrorism within local context, involving local politics and 
culture (pp.92, 93).  
 
1.8 Media Framing of Terrorism  
The news framing of terrorism has an impact on how events are portrayed and made 
to be understood. Dobkin (1992) argues that the framing through news accounts tells 
the audience ‘how to understand unfolding events’, while Louw (2005) observes that 
its influence is determined by the extent to which the media is integrated in the 
political process such as adherence to ‘the official line’.  
Since the events of September 11, 2001 a large number of academic articles and 
books have been released. The literature on media and terrorism has blossomed; 
nevertheless, most discuss terrorist events elsewhere within the macro frame of the 
‘war on terror’. Works, such as ReThinking Global Security, Media, Popular Culture, 
and the ‘war on terror’ (Martin & Petro, 2006), discuss media and terrorism 
relationships under the perspective of popular culture. The authors in this edited book 
explore the ways in which our notions of fear, insecurity and danger are fostered by 
intermediary sources of information such as the television, radio, film, satellite 
imaging and the Internet. Several of the essays  are drawn from television 
programmes picturing torture such as the examples of the Abu Ghraib spectacle, the 
French television programme The Intimate Enemy (pp.218, 223), and films such as 
The Peacemaker (p.29), Saving Private Ryan (p.118), and The Battle of Algiers 
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(p217). The essays provide a further understanding of media framing of terrorism in a 
sanitized and pre-packaged style of information. 
  Thussu (2006) for example looks into media reporting of terrorism with focus on 
television news where he explores the media’s use of legitimizing narratives and 
mythologies such as the alleged Islamic terrorism, the myth of nuclear threat, the 
myth of atrocities, the myth of morality to convey information. His analysis takes the 
post Cold War period as the new epoch when a radicalized Islam has replaced 
Communism as the trans-national threat. For Thussu, as television has become one of 
the main sources for information and entertainment, the circulation of the myths 
facilitates viewers’ acceptance as ‘natural’ something which in fact is manufactured 
reality (p.4).  
Kellner’s work Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy (2005) deals with 
the political scenario in the United States, particularly “the theft of the election in 
2000 and the bias of the corporate media” (p.xviii), “the hysteria following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks” (p.x), and how “following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
the aggression and militarism of the Bush-Cheney regime was brazen on the global 
scale” (p.x). Thus, Kellner provides one more perspective on how the framing of 
terrorism can be used by personalities, actors and the media. Using value laden words 
such as ‘banditry, ‘stolen’, ‘deliberate lies’, ‘Bush-Cheney Gang’, Kellner admits to 
be partisan and sharply critical (pp.x,xii,xv) towards democracy, social justice, 
accurate information, and good journalism. The author acknowledges his effort to 
develop a critical theory of contemporary media and society and their influence on 
U.S. politics. Kellner’s work delves into the complex nuances of democracy and 
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corporate relationships in the United States and perhaps the nuances of other forms of 
government with corporate relationships elsewhere.  
Another approach to the understanding of media framing of terrorism is offered 
by Jeff Lewis (2005). He looks into the construction of the debate on terrorism from a 
language perspective, particularly accepting Foucault’s view on discourse and 
political power (p.3). Taking as examples the terrorist events in Beslan (2004), Abu 
Ghraib (2004), Iraq invasion (2003) and the Bali bombings (2002), Lewis (2005) 
attempts to elucidate the discussion about audience and public responses to mediated 
terrorism and other models of political violence. The author of Language the role of 
Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence argues that “through the 
force of a U.S. dominated global order, the networked media culture has become both 
context and weapon in the progress and articulation of violence” (p.249). In his 
assessment, Lewis, citing the example of the Bali bombings (2002), claims that 
groups such as the “Jamaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad are in many ways reacting to 
the processes of globalization and modernization” (p.168). Nevertheless, as Slocum 
(2005:3) observes, al-Qaeda is a by-product of globalization and modernity. The 
groups Jemaah Islamiyah5 and Laskar Jihad are dealt with in the following chapters.  
Reinforcing the perspective on globalization, Ben-Shaul (2006) analyses the 
television news images of conflicts in the Middle East. He discusses the ‘new world 
order’ and the ‘war on terror’ as an expansion of capitalist elites that want to maintain 
their power within the economic and political domains, and shows how mainstream 
television news has embedded the dominant ideologies of the U.S. into their coverage 
of terror (p.149).  
                                                 
5 I will adhere to the different spellings of Jemaah Islamiyah in direct quotations. 
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On the other hand, Peter van der Veer (2004) explores the responses to the attacks 
in the United States in 2001 by looking at terrorism and media from the perspective of 
the “Western Enlightenment and the Clash of Civilization”. Veer claims that the 
assaults against the World Trade Center in New York, and on the Pentagon in 
Washington, have a combination of both notions (p.1). By suggesting the inter-
connectedness of national and global issues, Veer offers a collection of articles where 
the construction of public opinion is moderated by the electronic media. With essays 
representing different perspectives, the editor of Media, War, and Terrorism 
Responses from the Middle East and Asia assembles a combination of contributors 
exploring theoretical uses of the media as an instrument of warfare.  
Smith (2005) similarly looks into terrorism under the macro frame of the ‘war on 
terror’ and the events of September 2001. However, the editor of Terrorism and 
Violence in Southeast Asia Transnational Challenges to State and Regional Stability 
takes a regional approach and argues that terrorism in Southeast Asia can be related to 
deep social and economic issues that have been evolving for decades (p.xi). The 
collection of essays deals particularly with issues of security and ideology, except for 
the contribution from Shyam Tekwani that carries an examination of the media. 
Tekwani (2005) argues that new media technologies have an impact on the spread 
of terrorism. He suggests that Internet, cellular telephones, and computers have given 
terrorist groups a new venue for instant and clandestine communication. Tekwani 
notes that modern communications and transportation technologies have enabled 
groups in Southeast Asia to connect their local grievances to the globally networked 
al-Qaeda (p.235). Similarly, Giroux (2006) investigates how fear and anxiety are 
‘marketed’ in the media spectacle of terrorism. With focus on the new media Giroux 
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discusses the ‘spectacle of terrorism’ in the aftermath of the events in September in 
the United States and the need to understand how the electronic technologies have 
been used to propagate a culture of fear, thereby merging the ‘war on terror’ and 
violence with new forms of politics (p.63). The perspectives Tekwani and Giroux 
offer are examples of what and how scholars can look into the media and terrorism 
relationships and the different frames that emerge. 
Nevertheless, the violent nature of terrorism increases the drama and therefore its 
news value, and it is easily turned into a media ‘spectacle’. As Seaton (2005: xvii, 
xix) puts it, “from a production point of view, bad news is good news… [but] news is 
not just about marketplace” it is also about social values. News can be construed with 
the intention to canonize or demonize (xxii). It is able “to inspire emotional feelings 
for different purposes” but “particularly close to the feelings that politics seeks to 
mobilize” (p.140). As Slocum (2005) puts it, “the transformation of violent action 
into terrorism typically requires an agent to explain the political, moral, or discursive 
frames through which events are understood” (p.12). 
In Covering Islam (1997), Edward Said has argued that the oil crisis of the 1970s 
and the Iranian occupation of the American embassy in Teheran in 1978 were turning 
points in the Western media’s portrayal of Islam and Muslims, leading to a less 
sympathetic interpretation of the Middle East.  
Jenkins (2003) observed, terrorism has entered the realms of popular culture with 
films produced “for spectacular violence and demoniac villains [are] loosely related 
to actual events in the news headlines” (p.150). Citing examples such as Alfred 
Hitchcock’s 1936 British production Sabotage, the 1973 European production 
directed by Costa-Gavras State of Siege, the 1997 US-Brazilian production Four Days 
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in September, The Official Story, the 1999 Indian production The Terrorist, and the 
1989 Israeli film Streets of Yesterday, Jenkins points out that “each individual society 
naturally reflects the different concerns and political interaction of the nation in 
question” (p.150).  
In sum, political concerns and social values function as agenda setting to the news 
framing of terrorism while popular culture assists with the definition of what is 
terrorism and the personification of the villains.  
The broad range of views on media and terrorism presented above shows that 
media framing of terrorism is not restricted to print media or to popular culture, or the 
new media. Different scholars have different perspectives in trying to understand the 
phenomenon. Instead of reducing the ‘spectacle’ that is terrorism into a few 
established familiar boxes of awareness one should adventure to step out of the script.   
Surely, the relationship between media and terrorism is one of the most 
controversial aspects of studies on terrorism. As White (1991:265) puts it, 
“approaches to the topic are sharply debated”. Thus, regardless of any of analytical 
positions taken about the media, intellectuals will disagree over the meanings of 
terrorism, the analysis of media-terrorism linkages and so forth  
One of the failures of the literature review is that there is very little about the 
media in Southeast Asia and terrorism in the region. Furthermore, even the literature 
on terrorism in Southeast Asia operates in a type of circle with writers frequently 
citing each other. One of the examples is the edited book by Paul Smith (2005), in 
which Carlyle Thayer cites Peter Chalk who cites Zachary Abuza and all of them cite 
Rohan Gunaratna, a well established terrorism expert based in Singapore. The writers 
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also cite newspapers articles; it is a circle that has to be acknowledged. Nonetheless, 
one could argue that there is nothing wrong with circular references. 
 
1.9 Media in Southeast Asia 
The media sector in Southeast Asia, like the media in all parts of the world, functions 
within some form of governmental, societal and economic constraints. Hatchen 
(1996) notes that even the most independent press systems must deal with varying 
degrees of regulation. The media in Southeast Asia, generically, operates under three 
broad models of control (McCargo, 2003): the first is one of direct state control, as 
practised in Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos, where the media are monopolized and 
serve as the propaganda arm of the ruling party (Dixit, 1999). The second form of 
control is the licensing of private media, which is practised in Singapore, Malaysia 
and until 1998 in Indonesia. Only licensed publications can be produced and sold, and 
publications licenses can be revoked on technical or editorial grounds. The third 
model is the ‘free-for-all press’ as seen in the Philippines and in Indonesia since the 
fall of Suharto’s6 regime in 1998. Thailand’s media fell into the third model until the 
election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. Since then, the Thai 
Journalists’ Association has noted that challenges to the media’s rights and freedoms 
began shortly after Shinawatra’s political party rose to power in 2001. 
 The system of media ownership in some countries in Southeast Asia is often 
unclear. Powerful holders of public office may themselves have shares in media 
companies, while media shareholders can be divided into two kinds: open and shadow 
shareholders. In some cases the shadow shareholders may control most or all of the 
                                                 
6 I will adhere to the different spellings of Suharto in direct quotations. 
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assets of a media organization (McCargo, 2003). Even formal share listings might not 
reveal the real owners (George, 2002). The different kinds of media ownership can 
have an impact on the role played by the media in the region and readers should be 
aware of any association a newspaper may have with specific groups. 
The concept of media freedom in the region is central to an understanding of the 
political role of the media. Censorship is practised at various levels (Chonkittavorn, 
2002) as a way to “sacrifice freedom temporarily to achieve rapid economic 
development” (Kingsbury, 2001:53). The levels of freedom experienced by print and 
broadcasting media in the nations of Southeast Asia vary from freewheeling in the 
Philippines to totalitarian in Myanmar and to something in between in Malaysia and 
Singapore. The Reporters without Borders’ annual World Press Freedom Index in the 
last five years presented the following table: 
Table 1 World Press Freedom Index – 





1.9.1 The Media in Indonesia 
Since the resignation of dictator Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia has witnessed 
improved levels of media freedom. As Weintraub (2006) notes, the fall of Suharto 
brought an expansion of private television stations, popular print media and a 
loosening of the state’s control over media content.  However, a controversial draft of 
the criminal code being prepared by the government threatens the initial flurry of 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Indonesia  57  110  117 102 103 
Malaysia  110  104  122 113 92 
Singapore  n/a  144  147 140 146 
Thailand  65  82  59 107 122 
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press freedom, with journalists having been tried as criminals and jailed for 
defamation (Amnesty International, 2003; Pacific Media Watch, 2005).  
Woodier (2006) notes that any consideration of the media environment in 
Indonesia has to take into account the military and their place in the politics and 
culture of the state. Additionally, the military continue to influence the political life of 
the country (p.48). In Woodier’s view the political and military elite are yearning to 
control communications even though it is becoming more impractical due to the 
expansion of the media industry in the country (p.55). While old big companies have 
maintained their dominance, new publications are flourishing as a result of 
government initiatives to ease the rules requiring individuals and groups to secure 
licences before printing (Heryanto & Adi, 2001). Hobart (2006) notes that following 
the fall of Suharto there was a period of remarkable enthusiasm and exploration 
across much of the mass media with the rejuvenation of the film industry, the thriving 
of the print and broadcasting industries… if only to try to keep market share and 
attract advertisers (p.395). On the other hand, Woodier (2006) suggests that while the 
competition has to a certain extent improved the quality of the media, it has also 
become more sensationalist; and that a wide spread of corruption, intimidation and 
influence on the media from regional and national political forces is taking place. 
Stanley (2006) observes that despite the surfacing of many new media outlets, from a 
journalist standpoint there has not yet been any significant progress in the situation 
freedom of the Indonesian press (p.196). 
For decades, the state had sponsored and controlled media developments as part 
of the consolidation of nation-state building. During the Suharto era, from 1965 to 
1998, Suharto made sure the press was limited in its criticisms of the New Order. 
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Stories that could inflame racial, ethnic or religious tensions were off-limits. 
McCargo’s (2003:7,42) view of the Suharto regime is that it was based on a blend of 
economic development, military influence, centralized power structure and strict 
limits on popular political participation. McCargo (2003) claims that when Suharto 
took over the country’s governance and replaced the constitutional democracy for his 
‘guided democracy’, he gradually refined mechanisms for state control of the press 
(p.78). McCargo (2003), citing Hill (1994) and Hanazaki (1996), claims that 
Indonesia used to have an outspoken press during the period of the revolution (1945-
9) and in the early years of independence from the Dutch. Possibly, the period 
McCargo refers to is when the media was dominated by well-known figures such as 
Rosihan Anwar, B. M.Diah and Mochtar Lubis7. It is defined as the period of idealism 
within the press, an era when writers such as Burhanuddin Muhammad Diah was a 
journalist and a resistance fighter. 
With the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, took 
office. The new government had plans to amend laws in the areas of social, economic, 
political and the media policies. As Angela Romano wrote, “Topics once considered 
taboo were now under public discussion” (Romano, 2000:68). The government of 
B.J.Habibie did not last long.  One year later, in October 1999, the Muslim leader and 
intellectual Abdurrahman Wahid replaced Habibie as president. One of Wahid’s first 
acts as president was to abolish the Ministry of Information, arguing that the ministry 
was the propaganda arm of the Suharto regime. Independent media watch groups 
were established around the country while groups of journalists began working 
together for the abolition of the repressive media legislation, and an amendment of the 
constitution to guarantee press freedom (Harsono, 2000).  
                                                 
7 http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/572 
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In less than two years into his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, was 
complaining that the press had engaged in a concerted campaign against him.  
Romano (2003:167), observed “Wahid, once located at the very heart of the reformasi 
[reforms] push, who most directly attempted to reverse the flow of press liberalization 
[that Habibie initiated] by trying to instigate various controls”. Gus Dur was 
impeached by the Parliament and Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced 
him in August 2001. In the view of McCargo (2003) and foreign journalists covering 
Indonesia, Megawati appeared less committed to press openness. 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was sworn into office on October 2004. 
Under his administration, the Indonesian journalist Kafil Yamin8 (2006) has argued, 
the culture of telephone call journalism is back in use; it was a mechanism employed 
under the regime of Suharto. As Yamin puts it, the budaya telepon or the culture of 
the telephone call was the first phase of control under the ‘New Order’ when a story 
could be dropped or run on the basis of a high military official giving orders over the 
telephone. Yamin implies that state influence over media is Indonesia is still prevalent 
today.  
1.9.2 The Media in Malaysia 
The role of the press in Malaysia is to contribute to national unity and nation building. 
The press is supposed to be an agent of national unity and therefore must avoid 
reporting or raising issues that would inflame racial sentiments amongst the 
population. The press is supposed to be an agent of mobilization during the launching 
of campaigns or during social intervention programs (Anuar, 2000; Massey & Arthur 
Chang, 2002). It is not uncommon for the Malaysian government to use the Internal 
                                                 
8 http://www.asiamediaforum.org/node/572 
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Security Act against journalists. As a result, editors’ and journalists’ self-censorship 
practices play an important role in curbing press freedom in Malaysia (Asian 
Communication Handbook, 2003). 
Anuar (2000) claims Malaysia has one of the longest histories of journalism in the 
region dating back to the British colonial period. After independence in 1957, radio 
and newspapers gained prominence as useful tools of national development. From the 
1970s on, the media have been designed to play a role as partner of the government in 
promoting unity and development. It was during this period that the press system 
began to take shape, with various laws and regulations being enacted, most of them, if 
not all, still prevailing. With that in view, much of the media in Malaysia are still 
under the government’s control (Nain, 2002), and political parties (Glen Lewis, 
2006). 
 
1.9.3 The Media in Singapore 
‘Developmental journalism’ is just one of many characterizations of the media 
situation in Singapore (Wong, 2004). Development journalism prescribes a theoretical 
model of state-media dynamics which is cooperative and serves the objective of 
national development (Heng, 2002; Massey & Arthur Chang, 2002). In Singapore the 
role of the press is interlaced with the goals of national agenda, such as fostering 
social cohesion and the education of Singaporeans concerning government’s 
ideology, policy and actions (Bokhorst-Heng 2002:561). George (2003) argues that 
when dealing with print and broadcast media, the Singapore authorities have been 
able to tailor their political interventions narrowly so that these actions did not 
smother their economic priorities. Media freedom has been markedly absent in 
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Singapore, says Garry Rodan (2000:219), who argues, “the government remains 
determined to use what power it has to curtail critical and investigative media 
reporting on social and political issues”. 
     The press system is maintained by tight legal controls (George, 2002). Another 
source of control is the Internal Security Act, under which journalists can be detained 
without trial (Rodan, 2002; 2003). Journalists can be fined or jailed if they breach 
laws dealing with contempt of court or contempt of parliament. The punishment is an 
effective tool of repression. The Official Secrets Act also works as a deterrent. Libel 
laws induce writers to take extreme care with any comments that could be claimed to 
hurt officials’ reputations. Lim (1996) says, “Newspapers in Singapore readily accept 
the need to work within the constraints of the law. As such, self-censorship has, over 
the years, become the norm and is exercised at various levels” (p.75). 
Despite media control, the advanced infrastructure of Singapore makes the place 
the ideal base for reporting on Southeast Asia. In 2000, Rodan calculated that 
seventy-one foreign news organizations were then based in Singapore. Many of these 
are wire services that give emphasis to business reporting and other non-sensitive 
material but avoid local social or political issues. Nevertheless, agencies such as the 
former The Asian Wall Street Journal renamed The Wall Street Journal Asia, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Time, Asiaweek and Bloomberg.com resigned themselves 
to the special conditions applied to operating in Singapore after being in dispute over, 
and penalized for, their coverage of Singapore (Rodan, 2000:220). These disputes not 
only involved the content of articles but also the Singapore government’s insistence 




1.10 Media Theory: Constructionist 
Media data can be analysed in a variety of ways. I have chosen the social 
constructionist approach. It is often concerned with the unmasking of the taken-for-
granted understanding of social reality (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002:210). As Van 
Gorp (2007:62) puts it, “Social constructionism is concerned with the creation and 
institutionalization of reality in social interaction”.  
     In the context of media studies Van Gorp suggests that the media tend to stress 
different kind of issues, for that reason, offering the public a narrow number of 
alternatives. The construction of reality in media studies emphasizes that there is no 
‘single’ reality but rather a construed interpretation of reality (Williams, 2003:11, 16). 
The constructionist approach to news framing is concerned with the processes by 
which sources come to describe or explain the world in which they live, a product of 
historical and cultural processes (Johnson-Cartee, 2005:3). The cultural process is 
here understood as the shared beliefs of a collective society.   
1.10.1 Framing 
For this study the examination involved a look into the theories of news framing 
offered by Goffman, (1974); Entman (1993); Pan and Kosicki, (1993); Reese, Gandy 
and Grant, (2001); Norris, Montague and Just, (2003), and Johnson-Cartee, (2005). In 
fact, they are all associated with Goffman’s initial work on framing of news within 
the social constructionist approach. Erving Goffman (1974) sketched the theoretical 
foundation of frame analysis as symbolic interactionism constrained by structure and 
social organization (1974:13). Frames are windows that set the parameters ‘in which 
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citizens discuss public events’ (Tuchman, 1978: iv). The role of framing is to focus 
attention and selectively emphasize situations or events, and is defined as a symbolic 
interpretative construction (Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980). Van Gorp 
(2007) suggests that frames, in a constructionist approach, refer to the different ways 
the news media can cover an issue, but also it includes the processes that takes into 
account the role of journalistic production (p.70). 
 Entman (1993:52) has defined it as: 
 “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make 
 them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
 particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
 and/or treatment recommendation”. 
Approaches to media studies have been applied with the use of news framing 
analysis (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Gilboa, 2002; Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003). People 
think in terms of narratives and that production of stories is central to the news. To fit 
events into predetermined frameworks, stories are shaped in ways that demonize and 
canonize, create semi-fictions, exploitation and dramas, but there are also more 
professionally produced stories that are good, serious (Seaton, 2005: xxi, xxii). 
 
1.10.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Within the methodological applications of frames, some researchers opt for a 
qualitative approach such as discourse analysis (e.g. Pan & Kosicki, 1993), whereas 
others apply the traditional content analysis (e.g. Tankard, 2001), or still others prefer 
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quantitative methods (e.g. Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). I have chosen Norman 
Fairclough’s (2001) approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA).  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has drawn upon a variety of theoretical and 
analytical traditions, including theorization of ideology, hegemony, as well as the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School (e.g.Foucault, 1978; Wodak, 1989, 1996; 
Wodak & Busch, 2004; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2001; Phillips & 
Jorgensen, 2002).  
      Authors of texts draw on already existing discourses or set of beliefs. One of the 
main purposes of Fairclough’s approach is to show the links between discursive 
practice (power relations) and the broader social and cultural developments and 
structures. Critical discourse analysis recognises that while texts shape, and are 
shaped by social practices. Thus ideological representations are built into frames. 
CDA therefore shows the links between discursive practices, ideologies, power 
relations and the broad social structures. 
The general principles of critical discourse analysis (CDA) are concerned with 
social problems rather than language use per se (Wodak, 1996). Edward Said’s (1978) 
analysis of the discourse of Orientalism is an example of textual analysis without 
drawing on any linguistic theory (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999:6). As noted by 
Schudson (1982) and Tuchman (2002), news texts provide a supplementary 
understanding of social and cultural contexts; the identification of specific frames of 
understanding news involving justice, nationalism and political issues, such as weak 
government. CDA as an interdisciplinary method requires, as a precondition, 
comprehensive information about prevailing social and historical settings. The 
method implies a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies 
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and power relations. Another example of critical discourse analysis without drawing 
from linguistic theory can be found in Michel Foucault’s work. Foucault (1978) sees 
the modern power not as a form of coercion from the outside but as a form of 
discipline and consent.  
The work of Norris et al. (2003), Tuman (2003) and Picard (1991) on news 
framing of terrorism was also examined in order to apprehend how the press either 
defined or interpreted the answers to the research questions. Riessman’s (1993) 
introduction to narrative analysis was taken as a preliminary understanding of the 
weaknesses and strengths of qualitative methods.  
1.11 Methods 
This thesis is a comparative study of the press coverage of cases of terrorism reported 
by the Singaporean mainstream English language newspaper The Straits Times (ST), 
the Indonesian English language daily The Jakarta Post (JP), the Malaysian English 
language newspaper New Straits Times (NST) and the Indonesian English language 
version of the weekly magazine Tempo.  
     The ST is a public listed company, with the majority of its shares held by 
companies linked to Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) (George, 2002). 
JP is considered to be the most independent and credible English language daily in 
Indonesia (Sen & Hill, 2000; McCargo, 2003); the JP belongs to a consortium of 
business groups led by the Kompas-Gramedia Group, which dominates the publishing 
industry in Indonesia. NST is closely linked to UMNO (United Malay National 
Organisation), the ruling political party in Malaysia (Nain, 2002). Tempo magazine is 
an influential weekly news magazine, founded in 1971 by the writer Goenawan 
Mohamad and considered independent. The English edition dates from 2000. The ST, 
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NST and JP were chosen because as mainstream they are considered to be quality 
newspapers read by the well educated people, whom political scientists describe as 
the ‘attentive public’ (McNair, 1998). English is the lingua franca used in Singapore, 
while in Indonesia and Malaysia English is widely used by the business and 
intellectual elites.  
Table 2 Corpus Publications  
Newspapers Magazine 
 Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Indonesia 
Title Straits Times (ST) Jakarta Post (JP) New Straits Times 
(NST) 
Tempo (Tempo) 
Variables State influence Relatively auto-
nomous 
State influence Independent 
Readership Local & Expatriates Local & Expatriates Local & Expatriates Local & Expat. 
Competition Basically none Strong Considerable Considerable 
Format Daily Daily Daily Weekly 
 
 
The use of comparative analysis methodology is seen by Phillips and Jorgensen 
(2002), as a way for the researcher to distance him/herself from the material under 
analysis. Livingstone (2003), in On the Challenges of Cross-National Comparative 
Media Research, sees positive aspects in cross-national projects where the 
identification of similarities and differences contributes to international 
understanding. Such studies also help in learning of policy initiatives, national 
stereotypes and so forth. Sreberny (2004) notes that by analyzing the media output of 
different societies, and comparing and contrasting the outputs with one another, one 
can demonstrate the relationships between society, culture and how the media has 
been defined within each socio-cultural system, either working under a process of 
repression or one of hegemony.  
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1.11.1 Analysis and Period of examination 
The study examined the terrorist attacks of the 12 October 2002 Bali bombing, the 5 
August 2003 JW Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, the 9 September 2004 Australian 
Embassy bombing in Jakarta, the 2 October 2005 Bali bombings and the two rounds 
of arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) activists in Singapore. The reason for examining 
these events was a result of my own interest as a journalist to understand the press 
performance in the reporting of those acts as explained in further details in the section 
1.2 of the thesis’ aims.  
     The object of the analysis was news stories, news analyses, editorials and op-ed 
pieces during two weeks of reportage of the events. Letters to the editors were not 
included in the study. In line with the argument put by McNair (1998), editorials are 
important because they represent a newspaper’s official position on issues. In similar 
argument put by Picard (1991), op-ed pieces and commentaries reflect the opinions of 
individual authors; however, newspapers often run op-ed pieces that are in line with 
their editorial slant, although dissenting opinions are also used to promote balance 
and discussion.  
The reason for concentrating on two weeks of coverage is because after this 
period news tends to slide off (the front page) and give space to co-related issues or 
other events. In some cases, such as the coverage of the Australian Embassy bombing, 
the number of stories devoted to this issue reduced sharply in less than one week, 
probably because of the Indonesian presidential election. Moreover, in a case of 
saturated coverage, as happened with the Bali bombings in 2002, a longer review 
period would have generated greater volume of data but would be unlikely to 
materially affect the findings. The period of analysis of the coverage of the JI arrests 
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in Singapore exceeded a period of two weeks due to the complexity of the topic. 
Contrary to the hard fact events of the bombings where two weeks provided enough 
material, I felt the need to make sense of the announcement of the arrests and the 
various issues the press associated with them. The coverage of the bombings was 
straightforward mainly because the newspapers and the magazine were reporting on 
factual events and not on politically loaded circumstances, which contrasted with the 
case of the arrests of JI members.  
The research questions were: 
RQ 1: What was the conceptualization of terrorism presented by the newspapers? 
RQ 2: Who was represented as being the terrorists?  
RQ 3: What reasons did the stories advance as the cause for the arrests and the 
motivation for the bombings? 
RQ 4: What was the connection between violence and religion presented by the 
newspapers?  
In addition, in the cases of the bombings the researcher investigated how the 
publications discussed the victims of the attacks. This subject should provide ground 
for future research on the regional media treatment of the victims. 
The two phases of the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Singapore 
initially was not planned to be part of the study. However, during the course of the 
research it became apparent that the wider investigation of the JI arrests would 
contribute to a better understanding of the press coverage in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore since the bombings were reported within the discourse of Jemaah 
Islamiyah.  
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Early drafts of the analysis of the bomb attacks were written with the newspapers 
as the units of focus, but a close reading showed that the events had lost their 
relevance to the study of press reporting on terrorism. Consequently, the material was 
rewritten to put the events themselves at the centre of the framework of the study 
rather than the newspapers.  
For each newspaper and the magazine the researcher considered it important to 
put the findings into their social context at the end of each event analysis, referred to 
as ‘Insight’. The findings are discussed in chapter seven.  
While the researcher critically reflected upon questions such as ‘what constitutes 
terrorism’, ‘who are the terrorists’, ‘what is their causal motivation’, ‘what are the 
connections between acts of violence and religion’, she has also examined the 
reliability of sources of information, specifically whether the stories had been written 
by staff or been provided by newswire services (Koo, 2005).  
The study was already in its final phase when a series of explosions rocked parts 
of the Indonesian resort island of Bali on October 1st, 2005. As a result, a brief 
chapter on the 2005 Bali bombings, described in the study as Bali 2, was added. It is 
in chapter six. The reason for including this episode was that small changes were 
observed in JP’s reporting in that the stories were more professionally produced.  
 
1.11.2 How the job was done 
The analyses involved a comprehensive examination of each story and the selection 
of those elements that answered the questions about aspects of journalistic practices in 
respect of each of the events reported. This meant reading each text a few times, 
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taking notes, registering findings and finally reporting comparatively with examples 
from the newspapers and accounts of historical contexts (Tischer, Meyer, Wodak & 
Vetter, 2000). The process was developed as follows: (a) read each article at least 
three times; (b) write down the overall message of the story; (c) answer the research 
questions; (d) compile the answers.  
In order to grasp the central frames of the stories, I have used the four points 
elaborated by Entman (1993): the problem definition, the causal interpretation of the 
issue, the moral evaluation presented in the text and the solution the text has advanced 
to the problem. For example, some of the frame packages work on moral panics to 
generate fear and anxiety, calling for more social control. Further details are provided 
in chapter seven. 
Once the entries and research questions were answered another phase took place 
with the writing of a handwritten, rough draft of each chapter, where I have combined 
observations with examples from the newspapers and of the historical context. 
Handwritten material was then developed by computer, using Word, where further 
details and observations were added or refined. This exercise proved valuable since 
the same findings repeated themselves, which demonstrated a consistency in the 
method of analysis. The consistency was tested in the press coverage of the 2005 Bali 
bombing, ‘Bali 2’, when it became clear the process of analysis was efficient and 
replicable. Apart from answering the main questions, attention was given to aspects of 
journalistic practices, such as the use of public diplomacy, media patriotism, and the 
domestication of news reporting, faceless sources of information, leaks and 
sensationalism. These are details that have to be understood in the media framing 
analytical process. 
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1.11.3 Hard copies 
Original copies of the publications were used for analysis. In cases when these were 
not available, I visited the National University of Singapore library to examine the 
microfilms. Notes on the date, title and page number of the stories were taken. With 
such information it was possible to extract the articles from Internet archives, using 
either the lexis nexus or the factiva system. Despite this being a rather laborious 
approach, it provided the researcher with further details on article placement, photos 
and captions that together attract the readers’ attention. 
The Jakarta Post was not available either on newsstands in Singapore nor in the 
National University of Singapore’s library. Editions of JP were available for a limited 
period of time at Singapore’s National Library; however, after being available for a 
set period of one month, copies of JP would be removed for recycling. Asked if I 
could purchase the discharged JP editions, I was told that it was not possible since it 
was not part of the library’s policy to sell newspapers. I visited JP’s office in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, where editions for each of the study case were examined and pages 
photocopied. Similarly, original editions of Tempo magazine were examined and 
stories photocopied, albeit at the National University of Singapore’s library. Contacts 
were established with people in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, and systems put in place 
so that the required newspapers could be delivered to me in Singapore.  
Despite my awareness that as an academic enquiry this study also requires careful 
attention to being systematic and consistent in my findings, I sometimes found it 
difficult to write about the coverage of The Straits Times. There were occasions when 
time was spent in the search for ‘the right way’ or ‘the right words’ to describe and 
explain the findings. Self-censorship was the main obstacle. This form of hindrance 
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was due to my knowledge that attempts to challenge academic studies have been 
made in the past. An example of such challenge happened to a team of economists 
from Nanyang Technological University (NTU), who had arrived at conclusions that 
did not match the expectations or official views regarding the number of jobs 
occupied by foreigners in Singapore (Chia, R.“NTU Economists: we made honest 














Chapter Two: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
The Singapore authorities disclosed in early January 2002 the arrests of a number of 
men in connection with an alleged plot to attack US and other targets in the island 
state. The arrests were revealed weeks after they took place. Again, in September 
2002, government sources revealed the arrests of another group of men. As in the 
previous case, the announcement was made weeks after the arrests.  The Singapore 
authorities defined the group of men as belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, which was 
also operating in Malaysia and Indonesia (Nathan, D. ST, 7 January 2002, p.1; 
‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, ST, 7 January 2002, p.3). 
It should be noted that the name of the group Jemaah Islamiyah9 is written 
differently in the various newspapers studied; it is also often referred to as ‘JI’, a 
practice that is also adopted here. Similarly, the names of various suspected terrorists 
are written differently in The Straits Times (ST), New Straits Times (NST), The 
Jakarta Post (JP) and Tempo, and their different spellings will be adhered to in direct 
quotations. 
2.1 Portrayal of JI before Announcements of Arrests: Straits Times 
Following the September 11 attacks in the US, the ST reflected the view of the 
Singaporean authorities in stating, “there is no group here that is linked to Osama bin 
Laden, the prime suspect in the terrorist attack on the US” (‘S’pore is free of Osama 
links, says DPM Lee’, ST, 23 September 2001). Just one month later, however, the 
government revealed that, “A Middle-East terrorist group tried to cultivate and recruit 
Singaporean Muslims into its fold” (Lim, L., ST, 15 October 2001, p.1), noting the 
                                                 
9 I will adhere to the different spelling of Jemaah Islamiyah in direct quotations. 
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“dramatic revelation that the Internal Security Department (ISD) uncovered the plot 
last year”. And in early January 2002, the ST revealed the arrest of 15 people for 
terrorism-related activities (‘American establishments here were group’s main 
targets’, ST, 7 January 2002, p.3). 
An analysis of the press coverage of the arrests in Singapore of people suspected 
of ‘terrorism activities’ provides some background for understanding the coverage of 
the bombings that have taken place in Bali and Jakarta. The official disclosures of 
arrests in Singapore were made in January and September 2002. The newspapers The 
Straits Times (ST) in Singapore, New Straits Times (NST) in Malaysia, The Jakarta 
Post (JP) in Indonesia and Tempo magazine presented different perspectives at the 
time of the arrests.  
A full chapter on the coverage of the Jemaah Islamiyah network is justified by the 
prominence given to the group in the ST’s discussion of the ‘war on terror’, and by 
the way in which the other newspapers implicated the Jemaah Islamiyah group in 
their coverage of the Bali bombings in 2002, the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003 
and the blast near the Australian embassy in 2004.  
The ST’s reporting assumed from the beginning a connection between those 
arrested and the Jemaah Islamiyah group as well as the al-Qaeda network (‘A tale 
with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 2002; Long, S., ST, 14 January 2002). The JP 
focused on addressing the general issue of whether Indonesia was ‘a hotbed for 
terrorism’; while NST linked members of the political opposition group Kumpulan 
Militant Malaysian (KMM) to Jemaah Islamiyah. Both the JP and NST alluded 
extensively to Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda in their reporting.  
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The arrests in January 2002 will be referred to as ‘first round’ and the arrests in 
September 2002 as ‘second round’. 
 
2.2 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: Straits Times  
The first round of arrests was revealed some weeks after it was carried out on 9 and 
24 December 2001 (‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, ST, 7 
January 2002, p.3). Government officials identified the suspects as radical Muslims 
belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, and several key contentions by the government were 
reported as facts: attacks had been planned in 1999; there were plans for attacks to be 
carried out in 2002; and there was a connection between members of JI and the 
Afghanistan fighters of the 1980s (‘A tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 
2002; ‘No US tip-off before ISA arrests’, ST, 19 January 2002). The ST said “the 
group had two plans” (‘A tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 2002), one to 
blow up a regular shuttle bus for US personnel and the Yishun MRT (Mass Rapid 
Transport) station, and one to blow up Sembawang Wharf and US naval vessels. The 
ST presented as obvious its statement that “September 11 was of course another 
beginning for the Jemaah Islamiyah here” (ibid). It described Jemaah Islamiyah as a 
“clandestine group” that began surveying locations in Singapore frequented by 
Americans in January 1997.  
The coverage guided the reader’s interpretation of the arrests through several 
devices. At times, essentially the same story was repeated under different headlines 
(e.g. ‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, ST, 7 January 2002, 
p.3; ‘A tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 2002; Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 
2002; ‘Three countries targeted’, ST, 11 February 2002; Pereira, D., ST, 11 February 
  47
2002) with minor structural and stylistic variations. This may partly have been the 
result of harried sub-editors scrambling on deadline to fill column space, but it also 
had the effect of reinforcing the government’s version of events and establishing it as 
incontrovertible. In fact, the official announcement of the arrests, made five days after 
the news was first officially leaked (Shin-Ian, Lee, NST, 6 January 2002, p.6), was 
presented as a fresh news story on January 12, 2002, allowing all of the details to be 
presented yet again. 
The ST used a question-and-answer style, for example, “Is this group connected 
with the Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM)?” and “Is this group connected with 
Al-Qaeda?” (‘American establishments here were group’s main targets’, ST, 7 
January 2002, p.3), which allowed it to raise theories in readers’ minds even where 
hard evidence for those theories was limited at the time. It also presented the 
discovery of the JI plot as an entertaining and suspenseful process of discovery, for 
example, “we piece together the story” (‘A tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 
January 2002); this was vivid journalism and thus calculated to win readers for the 
newspaper, but it also suggested the facts in the story had been established by 
rigorous and independent investigation, rather than merely by relying on information 
provided by the government. The format of the stories is also like a movie with a plot, 
and with good and bad guys: dramatization. 
The ST appealed to readers’ patriotism and moral judgment by stressing that the 
suspects, as Singaporeans, had benefited from services and opportunities provided by 
the government and society:  
“They went to national school, all but one were gainfully employed: 
managers, businessmen, printers, drivers, technicians and engineers. All but 
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one lived in Housing Board flats. They apparently were not zealots and did not 
come across as fanatics. They were heartlanders. They were average 
Singaporeans. They were, all in all, the most unlikely- looking suspects (‘A 
tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 2002). 
This description of the JI members as ‘the most unlikely suspects’ also allowed 
the ST to reinforce the government’s calls for “Singaporeans to report any suspicious 
activities, and be especially alert of people going around taking pictures of ‘sensitive 
places’, and while staying vigilant, Singaporeans should also stay calm” (Long, S., 
ST, 14 January 2002). The residents of Yishun suburb made headlines when they 
participated in a session to watch video footage showing possible targets near the 
train station; the video was said to have been part of preparations for an attack 
planned for 1999, but it was not clear from the story whether or not the residents were 
informed of this (ibid). 
In subsequent weeks, the arrests continued to make headlines with stories linking 
the JI group to al-Qaeda and the Afghanistan fighters, and probing the existence of 
the group in Singapore (‘A tale with many beginnings’, ST, 12 January 2002; ‘No US 
tip-off before ISA arrests’, ST, 19 January 2002). The coverage soon expanded to 
include Indonesia, as in, for example, “Is there an Al-Qaeda connection in 
Indonesia?” (Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 2002). This story presented various 
possibilities and theories, which were not always clearly distinguished from 
assumptions or facts. For example, the newspaper asserted that “recent arrests of 
Islamic extremists in Singapore and Malaysia have raised the worrying spectre of 
Indonesia becoming a regional center for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist 
network”. It quoted unnamed intelligence officers as well as a “JI official, who 
declined to be named but who wanted to be known as the third most senior member of 
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the organization in Indonesia” (ibid). Faced with these impressive-sounding sources, 
which could not, however, be checked because of their anonymity, many readers 
would by the end of the story have concluded that at a minimum, there was a high 
possibility of Indonesia becoming a centre for al-Qaeda.  
In addition, on occasion the ST did not hesitate to introduce its own judgements 
into the story: “Could this have been more than just solidarity among Muslims? 
Probably” This story (Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 2002) linked JI to other radical 
Muslim groups and figures in Indonesia, including the Mujahideen Council of 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, and the Kumpulan 
Militant Malaysian (KMM). This perspective was reinforced by another story written 
by the same writer in the same edition, ‘A potent force with network in region’ 
(Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 2002), which interwove a historical account of the 
establishment of JI as a regional group with details of its functioning, ideology and 
physical training, based on anonymous JI and other sources. It was not always clear 
whether the information attributed to JI sources was in fact obtained second-hand 
from government security services.  
In subsequent stories, terrorism experts were also quoted to reinforce the 
newspaper’s view that JI was set up by al-Qaeda to attack Western interests in the 
region and to set up an Islamic state (Rekhi, S. ST, 25 January 2002).  
The ST’s reporting included the contents of a document allegedly discovered by 
Indonesian intelligence and passed on to an ST correspondent in Jakarta about the 
operations of terrorists in Asia (Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 2002). The document, 
identified by the newspaper as ‘Operation Jihad’, had extensive details on alleged 
plans to bomb US embassies and installations in Jakarta, Singapore and Malaysia in 
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December 2002. The ST repeated the information ten days later with the emphasis on 
“Three countries targeted in attack plan.” [sic] (Pereira, D. ST, 11 February 2002). 
The ST did not explain the apparent contradiction in its assertion that intelligence 
decided to keep the document secret while giving a copy to The Straits Times 
(Pereira, D., ST, 11 February 2002). 
In subsequent weeks, the ‘Operation Jihad’ document became the source of a 
number of stories on more planned attacks in Kuala Lumpur and in Jakarta. The ST 
did not elaborate on whether it was referring to previously published plans or newly 
revealed plans, but the result was to create a perception of an extensive campaign of 
violence. This backed up ST’s warnings that “S’pore is not safe even with the arrests 
of 13 Muslim extremists” (Latif, A. & Karen Wong, ST, 18 February 2002). It is 
against this background that the main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of 
terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorist, roots of violence, and the connection 
between violence and religion. 
 
2.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
The idea of terrorism first presented by the Straits Times was related to threats against 
American targets in Singapore. But as the coverage stretched into weeks after the 
news of the arrests, it expanded to include threats against Singaporean targets and 
Western interests in the country by Islamic radicals (Long, S., ST, 14 January 2002; 





2.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The stories provided names and details of the ‘terrorists’, not only of those arrested in 
Singapore but also of those alleged to be suspected of terrorist activities in other 
countries. The suspects were linked to both Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda groups. 
In the earlier stages of coverage, the JI members “appeared to be dominated by 
foreign elements and subscribed to these elements’ extremist ideology and its [sic] 
Anti-American, and anti-West Agenda” (‘A tale with many’, ST, 12 January 2002). 
The ‘terrorists’ were also referred to as “deviant Muslims” (Latif, A. & Karen Wong, 
ST, 18 February 2002). The principle ‘innocent until proven guilty’ was not applied in 
the reporting approach. 
 
2.2.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The newspaper argued that the fall of Indonesia’s President Suharto10 had allowed al-
Qaeda-linked Islamic militants to roam free in that country (Pereira, D., ST, 20 
February 2002; ‘Jakarta reactions to SM Lee ‘puzzling’, ST, 21 February 2002; 
Asmarani, D., ST, 22 February 2002; Pereira, D., ST, 22 February 2002;). The 
newspaper blamed the Indonesian government’s inertia in dealing with militants and 
stressed Jemaah Islamiyah members’ goals of establishing an Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia. The reporting stressed that the use of violence had its origins in 
extremist ideology dating back to the war in Afghanistan. 
 
                                                 
10 The variation in the spelling of Suharto/Soeharto will be adhered to in direct quotations. 
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2.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
Officials’ statements linked the teachings in madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) 
with extremist Islamic ideology, seeing them as a breeding ground for terrorists 
(Pereira, B., ST, 10, February 2002). The connection between violence and religion 
was reflected in Singapore government policy that religious teachers had to be 
registered with an official local institution in order “to stop anyone else from abusing 
the position of religious teacher” (‘ISA detainees cooperative, coping well’, ST, 24 
January 2002).  
 
2.2.2 Insight 
What started as press coverage of the arrests developed into extensive and wide-
ranging reporting on various issues related to the discourse of global terrorism in the 
context of the ‘war on terror’. Muslim communities as well as ‘madrassahs’ (Islamic 
schools) were put in the spotlight. The Straits Times reinforced the perception that 
even if Islam as a faith was not under scrutiny, Muslims as individuals were.  
In news production there was a pattern of repeating information, either in the 
same edition of the newspaper or several days later, without making it clear to readers 
that the information had already been published (Pereira, D., ST, 20 January 2002; 
Pereira, B., ST, 10 February 2002). The newspaper also made use of a polished style 
of persuasive communication involving a variety of discourses. This type of reporting 
was not observed in the other publications studied. 
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2.3 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: Jakarta Post 
The Jakarta Post’s (JP) coverage of the first round of arrests was to a large degree 
reactive, because the news initially broke in Singapore and the Indonesian media 
faced the task of responding to the ST’s contention that terrorism had roots in 
Indonesia. The ST contended this early on, claiming JI had cells in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. (‘A tale with many’, ST, 12 January 12, 2002; Long, S., ST, 14 January 
2002; ‘No US tip-off’, ST, 19 January 2002). It stated that, 
The Indonesian government’s official position up to now is that there are no 
terrorist cells linked to Osama bin Laden in the sprawling archipelago. 
American and Indonesian intelligence think otherwise… The truth lies 
somewhere in between… There is growing evidence that the Saudi-born 
Osama and his lieutenants had [sic] worked actively in the past five years to 
cultivate radical Muslim groups in Indonesia by providing them with training 
and funds from his war chest to get them to effect his vision of Islamic 
theocracy in Asia; their efforts have boosted the military capabilities of some 
of these groups and hardened their ideological framework. (Pereira, D., ST, 20 
January 2002). 
The above scenario was followed by a story based on statements made by the top 
political leader in Singapore, who was quoted as saying, 
“The arrest of the 13 Muslim extremists in December has not made things safe 
for Singapore. It is just a setback, a disruption to the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) 
cells. Singapore continues to face danger because the masterminds are still at 
large in Indonesia, said Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew” (Latif, A. & Karen 
Wong, ST, 18 February 2002). 
It was in such a context that the JP reported on the arrest of JI members in 
Singapore and repeated information disclosed by the ST that terrorists in Indonesia 
were planning to blow up US embassies in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 
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(Tahilramani, Y., JP, 12 February 2002, p.2; Tahilmarani, Y. JP, 14 February 2002, 
p.1). The JP also reproduced stories published in the American press (‘Wolfowitz 
rules out direct U.S. attack on RI’, JP, 9 January 2002, p.1), quoting US officials as 
lumping together Indonesia with Somalia, Yemen and the Philippines as sanctuaries 
for terrorist organizations.  
The JP published both these allegations and the reactions of local Muslim 
organizations and Indonesian police officers, denying a link between Indonesians and 
the al-Qaeda network (Hari, K., JP, 29 January 2002, p.8).  
To some degree, the coverage by the JP and the ST was a public political issue 
between Singapore’s allegations and Indonesia’s rebuttal (Nurbianto, B., JP, 7 
January 2002, p.1; Tahilramani, Y., JP, 14 February 2002, p.1; Siboro, T. & 
Tahilramani, Y., JP, 15 February 2002, p.2; Emmanuelle, A. & Siboro, T., JP, 18 
February 2002, p.8). Religious leaders in Indonesia urged the government not to 
arrest people indiscriminately (Nurbianto, B., JP 7 January, 2002, p.1) while the 
police and the security authorities demanded that Singapore officials substantiate their 
allegations (‘Indonesia asks for patience in dealing with terrorism’, JP, 31 January 
2002, p.3; Tahilramani, Y., JP, 23 February 2002, p.8; Unidjaja, F.D., & Siboro, T. 
JP, 23 February 2002, p.3). However, while repeating the views of Indonesian 
government officials, politicians and religious groups, the JP did not take a decisive 
stand on whether or not there was terrorism in the country; instead suggested the 




2.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Jakarta Post 
The conceptualization of terrorism presented in the stories is one of anarchy caused 
by “a number of militant groups in Indonesia [sic] were championing an Islamic state 
for Indonesia, but thus far their numbers were small and they had not resorted to 
violence” (Nurbianto, B., JP, 7 January 2002, p.1). The term ‘anarchy’ was used in 
the stories rather than the researcher’s choice of word (ibid). 
 
2.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists  
The concept of terrorists was related to Muslim militants, Indonesian Mujahidins, 
radical groups and subsequently to individuals such as Bashir, Hambali, Iqbal and 
others. The list of names was extensive. 
 
2.3.1.2 Roots of Violence 
Possible motivations for the existence of terrorists, defined in the discourse as radical 
Muslim militants, were given as inequality, corruption and disenchantment with the 
government and society; people interviewed by the newspaper cited these factors. 
However, the JP did not deeply investigate any of these issues in its reporting. 
 
2.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion  
The stories led readers to understand that the connection between religion and 




One characteristic of the JP’s coverage was that it did not seriously question the 
sources of the ST’s allegations about the identity of members of the JI network and 
terrorist activities in Indonesia. Many of the Singaporean allegations were based on 
the ‘secret’ Indonesian intelligence document that it had obtained, but the JP was 
uncritical of the use of this document. It did not ask questions such as how is it 
possible that the ST had access to supposedly confidential information. And who or 
what was behind the release of the intelligence document to journalists from a foreign 
country? Instead, the JP largely confined itself to reporting the allegations made by 
the foreign press and the reactions by Indonesian communities. One possible 
explanation could be that in the past, journalists would send their material for 
publishing outside the country11, therefore this reflects a historical practice. 
A few aspects of Indonesians’ understanding of the situation became apparent. 
For example, it was clear from the reporting that the existence of radical groups 
operating in Indonesia was not something new. In the past, the activities of radical 
groups represented anarchy but did not represent a danger to national stability. Also in 
the past, during the Suharto era, the press was discouraged to report on inter-group 
conflicts. Given the diversity and multitude of islands and people, ‘anarchy’ is not 
only tolerated but also understood as normal in Indonesia (Nurbianto, B., JP, 7 
January 2002, p.1). However, according to the report, since there were international 
allegations about terrorist activities in the country, they should be investigated.  
The JP mainly used religious leaders and government officials as its sources of 
information; these provided somewhat conflicting and varied accounts so the JP did 
                                                 
11 Professor David T. Hill’s presentation, Asia Research Institute, NUS, January 9, 2007. 
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not present the kind of single, consistent ‘news discourse’ that the ST presented. 
Instead of coming down on one side or other of the allegations and views, the JP 
appealed to Indonesian authorities to investigate the ST’s allegations, thus leaving the 
reader with the impression that many facts remained unproven and conclusions could 
not yet be reached with confidence.  
 
2.4 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: New Straits Times 
When the NST covered the arrests in Singapore, it quickly correlated them with 
statements by Malaysian authorities that police in Malaysia “are looking for 200 
people linked to the group Kumpulan Militant Malaysian- KMM”, and “that the 
police have established the group has a close link with [sic] Jemaah Islamiyah group 
in Singapore and the al-Qaeda network” (Singh, J., NST, 25 January 2002, p.1). 
In early January 2002, the NST reported the arrests of several KMM members 
from a second wing in Malaysia and said the people arrested in Singapore were 
believed to be KMM members (Shin-Ian, Lee, NST, 6 January 2002, p.6). Citing 
Malaysian official information, the NST reported, “over the past month… 10 KMM 
members were arrested under the ISA [Internal Security Act] for militant activities” 
(Singh, J., NST, 25 January 2002, p.1). The Malaysian Internal Security Act prohibits 
the promotion of feelings of ill-will between different races in the same way it 
prohibits actions that are considered prejudicial to public order. Still reflecting official 
views, the newspaper revealed that KMM was linked to Jemaah Islamiyah and to al-
Qaeda based on the training they had received in Afghanistan and Mindanao, in the 
Philippines.  
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The NST registered the ‘discovery’ of the document ‘Operation Jihad in Asia’ by 
a Singaporean journalist, but the paper did not explore the content of the document in 
any detail. The NST, reflecting an official’s view, said that, “police have yet to receive 
concrete evidence if the report, apparently in a 15-page document uncovered by 
intelligence sources in Jakarta, was true” (‘Police on alert for terror teams working 
with Jemaah Islamiah’, NST, 13 February 2002, p.4). 
 
2.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
In the reporting of the first group of arrests in Malaysia, which involved two 
university lecturers, the NST presented the view of Malaysian authorities that “KMM 
had plans to overthrow the government through militant means” (Singh, J., NST, 25 
January 2002, p.1), adding that KMM members had received “ideological training 
from three Indonesian ulamas” (religious teachers), particularly from Abu Bakar 
Bashir and Hambali (ibid).  
 
2.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The NST’s reporting contended early on that KMM members wanted to establish an 
Islamic state, and said the group had “violent intentions” (Baharuddin, N.A., NST, 17 
February 2002, p.2). But the newspaper’s initial reporting on the arrests in Malaysia 
referred to KMM as a militant group, not as a ‘terrorist’ group. The ‘terrorist’ label 
came later, with allegations of the involvement of KMM with JI and al-Qaeda, saying 
“KMM had links with Al-Qaeda” (Singh, J., NST, 25 January 2002, p.1). In an earlier 
publication (Shi-Ian, L., NST, 5 January 2002, p.1) the story said, “13 KMM men 
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were held under the Internal Security Act because they were holding secret meetings 
to discuss the formation of an Islamic state in the region”. 
 
2.4.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The reason for the alleged terrorists’ actions was presented by the NST as a desire to 
overthrow the government in order to establish an Islamic state. This was based on 
police official’s claims that “the arrested men had made preparations to wage jihad 
[struggle] against the government to form an Islamic nation” (Shi-Ian, L., NST, 6 
January 2002, p.6). The newspaper revealed that the group’s action “came to light 
after the botched Southern Bank robbery” (ibid). This reflected a tendency among 
some police officials to lump violent crime with terrorism; after the Marriott Hotel 
bombing, for example, Malaysian police announced new patrols in residential areas to 
fight crime that could be associated with terrorist activities (Joheng, J., NST, 10 
August 2003, p.2).  
 
2.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The connection between violence and religion was assumed when the NST quoted 
Malaysian officials as describing terrorists’ ideological training. The newspaper noted 
that the people arrested had copies of training manuals that included ideology, 
motivation and the activities of groups in Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan. They 
were also trained in guerrilla warfare. In addition, the newspaper linked terrorists to 
Islamic extremism and asked for actions against the many fringes of religious schools 
which are disseminating ideas about martyrdom and salvation. 
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In its editorial ‘Curbing the deviants’, dated 17 January 2002, the NST called on 
the government to  
“Review the role of religious speakers and schools while at the same time 
Government and the religious authorities should ensure that these schools 
fulfil their objectives of providing proper religious instruction, not the 
dissemination of barmy ideas about martyrdom and salvation” (NST, 17 




The NST actually disclosed the arrests in Singapore, with relatively few details, one 
day before the Singaporean authorities made it public: “Singapore police have 
arrested between 10 and 15 men in the republic last month believed to be KMM 
members” (Shi-Ian, L., NST, 6 January 2002, p.6). In fact, the disclosure of the arrests 
by Malaysian officials may well have prompted the ST to publish Singaporean 
officials’ statements on the events. Whereas the ST presented the arrests as an event 
with major political and security significance for the region, and carried saturation 
coverage, the NST’s coverage was much smaller and less sensational. The newspaper 
did not report extensively on the ‘Operation Jihad’ document that the ST cited 
repeatedly. However, the NST did quote Malaysian officials as saying police were 
looking for KMM members linked to JI and al-Qaeda.  
Reporting on the arrests of alleged KMM members, the NST essentially treated 
them as a domestic Malaysian issue rather than a regional one. It reported but did not 
closely examine a political opposition’s claim that the arrests in Malaysia were 
designed to cause fear among the population in view of the Indera Kayangan by-
election (“Arrests an attempt to cause fear.”, NST, 6 January 2002, p.6). Despite being 
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a government influenced newspaper, the NST provided space for the opposition to 
express its views. The approach suggested that the NST was determined to retain 
some space for dissenting voices in its pages. 
 
2.5 Coverage of First Round of Arrests: Tempo 
The weekly magazine Tempo’s initial coverage of the arrests in Singapore largely 
portrayed them as a domestic Singaporean matter. Its coverage intensified when the 
ST reported on the ‘Operation Jihad’ document. Tempo discussed whether the 
intelligence community in Southeast Asia was cooperating in the hunt for terrorist 
suspects, or whether the document was merely part of US propaganda (‘Al- Qaeda 
Angels?’ Tempo, 19-25 February 2002). The magazine said that Indonesian 
authorities doubted the existence of JI, and published a story about Hambali in 
response to an article by the Los Angeles Times quoting Malaysian and Philippines 
officials’ claims that Hambali had links with JI and al-Qaeda. 
Tempo’s story ‘Multiple charges against Hambali’ was a profile based on an 
‘inquiry’. The story said, “as a child, Encep – as Hambali used to be called – was 
known as a taciturn and obedient boy”, and that “prayer groups in his village 
described him as a very vocal figure. However, outside his community he turned 
introvert and rarely talked”. Tempo described Hambali as the second child of a family 
with 12 children, someone who  
“was slightly open only to his father. His activities while in Indonesia were 
obscure. Indonesia has linked him with the church explosions in Bandung and 
Jakarta. America charges him with involvement in the plan to bomb 12 aircraft 
in 1995 and the WTC tragedy. Singapore associates him with the US embassy 
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bomb plot that involved Jemaah Islamiyah. Malaysia will blame him for 
masterminding acts of violence committed by Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia 
(KMM)” (Tempo, 19-25 February 2002, p.23). 
 
2.5.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo 
The magazine did not offer any clear conceptualization of terrorism, but reported the 
claims made by other institutions about a radical movement planning to attack US 
interests in three countries, and international allegations about the existence of an 
underground movement called JI, which was involved with Islamic radicalism. 
 
2.5.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The identification of terrorists was based on names claimed by The Straits Times such 
as Hambali, Abu Bakar Bashir, Al Ghozi, Bafani, Halim, Fathur Rahman and so 
forth. Terrorists were described as members of ‘a radical Muslim network’, as 
‘alleged members of JI’, ‘arms smugglers’, ‘suspects’, ‘alleged terrorists’, ‘Islamic 
activists’, and as members of ‘KMM, a radical organization’.  
 
2.5.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The motivation for violence ascribed to the alleged terrorists was based on allegations 
by international sources that the suspects wanted to harm US interests and set up an 
Islamic state.  
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2.5.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
Tempo made the connection between religion and violence by describing the militant 
groups as hard-line organizations with Islamic ideology. 
 
2.5.2 Insight 
The magazine questioned the existence of the ‘Operation Jihad’ document obtained 
by the ST.  In its reporting the magazine reported on the document in an ironic tone 
saying,  
“The finding of this document is like a much needed thread linking Indonesia 
and the international terrorist movement. But to some, it all seems just too 
good a piece of luck. For the United States and its allies, that is. After all, the 
US has been pressing the countries of Southeast Asia to join in the fight 
against terrorism after [sic] the attacks of September 11 last year, when the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were hit by 
aircraft hijacked by terrorists” (Tempo, 25 February 2002, p.4). 
Nevertheless, the magazine published in-depth background stories on the various 
suspects, including Al Ghozi, Hambali and Fathur (‘Al Qaeda, made in Madiun?’ 4 
February 2002, p.16). 
Tempo noted the claim made by the ST that the document had been obtained some 
time previously, and that the ST’s journalist who broke the story, Derwin Pereira, had 
claimed to have checked and rechecked the document’s veracity. The magazine then 
emphasized the views of Indonesian officials, who doubted the authenticity of the 
document. Tempo also reported the arrests in Malaysia of 22 people suspected of 
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terrorist activities (Tempo, 4 February 2002, pp.16-18). No particular style of news 
production was noticed. 
2.6 Second Round of Arrests 
In September the authorities in Singapore revealed the arrest of 21 people on 
suspicion of having links to international terrorism (‘Another 21 arrested here over 
terrorism plans’ ST, 17 September 2002, p.1).  This was the second government 
announcement of arrests in less than nine months. For the purpose of the analysis this 
will be referred to as the second round of arrests. 
Since when the first round of arrests was revealed in January and the second 
round in September 2002 the governments and media in Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia intensively discussed Jemaah Islamiyah. However, this period, from March 
to middle September when the government revealed the second round of arrests, is 
not included in the analysis. 
 
2.7 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: Straits Times 
On 17 September 2002, the ST ran a front-page story headlined ‘Another 21 arrested 
here over terrorism plans’. It stated that the Singaporeans arrested “last month” were 
connected with terrorism, in association with the JI plot to blow up several targets in 
Singapore. The story claimed that several of the men arrested were trained in 
“terrorist camps in Afghanistan and in the Philippines”. The story linked the latter 
arrests to the arrests carried out in December 2001 (but only made public in January 
2002), and to a story published by Time magazine about a confession made by an al-
Qaeda associate (Omar al-Faruq) to American intelligence agencies after he was 
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handed over to the United States by Indonesian authorities (Pereira, B. & Go, R., ST, 
17 September 2002, p. H1; Ratnesar, R., Time magazine, 23 September 2002).  
 
2.7.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
What started as a plot against American, Western and Singaporean targets had 
evolved in the ST’s coverage to an issue of national and international security, since 
there was an alleged intention by the terrorists to create inter-ethnic friction between 
Malaysia and Singapore, and to overthrow the government of Malaysia with the 
ultimate goal of creating an Islamic caliphate (‘JI plan to disrupt relations ‘naïve’, ST, 
21 September 2002, p. H7; Teo, L. & Chia, S., ST, 25 September 2002, p. H4; 
Zaobao, L., ST, 30 September 2002, p.14). 
 
2.7.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
Following the official Singaporean line, the ST furnished readers with a large amount 
of information on the terrorist suspects, from their names and details of their family 
background to their military service and other forms of training. According to the 
newspaper, all suspects were members of JI and al-Qaeda. The main focus of the 
coverage was on the cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, alleged by Singapore and the US media 
to be the ‘spiritual leader of JI’, and on Hambali, claimed by the media to be the 
supervisor of JI activities in Southeast Asia and the link between the regional group 
and the al-Qaeda network.  
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2.7.1.2 Roots of Violence  
The clearest account of the suspects’ alleged motivation was produced in an editorial 
(‘Terror Threat’, ST, 21 September 2002, p.30), which said the aims of the group 
were to incite religious-ethnic conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, to blow up 
targets in both countries, to overthrow Malaysian government and to establish an 
Islamic caliphate.  
 
2.7.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The ST made the connection between violence and religion through commentaries, 
opinionated pieces and reporting of official statements. The ST also reported 
extensively on the creation in Singapore of a code of good behaviour for religious 
teachers, and the need for them to be registered with the Islamic Religious Council of 
Singapore (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), referred to hereafter by its Malay 
acronym ‘MUIS’. The paper also called for reforms in the teaching of Islam in the 
madrassahs (Islamic religious schools). Experts on terrorism were also quoted as 
linking the arrests to other broad issues, such as radicalism in Islam and politics in 
Islam (‘Friday sermons stress Islam rejection of violence’, ST, 21 September 2002, p. 




In reporting the arrests, the ST linked them to information disclosed by Time 
magazine, which claimed that Jemaah Islamiyah planned a string of “terror plots 
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…including a failed assassination attempt against Indonesia President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri” (‘Another 21 arrested here over terrorism plans’, ST, 17 September 
2002, p.1). The information extracted from the magazine and repacked into news 
stories was presented as ‘timely’, even though it appeared that some of the 
information was out of date. For example, the information on the alleged plan to kill 
Megawati was inserted in the third last paragraph of the story. It said that, “He [Omar 
al- Faruq] is also said [sic] to have confessed to involvement in a string of terror plots 
over [sic] three years, including a failed assassination attempt against Indonesian 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri”. Paragraphs and pieces of information from the 
article in the magazine became topics for entire stories in the ST; for example, the line 
from Time magazine “Abu Bakar Baashyir [sic] authorized Omar to use JI operatives 
and resources to conduct the planned bombings of the embassies” (ibid), became a 
headline in the newspaper (Rekhi, S. & Go, R. ST, 18 September 2002, p. H5.).The 
scope of the alleged plots reported in this second round of arrests was broader in 
comparison to the first round.  
A pattern of claiming, explaining and providing solutions was present in the ST’s 
general news stories, as well as in its op-ed pieces and editorials. The newspaper 
extensively explored the context of Jemaah Islamiyah’s ideology, existence and 
regional agenda.  
To illustrate the danger the group represented, the newspaper referred to a terrorist 
act several decades ago, noting that, “a water mains was bombed at St Francis Road 
by Indonesian militants during Konfrontasi in March 1965…when Indonesia carried 
out hostilities against Malaysia and Singapore” (‘Water system secure’, ST, 22 
September 2002, p.34).  
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To a large degree, the ST presented the people arrested not as suspects but as 
confirmed terrorists. For example, in an illustration headlined ‘The JI’s Ground 
Troops – A look at the Profile of the 21 arrested last month’ (ST, 22 September 2002, 
p.3), it was published the information on the racial composition of those arrested, 
their education, national service records and illegal military training. In other words, 
before a criminal trial was held, the suspects were presumed guilty of the alleged 
crimes. Another article asked questions such as “why did they turn to terrorism”, and 
then suggested answers, such as “was it their socio-economic status? …more likely, 
the cause was their charismatic religious teacher Ibrahim Maidin, 51, and the way he 
taught Islamic precepts”. The ST went further, implicating the Muslim community as 
a whole by stating: “since the arrests came to light – first in January and then again 
just last month – the Muslim community has been engaged in some soul-searching” 
(Teo, L., & Chia, S., ST, 25 September 2002, p. H4). 
At the same time, the ST published several stories repeating official 
recommendations on how Singaporeans should react to the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist 
plots, such as condemning extremist elements. It said, “Muslims should not be 
defensive and non-Muslim should not be prejudiced by the actions of a few, whom 
even the Malay/Muslim community reject” (Maine, W.S., & Osman, A., ST, 22 
September 2002, p.3; ‘Don’t let actions of a few destroy the social fabric’, ST, 22 
September 2002, p.34). The stories reflected the official initiative to create a code of 
practice governing how different faiths should interact (‘Unions act to allay fears of 
anti-Muslim bias’, ST, 26 September 2002, p.4). Interviews supporting this initiative 
were conducted with representatives of the Hokkien Huay Kuan (Hokkien clan 
association), the National Council of Churches of Singapore and the Islamic 
Fellowship Association (‘We’ve been through this before’, ST, 21 September 2002, p. 
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H5.). Stories quoted Chinese community leaders as saying that JI’s attempt to stir up 
racial tension was also a tactic used by Chinese communists in the past. 
The ST used official speeches and statements, experts’ views and analyses and 
religious and community leaders’ opinions to sustain the perspective that the group of 
men arrested was dangerous, but that Muslims in Singapore should nevertheless not 
feel uncomfortable. The ST also engaged in conducting international relations by 
identifying the presence of threats in other countries, and urging foreign governments, 
e.g., Indonesia, to make decisions. The ST claimed that terrorism had spread to 
Thailand and Aceh in Indonesia. 
The ST presented its news in a polished communications style. It presented a 
discourse on international affairs, practising diplomacy; a discourse on religion by 
linking the arrests to the teaching of Islam; a discourse on changing social behaviour 
by introducing policy on the interaction of faiths; a discourse on ethnicity, and a 
discourse on national security. Thus, while addressing a domestic audience, the 
newspaper sought some kind of influence on regional affairs. 
 
2.8 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: Jakarta Post 
The announcement of the second round of arrests in Singapore had an impact in 
Indonesia, where authorities started to address the concerns of the international 
community that terrorists were active in the country. The authorities stepped up a 
campaign against the alleged presence of an al-Qaeda network in the country despite 
continued official denials of its existence (Unidjaja, F., JP, 19 September 2002, p.1).  
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The Jakarta Post devoted considerable space to stories about the war on terrorism 
and on the Western leaders’ attitudes towards Muslims (Nafik, M., JP, 16 September 
2002, p.3). Two events were addressed in this context. Firstly, a man named Omar al 
Faruq was arrested in June and deported by Indonesia to the US; he was presented to 
the press as a mid-level operative of the al-Qaeda terrorist network (Muninggar S. 
Saraswati, M.S. & Tiarma Siboro, JP, 20 September 2002, p.2). The second event 
was the publication by the JP of a CIA document on the existence of al-Qaeda 
‘operatives’ in Indonesia, including a plot to assassinate Megawati Sukarnoputri 
(Muninggar S. Saraswati, M.S. & Tiarma Siboro, JP, 21 September 2002, p.1). The 
‘leaked’ CIA document, containing a confession by Omar al Faruq to American 
intelligence officers, was widely published by the Indonesian media, which referred 
to an article published in Time magazine (Ratnesar, 23 September 2002). 
The JP noted that Indonesian security officers had arrested and deported Faruq 
without interrogation. It did not sensationalise the information; however, the JP made 
it clear that Omar al Faruq was not the only suspected terrorist whisked secretly out of 
the country, mentioning ‘“another al-Qaeda suspect, Muhammad Iqbal Saad Madni, 
24, was deported [sic] to Egypt on board a Gulfstream V flight, only two days after he 
was arrested on Nov. 9, 2001 by immigration officials at his residence in Matraman, 
Central Jakarta” (Muninggar S. Saraswati, & Tiarma Siboro, JP, 21 September 2002, 
p.1).  
The JP started to warm up towards the issue by stressing that Indonesian 
politicians and organizations should be working together on how best to deal with the 
threat of terrorism. In its editorial, ‘The threat of terrorism’, it said, 
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   “Indonesia has to come up with a firm plan on how it will handle the threat. 
As an emerging democracy, it will have to deal with the issue without 
trampling on the rights of those suspects to be part of the international terrorist 
group” [sic] (JP, 23 September 2002, p.6). 
In a change from its previous emphasis on the issues of Islam in Indonesia, the 
growth of radicalism in the country and the threat represented by radical groups, the 
JP called for a legal framework to combat terrorism, “specially since intelligence 
sources hinted that there was enough evidence to support reports of the presence of an 
al-Qaeda’s terrorist network here” (Siboro, T., & Wijaksana, D., JP, 26 September 
2002, p.1). From this article in addition to the editorial, ‘The threat of terrorism’ (JP, 
23 September 2002, p.6), JP showed it was beginning to take an international frame 
of reference in reporting on the arrests of the alleged terrorists and to put pressure on 
the Indonesian government to tackle terrorism.  
In this round of the JP’s reporting on JI, there was no new conceptualization of 
terrorism, the images of terrorists, the roots of violence or the connection between 
religion and violence, outside the repetition of allegations made by the Straits Times 
and Time magazine. 
 
2.9 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: New Straits Times 
The second round of arrests in Singapore was reported by the NST but not presented 
as a major event. Nevertheless, the NST quoted then Prime Minister Mahathir as 
saying, “if such elements were positively identified then they should be arrested as 
militants could not be allowed to undermine democracy” (‘We’ll act against terrorists, 
says PM’, NST, 18 September 2002, p.2). This statement equated militants with 
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terrorists and described them as a threat to ‘democracy’. The newspaper did not 
discuss what type of democracy the prime minister was talking about. In reporting on 
the perceived terrorist threat, the NST went on to tackle other issues, such as robbery 
and the need for police surveillance in some housing areas (Johen, J., NST, 28 
September 2002, p.1; ‘63 with links to KMM arrested’, NST, 28 September 2002, 
p.4). 
 
2.9.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
The NST reflected the official view that “terrorism creates discord between the people 
of various races and religious beliefs in Malaysia and in Singapore; it creates chaos, 
anarchy” (‘DPM: No benefit in creating discord’ NST, 24 September 2002, p.3). 
Terrorism was also reported as a threat to democracy (‘We’ll act against terrorists, 
says PM’, NST, 18 September 2002, p.2).  
 
2.9.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The NST reported on terrorists based on information disclosed by the police, such as 
the names, profession and age of those arrested. The officials described the members 
of KMM as belonging to the JI network, and then also as belonging to the JI group 
based in Singapore (‘Strengthening co-operation on security issues’, NST, 24 
September 2002, p.4).  
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2.9.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The NST repeated official allegations that KMM members wanted to undermine 
democracy, to overthrow the government and establish a pan-Islamic state. 
 
2.9.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The connection between violence and religion was reported as a radical Islamic 




The NST’s reporting of the second round of arrests developed from a focus on the 
threat to democracy to include ethnic and religious arguments; it therefore covered a 
broader range of issues in comparison to the coverage of the first round of arrests in 
January. In the reporting of the first round of arrests, the JI members in Singapore 
were said to be KMM affiliates. In the second round of arrests, the suspected terrorists 
were firmly linked to KMM: “A leader of the Johor Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, 
who is also believed to have links with Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore, was detained 
in Kelantan today” (Joheng, J., NST, 28 September 2002, p.1). In addition, the 
reporting stated that the Singapore-based JI desired to establish a pan-Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia (‘Strengthening co-operation’, NST, 24 September 2002, p.4). 
In their reporting of the first round of arrests, the ST and the JP did not claim that 
there was a JI-KMM connection. Instead, the connection had been made by 
Malaysian authorities (‘DPA seeks early briefing on al-Qaeda from Norian’, NST, 12 
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January 2002, p.2; ‘Link among militant groups, says PM’, NST, 13 January 2002, 
p.4; Singh, J. NST, 25, 2002, p.1). The NST’s reporting also implicated the Indonesian 
Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir as the leader of “a wing within KMM that had 
violent intentions” (‘63 with links to KMM arrested’, NST, 28 September 2002, p.4). 
The newspaper said, “the existence of KMM came to light on May 18 last year after 
the group was involved in a botched Southern Bank robbery in Jalan Gasing, Petaling 
Jaya, when the bank’s security guard shot three armed robbers, killing two” (Joheng, 
J., NST, 28 September 2002, p.1). This was the same allegation the newspaper had 
printed when it quoted claims made by the police in January (Shi-Ian, L., NST, 6 
January 2002, p.6). It appeared that as in the case of the JP, the NST had begun 
framing the issue of the KMM in terms of a discourse of international terrorism.  
The NST reported on Singapore’s initiative to establish a code of interaction 
between religious communities but did not explore this in depth (‘Singapore’s code of 
interaction for religious harmony’, NST, 29 September 2002, p.4). 
The NST did not resort to a glossy style of reportage or the use of any particular 
news framing technique, except for the fact that KMM was initially cited as a militant 
group and then described as part of al-Qaeda. The KMM’s objective was initially said 
to be subversion, which then evolved into the creation of an Islamic state according to 
the paper’s reporting. In the first round of arrests, the NST gave space to the political 
opposition to express its view of the arrests; however, the newspaper did not report 
any dissenting voices in the second round. Little background information on suspects 
was provided except for name, profession and age. The connection between JI and al-
Qaeda was simply asserted by officials and reproduced by the newspaper, having 
been taken at face value.  
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2.10 Coverage of Second Round of Arrests: Tempo 
Tempo did not pay much attention to the second round of arrests in Singapore. 
Instead, it focused on stories on Hambali, Al Ghozi and Abu Bakar Bashir, all 
accused by foreign governments of inciting terror in the region (‘Al Qaeda targer?’, 
Tempo, 24-30 September 2002, pp.11-35).  
Tempo referred to “an American intelligence report linked to Time magazine” 
(Ratnesar, 23 September 2002) about two failed attempts to kill Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. The Time’s report centred on a confession allegedly made by Omar al 
Faruq, who had been arrested in Indonesia and whisked out of the country. Tempo 
published the reactions from representatives in Indonesian society, questioning why 
Indonesian intelligence handed al-Faruq over to another country without interrogating 
him first, and why Indonesian intelligence did not follow the case up with American 
intelligence.  
Tempo published an interview with Abu Bakar Bashir regarding international 
pressure on Indonesia and allegations of his involvement with terrorism, as reported 
by Time. It wrote that the problem started in May 2002 with a three-day visit by an 
American journalist to Bashir’s boarding school (‘Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: I don’t know 
Omar Al-Faruq’, Tempo, 30 September 2002, pp.33-35). In its coverage Tempo 
repeatedly asked for evidence, not only concerning the allegations made by foreign 




2.10.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo 
The conceptualization of terrorism in Tempo’s reporting was one of an Islamic 
terrorist movement, but it also published Time’s conceptualization of terrorism as an 
‘ideology from Abu Bakar Bashir’. 
 
2.10.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The images of terrorists reproduced by Tempo were based on names put forward by 
foreign sources; Tempo described terrorists as members of militant Islamic groups, 
radical circles and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MIFL), a militant group based 
in the Philippines. 
 
2.10.1.2 Roots of Violence  
Tempo repeated the view that the motivation for violence was to build a community 
based on Islamic Sharyah [Islamic law], and the refusal of the Bashir boarding school 
to accept Pancasila’s dogma of monotheism, in addition to the alleged intention to 
create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s Pancasila democracy principles 
are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarism; nationalism expressed in the unity of 
Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice.  The people’s interests should 
comes first and not group or private interests (Elson, 2002).  
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2.10.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
Tempo presented its coverage within the context of historical accounts of militant 
Muslim groups being used by intelligence agencies, and the campaign that took place 




Tempo’s reporting of the second round of arrests reflected the allegations published 
by Time magazine, based on the CIA document; this was in contrast to the first round, 
when Tempo questioned the validity of the ‘Operation Jihad’ document produced by 
the ST.  
Tempo also reported that the arrests in Malaysia and Singapore were carried out 
under each country’s Internal Security Act (ISA). It reported on the lack of evidence 
against the suspects arrested, on suspicions about the degree of US involvement in the 
operation, and on the attractive military and financial aid package that had been 
offered by the United States to countries in the region to join the fight on terrorism. 
Tempo reported on the radical Islamic movement Darul Islam12, which was started 
in 1940, and the histories of Abu Bakar Bashir and other Indonesians accused of 
terrorist activities. Tempo repeated Indonesian officials’ views that while there was no 
proof of Abu Bakar Bashir’s involvement in terrorism, there would be no arrests 
(‘Lifting the veil’, Tempo, 24-30 September 2002, p.16), but it reported the claim that 
Islamic boarding schools in Solo were a “nest of terrorists, says Uncle Sam” and that 
                                                 
12 See Intel Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, Ken Conboy, 2004. Jakarta: Equinox. 
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they were training centres for terrorists. Tempo asked for evidence, and also asked for 
Indonesian authorities to explain to the public the operation involving the arrest and 
transfer of al- Faruq to another country. To a certain extent Tempo reflected concerns 
with human rights and the right of the Indonesian public to be fully informed. 
 
2.11 Comparative Analysis 
The two rounds of arrests in Singapore were reported within a different context by 
each of the publications analysed. The Straits Times reported on the first round of 
arrests within the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ launched by the United States 
following the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. In the second round of 
arrests the news was framed within a string of plots against targets in the region. The 
ST’s coverage was based on extracts from Time magazine’s reportage. The ST’s 
reporting on the arrests was politicized, apparently in order to create a state of mind 
within the discourse of international terrorism and the ‘war on terror’. The ST was the 
only medium to make extensive use of sophisticated styles of reporting.  
There was a change of perspective in the JP’s reporting of the second round of 
arrests. The newspaper started framing the issue of JI within an international 
perspective by stating that the Indonesian government, politicians and organizations 
should work together to deal with the threats of terrorism. In the first round of arrests, 
the JP merely reproduced the views and opinions of politicians and government 
representatives while in its editorial ‘The threat of terrorism’, (JP, 23 September 
2002, p.6) it had appealed to Indonesian authorities to investigate the allegations 
made by the ST. The change may have been due to difficulties in maintaining an 
independent view on such a complex issue, or it could have been a response to 
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readership concerns since most of its readers are foreigners, English-educated 
business leaders, political opinion leaders (Sen & Hill, 2000); there has been one 
argument, however, that the newspaper ‘can now boost that 45% of its readers are 
locals’, as it has been pointed out13.  
The NST’s reporting linked the Singapore arrests to other arrests carried out at the 
same time in Malaysia, namely of members of the Kumpulan Militant Malaysian 
(KMM). Initially, the KMM was described as an opposition group with a subversive 
agenda, but in the second round of arrests, the NST reported on KMM’s goal as over-
throwing the government and stirring up racial friction in order to set up a pan-Islamic 
state. The NST framed KMM within the discourses on Jemaah Islamiyah and al-
Qaeda. The NST neglected to produce background information on the existence and 
purpose of KMM, but equated first the whole group and later a ‘wing’ of the group 
with terrorists with ‘violent intentions’. The NST reporting focused on a domestic 
Malaysian audience. 
To a certain extent, Tempo was able to maintain an independent perspective by 
stating its doubts about the existence of the ST’s ‘Operation Jihad’ intelligence 
document, and by asking whether the US might be involved in the arrests since the 
American administration was actively trying to persuade Southeast Asian states to 




                                                 
13 http://www.thejakartapost.com/adspecial/medkit06/readprof.html 
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Chapter Three: The 2002 Bali Bombings 
Explosions ripped through two popular nightclubs in Kuta on the Indonesian resort 
island of Bali in October 12, 2002. The bombings killed 202 people and injured more 
than 300. 
The 2002 Bali bombings (referred to as such here since there was another 
bombing attack in 2005) provided Indonesian authorities with the evidence that 
terrorism cells were active in the country. Jakarta could not continue denying claims 
by several countries, among them Singapore and Malaysia, that terrorists were active 
in Indonesia. The blasts were the worst terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Foreign tourists 
were the main victims, but Indonesia also had its share of victims – more than one 
hundred of the dead were locals, though they hardly made it into the headlines. 
In order to understand the coverage of the bombings by the Straits Times (ST), it 
is necessary to read the newspaper’s coverage of the previous arrests in Singapore of 
groups of men allegedly involved in terrorism-related activities. The ST’s portrayal of 
the Bali attacks and other bombings in Indonesia is in line with its portrayal of the 
Jemaah Islamiyah network linked to al-Qaeda. 
 
3.1 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: Straits Times 
The ST politicized the Bali bombings and its coverage demonstrated a strong reaction, 
as if the attacks had affected Singapore’s interests. In the pages of the ST, the 
newspaper and Singapore officials demonstrated a distinctive way of ‘speaking’ to 
Indonesia, using headlines that delivered messages and editorials that demanded 
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actions. It is against this background that the four main subcategories of 
‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the 
connection between violence and violence, and the victims. 
 
3.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
The ST’s conceptualization of terrorism focused on the security threat and the danger 
to religious harmony and foreign investors in Singapore’s economy (Choong, W., ST, 
15 October 2002, p.6; Jansen, P., ST, 18 October 2002, p. A4; Pereira, B., ST, 20 
October 2002, p.32; ‘Tightened security in S-E Asia’, ST, 21 October 2002, p. A1; 
Nirmala, M., ST, 21 October 2002, p. H2; Lee, J., ST, 21 October 2002, p. H2; 
Pereira, B., ST, 21 October 2002, p. A2; ‘Bashir may be arrested but ‘Hambali still 
directing JI ops’, ST, 23 October 2002, p.A6; Simon, M., ST, 26 October 2002, p.H17; 
Asmarani, D., ST, 28 October  2002, p.A6).  
 
3.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The ST published an extensive list of names of alleged terrorist suspects. At the top of 
the list were the names of the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir along with Hambali; 
the latter was reported to be the connection between the Jemaah Islamiyah network 
and al-Qaeda. The newspaper reported extensively on both. There was a variety of 
op-ed and commentary pieces depicting terrorism and describing the ‘evil’ in both 
men. Terrorists in general were portrayed through a string of labels such as 
‘anarchists’, ‘Muslim radicals’, ‘Islamists’, ‘hardline Muslims’ and ‘Muslim 
extremists’. Government officials, experts and journalists all used such labels. (‘Bali 
loses innocence’, ST, 14 October 2002, p.12; Go, R. ST, 14 October 2002, p.12; 
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Rekhi, S., ST, 14 October 2002, p.7; ‘PM condemns ‘dastardly acts’ at S’pore’s 
doorstep’, ST, 15 October 2002, p.1; Chew, L.K., ST, 15 October 2002, p.12; 
Gunaratna, R., ST, 15 October 2002, p.7).  
 
3.1.1.2 Roots of Violence  
There was no single, established reason for the bombing but various possible causes. 
The ST reported on security agencies’ rivalries in Indonesia; Indonesia’s weak 
intelligence system (‘Security of nation under threat’, ST, 14 October 2002, p.6; ‘Bali 
loses innocence’, ST, 14 October 2002, p.12); poor public security precautions; the 
theory that the blast was due to Australia’s support of ‘the war on terror’ (Rekhi, S., 
ST, 15 October 2002, p.7); and Indonesia’s failure to heed international warnings (Go, 
R., ST, 17 October 2002, p.1; Pereira, B., ST, 17 October 2002, p. A5; Quek, A., ST, 
23 October  2002, p.1). However, the ST singled out the anniversary of the attack on 
the US warship Cole in Yemen in 2000 (Go, R., ST, 14 October 2002, p.1). The Cole 
was attacked during a refuelling stop by two Yemeni who piloted a boat filled with 
about 500 pounds of explosives. 
 
3.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The ST’s stories reported on the bombings as related to religion. It noted that the 
bombers were Muslims, and its stories covered a broad range of aspects of radical 
Islam, including the boarding schools associated with cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and 
described as a breeding ground for terrorists. The newspaper also published stories 
portraying aspects of racial intolerance, stressing the need to eliminate discrimination 
(En-Lai, Y., ST, 19 October 2002, p. A6; Simon, M., ST, 26 October 2002, p. H17; 
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Asmarani, D., ST, 28 October 2002, p. A6.). The reporting of Australian police raids 
of homes of Indonesian Muslims brought to the surface discrimination against 
Muslims in Australia (‘Aussie cops raid homes of terror suspects’, ST, 31 October 
2002, p. A4), and the view that Islamic schools are a breeding ground for radicalism  
(‘Education aid to be used to fight radicalism’, ST, 31 October 2002, p.4). Given such 
reporting, Muslims who had nothing to do with the bombing had only one way to 
react to the violence, namely, to feel guilt by association (‘Statement against terror 
not a defensive move’, ST, 13 October 2002; En-Lai, Y., ST, 19 October 2002, p. A6; 
Yusof, H., ST, 20 October 2002, p.30).  
 
3.1.1.4 The Victims 
The ST reported on Singapore as doing a great job in bringing aid to the victims in 
Bali by running caption headlines such as ‘A helping hand’ (ST, 16 October 2002, 
p.1); it also portrayed Singapore as a medical hub in the region through headlines 
such as ‘Victims to be flown to S’pore for treatment’ (Mulchand, A., ST, 14 October 
2002, p.4) and ‘Victims arrive swathed in bandages’ (ST, 15 October 2002, p.4). The 
ST sought to produce the humanitarian face of Singapore, a society that was not 
entirely materialistic: ‘S’pore doctors treating Balinese’ (En-Lai, Y., ST, 16 October 
2002, p. A2), ‘Spore doctors put aside paying clients to aid blast victims’ (Tan, T. ST, 
20 October 2002, p.14), and Singaporeans portrayed as the ‘good Samaritans’ in 
‘S’poreans collect cash and supplies for Bali victims’ (En-Lai, Y., ST, 21 October 
2002, p.A5), and ‘S’poreans hailed for helping out’ (ST, 25 October 2002, p. A7). The 
emphasis of the coverage of the victims was on foreigners. The newspaper also 
focused on Singapore’s cricket and rugby players, who were in Bali for a sports 
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tournament and found themselves in the discos on the night of the bombings. Asian 
footballers were featured in the pages of the newspaper alongside stories about 
survivors comforting themselves. The newspaper touched briefly on the “second-rate 
medical treatment” that Indonesian victims received (Asmarani, D., ST, 18 October 
2002, p. A1).  
 
3.1.2 Insight 
The ST’s coverage of the Bali bombings was centred on the discourse of foreign 
terrorism, its threat to Singapore, and persistent calls on Indonesia to implement stern 
laws to deal with terrorists. The coverage was developed around official accounts and 
the reproduction of official statements. The newspaper quoted former Prime Minister 
Goh Chock Tong saying, “how South-east [sic] Asia can lick terrorism.” (Teo, L., ST, 
21 October 2002, p.1). On the domestic front, this was to be done by promoting the 
Code on Religious Harmony, “a pledge affirming that groups will practice their 
respective religions bearing in mind Singapore’s secular and multi-religious context” 
(ibid); for foreign consumption (addressing readers outside Singapore), the ST 
reported on the need for the region to rally together against terrorism.  
Under the headline ‘Plea to get rid of racial stereotypes’ (Lee, J., ST, 21 October 
2002, p. H2), race discrimination was reported as “still a major concern despite the 
government having addressed these issues repeatedly in the past”. The newspaper 
reported on the official line that Muslims have to be friendly and non-Muslims had to 
be kind to Muslims.  
In the article ‘Religious code goes beyond keeping peace’ (Chia, S.A, & Arshad, 
A. & A. Yeo, A, ST, 16 October 2002, p. H2), quoting sociologist Tan Ern Ser, the 
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newspaper printed, “the guidelines are not new, but it was [sic] critical to articulate 
these principles now as recent events indicate that the source of religious conflict can 
come from elsewhere, making it a lot more difficult to control”. The manager of Al-
Falah mosque, Yahya Hashim, was quoted as saying, “this code comes at a very 
crucial time when Islam is being slammed worldwide.” 
The ST localized the issue with stories saying Singapore was coping with the 
terror threat. Grassroots and community leaders meeting with Rear Admiral Teo Chee 
Hean were assured that “Singapore is fighting terrorism in various fronts” and “this 
will give confidence to investors that we are not shutting our eyes and hoping the 
problem will go away” (Nirmala, M., ST, 21 October 2002, p. H2). The coverage 
reported that “Singaporeans should not become over-anxious” – nevertheless, security 
had increased in various places, including public car parks and shopping centres, 
creating a climate of fear and apprehension. In the meeting between community 
leaders and the military official, there were calls to set up “activities to promote inter-
racial understanding, social cohesion in the wake of the JI arrests”. In my reading of 
these events, I realize that if there is a need for groups to set up activities to promote 
inter-racial understanding, this ironically signals that such understanding does not 
exist and that social cohesion is fragile. Therefore, the problem does not seem to be 
one of terrorism but one within society.  
In discussing ways of fighting terrorism, the newspaper published stories 
reflecting officials’ views on security fears and social cohesion. There was a 
perception that racial differences were enveloped in the discourse of terrorism. This 
was evident in stories such as ‘It is ‘yes, but’ for Malay/Muslims today’ (Simon, M., 
ST, 26 October 2002, p. H17). The official suggestion to Muslim leaders on “how the 
community can be insulated from the influence of extremists” also reflected that 
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ethnicity was an issue (‘PM condemns ‘dastardly act’ at S’pore’s doorstep’, ST, 15 
October 2002, p.1). The newspaper touched on the issue of race in Bali with stories 
such as ‘Bali’s Muslims say they too are victims’ (En-Lai, Y., ST, 19 October 2002, 
p. A6). The issue of race in this context could be interpreted as Balinese versus non- 
Balinese or Hindus versus non Hindus; however, the story did not make it clear. 
The ST reported on “a big show of solidarity in recent times, 123 Malay Muslim 
organizations signed a joint statement saying Islam does not permit violence against 
innocent people” (‘Statement against terror not a defensive move’[sic] (ST, 13 
October 2002). This story exposed some weakness in ST’s approach. It did not clarify 
whether Islam permits violence against people who were not innocent, or discuss the 
attitude of Islam to violence in any but the most simple and trite terms. It also did not 
resolve the contradiction between linking the issues of terrorism and religion on the 
one hand, and the repeated insistence of officials and editorials in other editions of the 
ST that terrorism had nothing to do with religion. Ultimately, it became clear that the 
ST was eager to approach terrorism in the context of religion. 
One of the worst categorization made by officials in Indonesia and reinforced in 
the ST’s reporting was the case of 10 Pakistani clerics who were arrested in a police 
raid in connection with the bombings. The JP reported that, “The Pakistanis gave 
lectures on social and religious matters in various places but never informed the 
police about their activities” (‘Police question two suspects over blast’, JP, 16 
October 2002, p.1). The ST, however, reported that the Pakistanis were arrested “for 
preaching radical Islamic doctrines in Bali mosques” (Go, R., ST, 16 October 2002, 
p.1). The ST quoted an unidentified source as saying, “the Pakistanis looked rather 
suspicious, they dressed like Osama bin Laden, so we thought since there are a lot of 
western tourists here and because of the tensions, it is better that they are not seen too 
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much” (Asmarani, D., ST, 16 October 2002, p. A4). The categorization indicated that 
the arrests occurred because of the men’s clothing and because of the presence of 
Westerners; therefore suggesting the arrests were influenced by stereotypes. 
Similarly, in the story ‘Fears over identity breeding religious intolerance’ the 
journalist writing about the Islamic fundamentalist movement and its influence on the 
Muslim community in Singapore said, “as more and more Muslims adopt orthodox 
ways of dress and behaviour, the community will grow apart from the other racial and 
religious groups here” [Singapore] (Lim, L., ST, 19 October 2002, p. H19). 
Just two days before the Bali bombings, Singapore’s then Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, while addressing senior newspapers editors from ASEAN, emphasized 
the need for Asean members to exercise greater political will to deal with the rise of 
Islamic extremism, for the sake of security and to preserve investor confidence 
(‘Muslim fringe on march in Asean region, says PM Goh’, ST, 12 October 2002, p. 
A13). He described the “rise of Islamic extremism” and the need to “root out Al-
Qaeda cells without alienating the moderate Muslim communities”. The solution 
suggested to the editors was to address the aspirations of the population through 
economic development; Goh said “he hoped to convince Thailand, the Philippines 
and Malaysia that the Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) which Singapore is pursuing 
with the US would not undermine Asean” [sic]. This discourse of terrorism and the 
need to address economic development in countries with large Muslim population 
was not given much space by the ST; only after the bombings, when terrorism had 
become a pressing issue for Singapore and its economy, did it devote much attention 
to the theories espoused by Goh (Kin, K.W., ST, 18 October 2002, p, 3; Jansen, P., 
ST, 18 October 2002, p. A4; Kin, K.W., ST, 19 October 2002, p. A7).  
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The newspaper reproduced the assertion that ‘terror’ was shifting to Southeast 
Asia (Gunaratna, R. ST, 15 October 2002, p.7). In the story ‘Anti-Iraq moves a trigger 
for Bali blast’ (Raman, B., ST, 16 October 2002, p.16) the author, from the Institute 
for Topical Studies in India, identified “Indonesia as a major hub of Southeast Asia-
based Islamic terrorist groups with two motivations: a pan Islamic state and anti-
Christian”. The writer, B. Raman, without elaboration, implicated religion and 
ethnicity in the bombing and the concept of terrorism. The writer identified “security 
trouble spots such as Aceh, Maluku, Papua Sampit, Poso and West Timor in 
Indonesia” and lumped together all the different groups around Indonesia as “Islamic 
terrorist”. Such remarks encourage distrust and risk misunderstanding. In addition to 
the misconstruction, the newspaper published a story by writers based in the United 
States on ‘Wealthy Saudis identified as Al-Qaeda backers’ (The Washington Post, ST, 
19 October 2002, p.10). In fact, this story was similar to another article filled by the 
New York Times and published by the ST on the previous day (‘Saudi groups filling 
Al-Qaeda’s coffers’, ST, 18 October 2002, p.12). Other stories dealt with the status of 
women in Saudi Arabia (Kristof, N., ST, 28 October 2002, p.14).  
Terrorism was linked to the hostage drama in Moscow (Associated Press, 
‘Rebels’ message eerily similar to Osama’s’, ST, 26 October 2002, p.8), along with 
stories about European leaders’ views on “the threats of Islamic fundamentalism”; the 
newspaper then linked these issues to the Malay and Muslim community at home 
(Simon, M., ST, 26 October 2002, p. H17). The broad range of issues extended to 
combat piracy in high seas (Agence France Presse, ‘Radical plans to combat piracy 
on high seas’, ST, 24 October 2002, p. A7). Stories mixed up Muslim radicals who 
attacked nightspots in Indonesia with terrorists, and religious radicals with terrorists. 
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The ST portrayed Indonesia as a “sanctuary for terror operatives” (‘Bali loses 
innocence’, ST, 14 October 2002, p.12), adding that “S’pore offered information to 
the Indonesian security authorities about certain anarchists, like Abu Bakar Bashir”. 
Then the paper asked, “will Indonesia act now – live up to its duty of handling the 
menace?” The story was accompanied by a piece entitled ‘Blasts show need for 
crackdown’, written by a staff journalist, Robert Go, who not only wrote the news 
analysis but apparently was also promoting his book entitled ‘Terror Blasts in Bali’; 
there was a picture of the book inserted in the story (Go, R. ST, 14 October 2002, 
p.12).  
Most of the analysis pieces tended to preach a set of moral actions to Indonesia, 
including the suggestion that Indonesia create a code of religious harmony. The 
newspaper promoted the perception that ‘our moderate Muslims were good, decent, 
respectable and doing a good job’, while their Indonesian counterparts were bad, 
represented a threat and were linked to Jemaah Islamiyah al-Qaeda and Bashir (‘Bali 
and its after-shocks’ [sic], ST, 15 October 2002, p12; Hoong, C.L., ST, 15 October 
2002, p.12; “Coping with the terror threat in S’pore”, ST, 15 October 2002, p.13). 
In order to reinforce the view that al-Qaeda was behind the Bali bombings, the 
newspaper published an interview with “a London-based Muslim cleric suspected of 
having ties to the network. Abu Hamza Al-Masri said he believed al-Qaeda was 
involved, and warned there would be more attacks like this because of American 
arrogance” (Go, R., ST, 15 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper also printed warnings 
by Singapore intelligence to Indonesia (‘Bashir may be arrested but Hambali still 
directing JI ops’[sic], ST, 23 October 2002, p. A6). In general, opinions expressed in 
opinionated [op-ed] and commentary pieces reflect those of individual authors. This is 
to promote balance and discussion. However, often newspapers run op-ed pieces that 
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are in line with their editorial line. The ST not only used writers from other parts of 
the world but also op-ed and commentaries written by the newspaper’s staff such as 
the feature editor Chua Lee Hoong and the chief regional correspondent Lee Kim 
Chew, both in the same publication date (15 October 2002, p.12); the staff writer 
Helmi Yusof (20 October 2002, p.30); Lydia Lim (19 October 2002, p. H19); and 
Robert Go (14 October 2002, p.12). 
ST journalists typically added their own inferences to the story, for example, in 
the headline ‘Mega seeks special power to fight terror’ (Go, R., ST, 16 October 2002, 
p.1); the initial paragraphs were a straight account of the situation, but the third 
paragraph switched to quoting ‘unidentified sources’, appealing for the introduction 
of a Security Act in Indonesia, similar to the laws of Singapore and Malaysia. The 
journalist, Robert Go, provided his own judgment in stating, “Megawati clearly sees 
the need to equip herself [sic] with similar authority as her government moves more 
seriously to dismantle any terrorist network here”.  
The same approach could be seen in the story ‘KL detains five JI men – one with 
Osama link’ (Pereira, B., ST, 17 October 2002, p.1); the first paragraph was simply 
informative, but midway through the story the author interwove information linking 
the Bali bombings and JI. In some other cases it was not clear who made the 
connection – the writer or the authorities – mainly because of the use of phrases such 
as “the Straits Times understands”(ibid).  
In a report headed ‘Apec awaits Megawati’s moves on terror’ (Chew, L.K., ST, 26 
October 2002, p.4), the article started by suggesting Megawati was under pressure to 
act: “the world is watching to see what action she will take against Islamic militants, 
particularly the cleric Abu Bakar Bashir” and “Ms. Megawati’s reluctance to crack 
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down on them for fear of alienating the Muslim vote has been a source of frustration 
in Washington”. No source for these assertions was given in the story. In many cases, 
the ST appeared not to reflect the principle of non-interference that exists among 
ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asia Nations (Go, R., ST, 21 October, p. A4).  
The ST was insistent in calling on Indonesia to get tougher with terrorism. Stories 
describing official views stressed that Indonesia has to seriously address terrorism 
because of apprehension in the investment and tourism sectors in the region (Kin, 
K.W., ST, 18 October 2002, p.3; Go, R., ST, 20 October 2002, p.15), and at times 
made explicit demands: ‘Jakarta told: Act now and act decisively’ (Quek, A., ST, 23 
October 2002, p.1), and ‘After Bali, will Indonesia act?’ (Desker, B., ST, 31 October 
2002, p.14). The ST used editorials to censure the Indonesian administration, saying 
Megawati “must act now” and passing on judgment on Indonesia’s leadership skills 
(‘Mega should go all out’, ST, 17 October 2002, p.16.); it identified “her choice of 
weapon to fight security threat” as “a presidential decree that will permit detention 
without trial. A way must be found to convince the doubters why an emergency 
decree is necessary”. In this particular example, the editorial was accompanied by two 
other op-ed stories on a single page, both making similar points (Hafidz, T., ST, 17 
October 2002, p.16; Witoelar, W., ST, 17 October 2002, p.16). 
The second story titled ‘but Al-Qaeda not the only group in town’ written by 
Wimar Witoelar, former spokesman for Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000-2001, took a 
refreshing approach to the Bali issue. It contained the following points: (1) various 
world leaders blamed Al-Qaeda even before the investigation into the Bali bombings 
started; (2) Indonesia had experienced decades of terrorism involving more victims 
than the Bali attack, but the earlier incidents never really became the subject of global 
headlines; (3) murderous campaigns in Aceh, Lampung and Tanjung Priok never 
  92
made the headlines; (4) East Timor was widely reported only because of Australian 
involvement; (5) the Suharto regime was based on state terrorism for 30 years; (6) in 
1970, Suharto required the military and Muslim extremists to work together to 
combat communist danger; (7) this led to the establishment of JI, now mentioned as 
the local arm of al-Qaeda; (8) military hardliners plus radical Islamist militants 
worked together on and off for years in special operations; (9) US President Bush 
made al-Qaeda a world brand, a global franchise of terror in some ways similar to 
McDonald’s; (10) Megawati’s government was soft and ineffectual; (11) a convicted 
criminal headed Indonesia’s parliament, and military figures were involved in 
corruption and human rights abuse; (12) Megawati was praised and urged to grasp the 
opportunity to act against terrorism. The op-ed piece demonstrated a revitalizing 
approach to the Bali issue, including detailed and sometimes little known historical 
background. 
The ST reproduced Bashir as an issue. In ‘Radical Bashir’s arrest by police looks 
imminent’ (Go, R., ST, 18 October 2002, p.3), the story was developed from 
allegations made by foreign governments’ representatives, who implicated Bashir in 
terrorism. The arrest of Bashir made the headlines, with Jakarta signing stricter new 
laws (Go, R., & En-Lai, Y., ST, 20 October 2002, p.1; Asmarani, D., ST, 29 October 
2002, p.1).  
The newspaper dedicated space to Australia’s response to the bombings and its 
offer of expertise and money to Indonesia to fight terrorism (Associated Press, 
‘Canberra pours more money into security after Bali blasts’, ST, 24 October 2002, p. 
A7); later, the newspaper emphasized police raids on houses of Indonesian Muslims 
in Australia (Associated Press, ‘Attacks on Muslims on the rise in Sydney’, ST, 29 
October 2002, p. A6). When reporting on Singaporeans injured in the Bali blasts, the 
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newspaper produced a positive approach, with heroes smiling through their tears; but 
when describing the attacks, it used gruesome details. The newspaper made extensive 
use of ‘villain’ and ‘hero’ approaches, including, for example, in the many stories 
loaded with sorrow and anger towards Indonesia (‘Shock and disbelief at attack so 
close to home’, ST, 15 October 2002, p.3; Asmarani, D., ST, 15 October 2002, p.5; 
En-Lai, Y., ST, 21 October 2002, p. A5).  
Appeals to emotion dominated the ST’s coverage of human-interest stories about 
the problems the authorities had in identifying the victims and also the Singaporean 
doctors who went to Bali to help local burns victims. In the article ‘S’pore doctors 
treating Balinese’ (En-Lai, Y. ST, 16 October 2002, p. A2), an implicit comparison 
was drawn between the quality of hospital wards in Indonesia and Singapore hospitals 
of the 1970s. In this particular story it appeared that the reporter was there to give an 
account of Singaporean doctors operating in “horrible and dreadful conditions” while 
at the same time demonstrating the good attitude of Gleneagles doctors. The ST wrote 
that the “Parkway group, which runs Gleneagles, has offered to fly five of the most 
serious burn cases to Singapore”. In other human stories patients were quoted as 
saying, “I am happy my son is receiving good medical care here” and “truly grateful 
to the hospital staff and the people of Singapore for helping us” (Vijayan, K.C., & 
Soh, N., ST, 16 October 2002, p. A2) Such remarks support the government’s 
campaign to turn Singapore in a regional medical hub. The ST printed gruesome 
photos and eye-catching captions. 
The ST’s reporting contained some religious references, for example in its 
editorial ‘Bali and its after-shocks’ [sic] (ST, 15 October 2002, p.12); and stories 
contained phrases such as “hell on earth” (‘Holiday haven became hell on earth’, (ST, 
14 October 2002, p.2);  “prayers for souls, search for bodies” (Asmarani, D., ST, 14 
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October 2002, p.3); “Tears and prayers flow as devastation sinks in” (En-Lai, Y. ST, 
21 October 2002, p. A3.); “Praying for peace” (ST, 24 October 2002, p. A7). The 
coverage had one illustration representing a bomber wearing an Arab headscarf (Loh, 
J., ST, 16 October 2002, p.16).  
The editors of the newspaper, whether consciously or not, framed the Bali 
bombings coverage within the issues of global terrorism and religion. The stories 
were loaded with political messages related to patriotism, values and norms, and 
economic benefits. The approach could be seen not just in a single article or in a 
group of articles; it was embodied in a style of communication that pushed the reader 
towards the ST’s interpretation of events through techniques such as juxtaposing 
stories, adding suggestive headlines and section headings, and anchoring captions 
with photographs. These techniques overlapped and reinforced each other. The ST 
appeared to have sent journalists to Indonesia to cover the incident. The newspaper 
also used material extensively from the newswire services. 
 
3.2 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: Jakarta Post 
The Bali bombings occurred at the height of the US ‘war on terror’ and amid 
persistent denials by Indonesian authorities that terrorists were operating in the 
country. The bombings were the most significant act of violence against foreign 
tourists in Indonesia. 
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3.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Jakarta Post 
In the early stage of its coverage, the JP did not present a clear indication of what 
concept of terrorism it would use. Nevertheless, it assumed the bombings were an act 
of terrorism (‘National tragedy’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.6). It treated the violence as 
an imminent threat to the country’s economy, with particular focus on tourism 
(Wulandari, F., JP, 14 October 2002, p.13; Moestafa, B. K., JP, 14 October 2002, 
p.1; Harsanto, D. JP, 15 October 2002, p.8; Suryana, A., JP, 15 October 2002, p.13; 
‘Stay home, Mrs. President’, JP, 16 October 2002, p.6; Simamora, A.P., JP, 16 
October 2002, p.13; Witular, R.A., JP, 16 October 2002, p.14). As the consequences 
of the bombings started to become apparent, the JP’s concept of terrorism began to be 
shaped by the international discourse on the ‘war on terror’. 
 
3.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The JP’s images of terrorists were of Muslim radicals and religious extremists. This 
perception was based on official sources of information, such as government 
representatives, police and intelligence officers. While it reflected the business 
sector’s view that militant groups could be responsible for acts of violence (Junaidi, 
A., JP, 14 October 2002, p.8), “Muslim hard-liners” soon became the source of 
concern for the authorities, (Nafik, M., & Kurniawan H., JP, 17 October 2002, p.2; 
‘Hard-line groups told to emulate Laskar Jihad’s move to disband’, JP, 18 October 
2002, p.2; ‘Police detain FPI chairman’, JP, 18 October 2002, p.2; Kurniawan, Moch. 
N., JP, 21 October 2002, p.4; ‘VP denies govt interference in the arrest of Ba’asyir’, 
JP, 22 October 2002, p.2). These images had evolved to identify one single group as 
suspect terrorists, i.e., the Jemaah Islamiyah organization (JI), (Harsanto, D. JP, 18 
October 2002, p.1). Even though the newspaper reproduced an official quote saying, 
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“investigators had yet to find any evidence to link the blasts to the military, foreigners 
or Muslim radicals” (Siboro T. & Suryana A. JP, 22 October 2002, p.1; ‘Police 
release sketches of Bali bomb suspects’, JP, 31 October 2002, p.1.). As the coverage 
stretched into weeks, the newspaper began to refer to JI members as the suspects as a 
matter of course, reflecting the view of the international community  (Unidjaja, F.D., 
& Harsanto, D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.4; Unidjaja, F. D., JP, 25 October 2002, p.1; 
Muninggar, S. Saraswati, JP, 26 October 2002, p.2). Within weeks, the newspaper 
was referring to the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and al-Qaeda as involved in the 
Bali bombings.  
The early signs of international pressure on Indonesia to act against ‘radical 
groups’ started to appear in the press days after the bombings, which prompted 
Indonesian officials finally to admit publicly “that leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a 
suspected international terrorist organization, were Indonesian citizens… operating in 
neighboring Singapore and Malaysia but not in Indonesia” (Unidjaja, F. & Harsanto, 
D. JP, 17 October 2002, p.4; Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 29 October 2002, p.4). However, the 
JP failed to ask some basic questions, such as, what was the connection of the Bali 
bombings to Singapore and Malaysia? Who or what was behind the bombings? And 
were there other reasons behind the bombings?  
It appears that social grievances were not considered relevant, despite some 
concerns raised by academics about social problems in Indonesia (‘Bali tragedy the 
last wake-up call for govt’, JP, 16 October 2002, p.3; ‘Megawati is the key to 
rebuilding devastated Bali’, JP, 17 October 2002, p.3; ‘The future of our nation is at 
stake- Syafii’, JP, 18 October 2002, p.3). When the bombings occurred, groups of 
men had been attacking nightspots and entertainment centres in the capital Jakarta for 
the past three years. The most recent of those incidents took place days before the 
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Bali bombings, when more than 400 members of a group called Islam Defenders 
Front (FPI) attacked a discotheque and two billiard centres (Harsanto, D., JP, 17 
October 2002, p.2). For years, members of FPI had played what the newspaper 
described as an “alleged role in provoking violence and acts of vandalism” (‘Police 
detain FPI chairman’, JP, 18 October 2002, p.2) with some level of impunity. The 
newspaper could have tried to explore the reasons why the authorities only turned 
their attention to FPI after the Bali bombings.  
Similarly, the JP showed lack of journalistic interest in exploring the motivation 
behind the decision by members of the hard-line group Laskar Jihad to disband itself 
after the Bali bombings (Wahyuni, S., & Pinontoan, O. JP, 16 October 2002, p.1). 
Laskar Jihad was involved in social and religious conflicts between Muslims and 
Christians in Maluku islands during the three years of the sectarian conflict. Instead, 
the newspaper published interviews with Muslim scholars hailing the decision of 
Laskar Jihad and at the same time urging other “hard-line organizations to follow suit 
or have the authorities disperse them” (‘Police detain FPI chairman’, JP, October 18, 
2002, p.2). In a single sentence at the end of a story the newspaper casually dropped 
the information that “Laskar Jihad has been accused of links with Jamaah Islamiyah 
who is believed to have links with international terrorist group al-Qaeda” (Juniartha, I 
W, & Wijaksana, D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper briefly noted that 
many “fundamentalist groups” had resurfaced in Indonesia following the downfall of 
the strongman Suharto in 1998, with Laskar Jihad and Islam Defenders Front being 
the most prominent ones. In the newspaper’s view, both groups have persistently 
attempted to impose Sharyah law on Indonesia, and this “has sometimes turned 
violent” (Nafik, M., JP, 18 October 2002, p.2). 
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At this stage, Indonesia was not only being pressed internationally to admit the 
existence of terrorist cells on its soil, it was also being pressured by the US and 
Australian governments to arrest the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir14 (Unidjaja, 
F.D., & Harsanto, D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.4). Both governments identified Bashir 
as the leader of JI. The JP failed to provide detailed information on why Australia and 
the US wanted the arrest of Bashir (Bayuni, E.M., JP, 21 October 2002, p.3); some 
background information would have helped readers understand the inclusion of the 
religious leader among the suspects of the bombings. Instead, the JP’s coverage 
switched from the bombings to problems of governance, the economic consequences 
and the involvement of JI, to name a few of the issues that are associated with the 
events of 12 October 2002.  
 
3.2.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The assumption behind the JP’s coverage of the Bali bombings was that violence was 
linked to anarchy, because of a lack of law enforcement and the central government’s 
weak leadership of the country (‘National tragedy’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.6), in 
addition to the government’s insufficiently proactive approach towards terrorism 
(‘Nation unites in condemning bombing’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.1). The JP made a 
series of criticisms of the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, attacking 
her leadership skills and “the lack of vision of a leader of a nation of more than 200 
million people” (Nafik, M., JP, 29 October 2002, p.2). 
As foreign governments put pressure on Indonesia to admit to the existence of a 
terrorism network in the country, the newspaper took the lead in insisting that others 
                                                 
14 I will adhere to the different spellings of Abu Bakar Bashir in direct quotations. 
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were right, Indonesia was wrong (‘National tragedy’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.6). The 
JP then focused on two issues, namely, criticism of Megawati’s governance and the 
economic damages caused by the bombings (Moestafa, B.K, JP, 14 October 2002, 
p.1; Suryana, A., JP, 15 October 2002, p.13; ‘Stay home, Mrs. President’, JP, 16 
October 2002, p.6; Simamora, A.P., JP, 16 October 2002, p.13; Witular, R. A., JP, 16 
October 2002, p.14). 
The JP described the weak response of Indonesian authorities to the threat of 
terrorism as “most deplorable” (‘National tragedy’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.6), 
“whereas most other countries in the region were taking steps necessary to counter the 
terrorism threat”. Newspaper staff writers and guest writers reported critically on 
Megawati (Bandoro, B., JP, 16 October 2002, p.6; Purba, K., JP, 18 October 2002, 
p.2; Nafik, M., JP, 29 October 2002, p.2; Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 29 October 2002, p.4).  
The JP linked terrorist violence to the militancy of radical groups, a weak govern-
ment and a lack of law enforcement, and described serious implications for the 
economy and the tourism industry. But the newspaper did not carefully explore the 
reasons for the lack of law enforcement. Instead, it insisted the government had failed 
to solve the problem of terrorism because of its inefficiency.  
 
3.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The JP made the connection between the bombings and religion by interviewing 
religious scholars and leaders of religious organizations as well as having people in 
the religious milieu to contribute as guest writers (Mu’ti, A., JP, 21 October 2002, 
p.7; Winoto, S., JP, 23 October 2002, p.2). This created the perception that religion 
was linked to violence, an attitude that was reinforced by government and police 
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officers describing the bombers as ‘radical Muslim’ and ‘Muslim hardliners’ 
(Wulandari, F., JP, 14 October 2002, p.13; Nafik, M., & Kurniawan, H., JP, 17 
October 2002, p.2).  
The perception that violence was linked to Islam, specifically, to radical Islam 
was also passed on to readers with stories quoting authorities in the United States and 
Singapore whose government leaders were quoted as appealing to Indonesian 
authorities “to crack down on Muslim radicals” (Nafik, M., & Kurniawan, H., JP, 17 
October 2002, p.2; Mu’ti, A., JP, 21 October 2002, p.6; ‘VP denies govt interference 
in the arrest of Ba’asyir’, JP, 22 October 2002, p.2; JP, Winoto, S., JP, 23 October 
2002, p.2). The JP did not try to distinguish in its reporting between Islamic 
fundamentalists belonging to Islamic movements with social motivations and those 
belonging to Islamic movements with political agendas. 
 
3.2.1.4 The Victims 
The JP’s focus was on the foreign victims, especially on Australians, who accounted 
for the largest number of fatalities. Indonesian victims did not get much attention 
(Juniartha, I. W., JP, 15 October 2002, p.19; Widiadana, R. A, & Juniartha, I W., JP, 
15 October 2002, p.1; Widiadana, R. A., JP, 17 October 2002, p.3; ‘Mourners 
continue to flock to blast site’, JP, 17 October 2002, p.3). But reporting on the victims 
was not a priority. Instead, the newspaper slanted its reporting of the tragedy to press 
the government to catch the culprits as soon as possible, in order to prevent 
consequences for the tourism industry, which is Indonesia’s second-largest non-oil-
and-gas foreign exchange earner (Wulandari, F., JP, 14 October 2002, p.13; 




The JP’s coverage of the Bali bombings was different from its coverage of other 
bombings in the country. Firstly, the Bali attacks were considered an act of 
international terrorism from the moment that initial information started to flow to the 
media. Secondly, the bombings occurred at the height of the ‘war on terror’, despite 
persistent denials by Indonesian authorities that the country was a ‘hotbed’ for 
terrorism (Juniartha, I W., & Widiadana, R.A., JP, 14 October 2002, p.1). Thus the 
Bali bombings came as much needed proof that the country was facing a terrorism 
epidemic. The newspaper did not raise questions when world leaders fingered JI 
members even before the investigations had started (Witoelar, W., JP, 22 October 
2002, p.7; Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 23 October 2002, p.1). Once jailed, the suspect bombers 
acknowledged they were members of JI; however, the JP failed to raise questions 
about the circumstances of their apparent confessions.  
The newspaper was slow in grasping the importance and foreseeable 
consequences of the bombings. Once it realized the impact of the blasts and the large 
number of victims, the JP devoted a large amount of space to stories related to the 
incident and pondering the negative economic consequences. The JP was keen to 
make the international community aware that the government was weak and by doing 
so, it was also putting pressure on the Indonesian authorities to accept international 
views on the existence of terrorism and the involvement of JI in the bombings. It saw 
urgent action as paramount in restoring the confidence of investors and the business 
community in the Indonesian government (Suryana, A., JP, 15 October 2002, p.13; 
Simamora, A.P., JP, 16 October 2002, p.13).  
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The newspaper established that the Bali bombings were the result of an 
intelligence failure due to internal conflicts, such as the rivalry between the police, the 
military, intelligence officers and government officials (Muninggar, S. Saraswati, JP, 
15 October 2002, p.3; Kurniawan, M.N., JP, 15 October 2002, p.4; ‘Intelligence 
failure’, JP, 15 October 2002, p.6). This line of reporting took precedence, despite 
initial speculation of various kinds, for example, that the culprits came from terrorist 
groups outside Indonesia, and of involvement of the Indonesian military, and even of 
members of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The newspaper opted to 
follow the suggested official line in not pursuing the possibilities that parts of the 
Indonesian military or former military personnel were connected to the bombings 
(Juniartha, I W., & Wijaksana, D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.2; Wijaksana, D. & Siboro, 
T., JP, 18 October 2002, p.1). Readers therefore had their ability to assess the 
situation independently removed, first by the authorities and then by the newspaper.  
Considering the historical involvement of the Indonesian military in the nation-
building process, its poor record on human rights and the past close cooperation 
between the Australian and Indonesian militaries during the Suharto regime, the fact 
that Australia and Indonesia formed a joint team to probe the Bali bombings should 
also have been reported with a great deal of background information (Associated 
Press, ‘Deadly bombings could aid Australia- RI ties: Analysts’, JP, 15 October 
2002, p.10) Instead, the JP saw as more relevant the fact that Australia, as the nation 
with the largest number of fatalities in the bombings and a total trade with Indonesia 
valued at up to US$ 3.87 billion per year, had the right to contribute to investigations 
from an early stage (Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.1). The newspaper 
justified Australia’s involvement in an editorial as follows: “Australia, of course, 
because of the large number of its citizens that were killed or injured in that 
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horrendous event, felt compelled to send in its own police team to satisfy its domestic 
demand for information and clarification” (‘Police work in Bali’, JP, 19 October 
2002, p.6). Other countries cooperating with the investigations were Great Britain, 
Japan, the United States and Germany. Days later others countries such as New 
Zealand and Sweden also joined the investigation team. Nevertheless, the newspaper 
did not offer insights on the relationships between these countries and Indonesia or 
discuss trade ties between them or their level of participation in the ‘war on terrorism’ 
(Wijaksana, D., JP, 18 October 2002, p.3; Christie, M., JP, 19 October 2002, p.3). 
The JP portrayed the view that the future of the nation was at stake as a 
consequence of the Bali bombings (Purba, K., JP, 18 October 2002, p.6). That was 
positive, considering the US’s insistence that involvement in the ‘war on terror’ 
should determine whether a “nation is with us or against us”15. But the newspaper 
failed to discuss seriously why the future of the nation only entered the risk zone after 
the Bali bombings and not previously when a wave of violence hit the country 
following Suharto’s fall (Maarif, S., 18 JP, October 2002, p.3). However, one 
possible reason was given by the newspaper: “very few people believe that Indonesia 
can effectively act to fight terrorism because many of the leaders… act like parents 
trying to hide the fact that their children are chronic drug addicts despite what their 
friends and neighbors know” (Purba, K., JP, 18 October 2002, p.6).  
Thus, while Indonesians were killing their own people during the Suharto era - 
when some half million people were murdered during the Suharto takeover, 
(Nordholt, 2002:43), the invasion of East Timor in 1975, and the fighting in Maluku 
between Christians and Muslims which killed between 4,000 and 10,000 people 
(Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002:2)- and afterwards, those events were apparently of less 
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magnitude than the deaths of two hundred foreigners in Bali (Rais, A., JP, 24 October 
2002, p.3). Therefore international investigators were welcomed to do the work that 
Indonesians were not capable of doing (‘Downer pledges aid for Bali blast probe’, JP, 
16 October 2002, p.1; Kelley, M., JP, 16 October 2002, p.3; Hopkins, A. JP, 16 
October 2002, p.12; Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 17 October 2002, p.1; Wijaksana, D., JP, 19 
October 2002, p.4).  
The JP reported but failed to question allegations made by Singapore’s ST that 
“the money to buy the explosives for the Bali bombings was transferred from Osama 
bin Laden to the Jemaah Islamiyah organization, which Ba’asyir chairs” (Siboro, T. & 
Suryana, A., JP, 22 October 2002, p.1). The JP was already reporting on Abu Bakar 
Bashir as the leader of the alleged terrorist group JI. The JP did not question the fact 
that details of the story published by the ST were based on information provided by 
Indonesian intelligence. The simple question to be asked was: How was it possible 
that a Singapore newspaper had access to detailed information of Indonesian 
intelligence while Indonesian journalists did not get the same ‘first hand’ kind of 
treatment? (Reuters, ‘Saudi ‘gave money’ to JI for explosives, expert say’, JP, 17 
October 2002, p.3; Harsanto, D., JP, 18 October 2002, p.1; Siboro, T., & Suryana, A., 
JP, 22 October 2002, p.1).  
The JP’s Bali bombing coverage had a modest level of photo illustrations, for 
example, in comparison with the ST. Most of the information for the JP’s stories 
came from police and government officials, scholars, religious leaders and eye-
witnesses.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
15 U.S. President George W. Bush’s remarks on 6 November 2001. CNN.com./U.S. 
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3.3 Coverage of the Bali Bombings: New Straits Times 
The NST’s coverage of the Bali bombings was wide-ranging compared with its 
coverage of the other bombings studied in this project. The coverage shifted from a 
focus on Bali to national security, the arrest of Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) 
members, Indonesia’s handling of terrorism and the possible causes of the bombings. 
It also addressed the negative effect of the attacks on the tourism industry. 
 
3.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
The NST portrayed terrorism as a threat to racial harmony, intended “to pit Muslims 
against the predominantly Hindus or to undermine the presidency of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, who is a moderate” (‘Prevention better than cure’, NST, 15 October 
2002, p.10). 
 
3.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The NST referred to ‘Muslim terrorists’ in its editorial ‘Prevention better than cure’ 
(NST, 15 October 2002, p.10); various stories carried out categorizations such as, 
‘Islamic militants’ (Akmar, S., NST, 19 October 2002,p. 2), ‘Islamic terrorists’ 
(Akmar, S. NST, 26 October 2002, p.2), other stories described members of Jemaah 
Islamiyah and al-Qaeda as terrorists, while the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was 
reported as spiritual leader of JI (Emmanuel, T., & J. Joheng, NST, 17 October 2002, 
p.1). The NST equated members of the KMM, who were described as religious 
fanatics and murderers, with terrorists (‘Studies in contrasts’, NST, 18 October 2002, 
p.10; Kaur, H., NST, 19 October 2002, p.1). 
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3.3.1.2 Roots of Violence 
A possible reason for the bombing presented by Malaysian officials and reflected by 
the newspaper was domestic Indonesian social conditions, given social and race 
discrimination by the entertainment industry in Bali, which gave preference to 
Western clients to the detriment of locals. In its midweek editorial the newspaper 
said, “the Sari club did not welcome locals, and charged them Rp 50,000 for entry 
while foreigners got in free” (Rashid, R., NST, 16 October 2002, p.10).  
 
3.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion  
One of the connections between religion and violence was the description of the 
bombers as Muslims. Another generic correlation to religion was made through the 
observation that Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation, an undisputed 
fact. In addition, there was one story, which reproduced a quote saying, “the week-
end bombing in Bali should not be linked with any Muslim organisations.” (“Nik 
Aziz: Don’t link it to Muslims’, NST, 17 October 2002, p.6). 
 
3.3.1.4 The Victims 
The NST published many photos of the injured and the destruction in the Kuta area, 
but did not elaborate on the victims. With photo-illustrations entitled ‘World’ (NST, 
14 October 2002, p. B21), and ‘World in pictures’, (NST, 15 October 2002, p. B23), 





The NST’s reporting immediately after the bombing was informative and concise. The 
suggestion that the bombings were an act of terrorism came three days after the initial 
reporting and particularly after Washington issued a worldwide terrorism alert. The 
reporting, reflecting international concerns, mentioned the attacks had heightened 
fears of “Indonesia becoming a heaven for terrorists” (‘Bali blasts jolt Jakarta into 
facing reality of terrorism’, NST, 15 October 2002, p. B22; ‘Test of Megawati’s 
leadership’, NST, 16 October 2002, p. B21). 
In its editorial ‘Prevention better than cure’ (NST, 15 October 2002, p.10), the 
newspaper fingered Al-Qaeda as responsible for the attacks and referred to the 
bombers as “Muslim terrorists” while at the same time condemning Indonesia for not 
going after “religious fanatics”. The editorial addressed the issue of Muslims and 
Hindus in Bali and pressed for the arrest of suspected terrorists, “even if concrete 
evidence is lacking”. The editorial also warned against oversimplification in pinning 
the blame on al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.  
However, in the same edition, the newspaper reproduced official concerns that the 
attack “may have a domestic connection” (Sharmini, P., NST, 15 October 2002, p.4), 
and the police should investigate first before linking the bombing with international 
terrorists (‘Isis: Bombings will affect investments’, NST, 15 October 2002, p.4; ‘Syed 
Hamid: Let’s not point fingers until probe is completed’, NST, 16 October 2002, p.4). 
At the same time the newspaper provided stories on the arrest of KMM members 
in which the militants were reported as part of al-Qaeda and JI (Emmanuel, T., & 
  108
Joheng, J., NST, 17 October 2002, p.1). The later stories stressed the issue of national 
security, with police saying weapons and maps were sized from those detained. 
In the story ‘Why did the bombers pick on the Sari Club?’ it touched on the issue 
of social-ethnic discrimination as an insult to the local community in a situation 
where foreign tourists could do anything and were abusing the culture in Indonesia 
and Bali, declaring this “an only white foreigner club, an insult to the local 
community” (Rashid, R. NST, 16 October 2002, p.10). However, the NST changed 
from “discrimination in the entertainment industry in Bali” to the discourse on 
terrorism, including challenges to Indonesia’s stance on “Islamic fanaticism ragged 
carpet of National Unity and territorial integrity”. The newspaper went on to criticise 
Indonesia for “not heeding repeated warnings” (‘No more excuses’, NST, 17 October 
2002, p.10).   
Following the Malaysian government’s official line, the newspaper reported on 
terrorism as an issue (‘US, Britain urged to discuss problem with others’, NST, 15 
October 2002, p.4). It was not clear when the newspaper changed from the idea that 
the Bali bombings were an internal act of vengeance to the idea that they were an 
instance of international terrorism. 
The NST ran stories portraying Malaysia as a safe place where foreign tourists had 
nothing to fear (Mohamad, A. & Waheed, S., NST, 15 October 2002, p.1; Kaur, H., 
NST, 19 October 2002, p.1), while portraying Indonesia negatively as disruptive 
(Akmar, S., NST, 19 October 2002, p.4; Sayuthi, S., NST, 19 October, 2002, p.4). In 
its editorial ‘Studies in contrasts’ (NST, 18 October 2002, p.10), it said citizens and 
residents of Singapore and Malaysia were thankful for their leaders’ good 
governance. Malaysia and Singapore experienced no bombing because of decisive 
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actions by their governments, i.e., the arrest of KMM members and, in Singapore, JI 
members (‘Najib – We can handle terrorism threat’, NST, 22 October 2002, p.4).  
The newspaper reproduced police views that there was no link between the KMM 
arrests and the Bali bombings. At the same time, still quoting the police, the 
newspaper published stories on the arrest of 68 people as “suspected of militancy” 
under the Internal Security Act since May 2001 (Emmanuel, T. & Joheng, J., NST, 17 
October 2002, p.1; ‘No more excuses’, NST, 17 October 2002, p.10; Kaur H., NST, 19 
October 2002, p.1). 
     The NST quoted the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad as saying, “the 
terrorism issue was not being handled properly” and “too much emphasis was being 
given to security and defence and not enough attention to the causes of terrorism” 
(‘Terrorism issue not being handled properly’, NST, 18 October 2002, p.2). But there 
was no clear indication of what the causes of terrorism were. The NST reproduced the 
positive assertion that Malaysia can handle the terrorism threat (‘Najib – We can 
handle terrorism threat’, NST, 22 October 2002, p.4). However, Malaysia stepped up 
security (‘Police tightening security at foreign-owned places’, 16 October 2002, p.15; 
‘Security alert stepped up after Bali bombing’, NST, 17 October 2002, p.6; ‘Dr. Ling 
advises local port, airport managements to tighten security’, NST, 21 October 2002, 
p.4), which appeared to contradict its officials’ view that the explosions could have 
been an act of vengeance for tourists abusing the religious culture of Bali.  
The NST ran stories providing the view that after Suharto’s fall, President Habibe 
dismantled controls imposed by his predecessor, giving Muslim movements’ new 
freedom. This partly reflected the fact that the US and its allies wanted democratic 
reforms in Indonesia and less state control, but that after 9/11, the US wanted Jakarta 
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to be firm with Islamic groups (Akmar, S., NST, 19 October 2002, p.2; Noor, F., NST, 
19 October 2002, p.11).  
The discourse on terrorism became the main topic for the NST. It reported on the 
threat to national security along with the need for preventative measures to track 
down KMM members, and the army’s calls for the public to be more security 
conscious (‘ISA to give absolute powers to the Executive on national security 
matters’, NST, 20 October 2002, p.2; ‘Army wants public to be more security 
conscious’, NST, 20 October 2002, p.7; ‘Be more vigilant, Sarawak folk advised’, 
NST, 20 October 2002, p.7; ‘Be alert at all times, advises MB’, NST, 21 October 
2002, p.4). The newspaper ran stories linking the Bali bombings to the instability in 
the south of Thailand, reproducing statements by Thai police officials that the south 
was known as a terrorist route for al-Qaeda. The NST reported on the conspiracy 
theory that the CIA was involved in the blasts in Bali (‘Conspiracy theories abound 
after bombings in Bali’, NST, 16 October 2002, p. B23). 
In its editorial ‘Sleeping giant awakened’ (NST, 21 October 2002, p.10), the NST 
said that Indonesia was the weakest link in the regional anti-terror campaign. It dealt 
with the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir and also with Washington’s “infuriating habit of 
linking the Al-Qaeda with every Indonesian in a skull cap and jubah” (ibid).  
The editorial ‘Sleeping giant awakened’ said the West should rebuild confidence 
in the region in order to return it to political stability, and that economic growth was 
the only long-term cure for “the disease of terrorism”. The editorial did not explain 
why the West had responsibility for rebuilding confidence in the region and why the 
region itself did not assume this responsibility. The NST’s discourse on terrorism also 
included stories from elsewhere on the acts of militants in the Philippines and the 
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violence in the Indonesian islands of Maluku. Editorials, especially in places where 
the government influences the press, such as Singapore and Malaysia, reveal their 
political and social agendas.  
The newspaper presented contradictory stances towards the bombing: one was 
critical of Indonesia and within the international frame of global terrorism, and the 
other was the appeal by Malaysian officials for authorities to investigate before 
jumping to the conclusion that international terrorists were involved in the blasts 
(‘Prevention better than cure’, NST, 15 October 2002, p.10; Sharmini, P., NST, 15 
October 2002, p.4). Whereas former PM Mahathir Mohamad said, “Bali is one of the 
many unfortunate incidents engineered by angry and frustrated people in retaliation 
and revenge” (Mohamad. A., & Waheed S., NST, 15 October 2002, p.1). Despite 
repeating allegations that the Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir’s was 
involved with terrorism, the newspaper gave space to the cleric to put his views 
across (Agence France Presse, ‘Abubakar blames US for Sari Club blast’, NST, 14 
October 2002, p. B21). Abu Bakar Bashir blamed the US for the blasts in the 
nightclubs. Noordin Sophies, chairman of International Studies Malaysia, presented 
his views on the consequences of the blasts. Both stories produced a conciliatory tone 
with suggestions to “look for the causes of terrorism”, and talk about “cooperation” 
and not jumping to conclusions that international terrorists were involved. The 
approach was in contrast to the editorial ‘Prevention better than cure’, which at the 
time of the bombing took a harsh tone towards Indonesia (NST, 15 October 2002, 
p.10).  
The newspaper dedicated space to official concern about tourism (‘Sabah hopes 
Bali blast won’t hit its tourism’, NST, 18 October 2002, p.14), saying Australians 
tended to go to Bali whereas Japanese and European tourists went to Malaysia. 
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Nevertheless, the NST missed the opportunity to refer to the kidnapping of foreign 
tourists in April 2000 from a resort in Sipadan Island in Malaysia by the Abu Sayyaf 
group. At the time of the kidnappings, the culprits were called ‘bandits’, ‘pirates’ or 
‘rebels’ rather than terrorists (Bingksan, J., Emmanuel, T., Bangkuai, J., Kaur, J. 
Andres, L., Singh, S., NST, 25 April 2000, p.1).  
Within one week of the bombings, the NST had already left the Bali attacks far 
behind and turned its full attention to terrorism in general and to official reactions to 
foreign allegations that Malaysia was a site for terrorist activity (Kaur, H., NST, 19 
October 2002, p.1; ‘Call to stop labelling of countries as terrorist bases’, NST, 19 
October 2002, p.4). The NST quoted Malaysian officials as rejecting this label for the 
country (‘Foreign investors know better, says Mustafa’, NST, 21October 2002, p.4).  
The NST also reproduced the official views that Malaysia did not expect investors 
to be scared away by unsubstantiated reports that terrorist groups were active on its 
soil, in an allusion to a story published in the Far Eastern Economic Review. The 
editor of the now defunct Hong Kong-based magazine subsequently apologized 
(Sayuthi, S., NST, 19 October 2002, p.4) 
The newspaper printed reactions to allegations by a Singapore based terrorism 
expert, Rohan Gunaratna, who claimed in a United Nations report that the Malaysian 
political party Barisan Nasional had links to al-Qaeda (‘BN, Opposition leaders 
condemn report’, NST, 19 October 2002, p.6). The NST also published reactions from 
opposition leaders condemning the United Nations report (Bangkuai, J. NST, 20 
October 2002, p.2). Despite giving negative coverage to the Singaporean expert in 
“meat for some, poison to others” (Akmar, S., NST, 20 October 2002, p.8), the fact 
that the newspaper allowed the expert and members of the political opposition to 
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explain their positions indicated a more open approach of coverage, in contrast to the 
ST.  
The opinions of the public were not present in the coverage, only the views of 
officials and sources that reinforced the status quo. Nevertheless, the NST reproduced 
different opinions expressed by government officials in the same article regarding the 
bombings in Bali. For example, the Minister of Defence Najib Tun Razak was quoted 
as saying, “the attacks prove that the region is facing threats from terrorists”, whereas 
Foreign Minister Syed Hamid was quoted as saying, “the Bali bombing was an 
isolated incident not linked to Malaysia” (Sharmini, P., NST, 15 October 2002, p.4).  
The NST reflected official condemnation of the Western media’s use of the phrase 
‘Muslim terrorists’, even while it paraphrased Western media. The newspaper itself 
referred to ‘Muslim terrorists’ in its editorial ‘Prevention better than cure’ (NST, 15 
October 2002, p.10), and in another editorial two days later equated terrorism with 
‘Islamic fanaticism’ (‘No more excuses’, NST, 17 October 2002, p.10). 
The NST’s Bali bombing stories were mostly distributed on inside pages, which 
did not create a sense of crisis. The ordering and duration of the stories reflected the 
importance that the newsmakers attributed to them. The NST thus downplayed the 
importance of the Bali bombings after the initial reporting. In general, the NST’s 
editorials were harsher towards Indonesia for not going after religious fanatics while 
at the same time it reproduced a softer stance from officials saying the Bali incident 





3.4 Coverage of the 2002 Bali Bombings: Tempo 
Tempo published two issues on the Bali bombings; the second publication was a 
special edition (15-21 October 2002; 22-28 October 2002). The reporting was 
emotional with grisly details on bodies found on the tops of trees and roofs. The line 
of the coverage was one of criticism. It blamed the lack of cooperation between 
intelligence agencies; it accused the central government of reacting slowly to the 
attacks; and it portrayed the police as “slow” and “sloppy” (Zulkifli, A., & Fibri, R, & 
Hakim, J. & Sunudyantoro & Koko, A., Tempo 22-28 October 2002, p.30).  The 
reporting challenged the government’s resolve to fight terrorism. 
 
3.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo 
Tempo reported on the act of violence as a threat to national security and a “larger-
than-life threat” (Ismartono, Y., Tempo, 15-21October 2002, p.16). The weekly 
magazine printed information on the recent history of violence in Indonesia. 
 
3.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
While US President George W. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
were straightforward in their blaming of JI, Bashir and al-Qaeda, the magazine said 




3.4.1.2 Roots of Violence 
In its ‘No Armageddon’ story, Tempo suggested that social problems in Bali 
constituted one possible reason for the attack. It mentioned the grievances of the local 
community against tourists and the alleged exploitation by the tourism industry of 
temples and religious symbols (Setia, P., Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.44). But it 
also presented the perspective that “the international media were convinced that the 
bombing was the work of Al-Qaeda” and that “the defence minister endorsed the 
claim that the bombings were the work of the terrorist network” (Zulkifli, A., & et al., 
Tempo 22-28 October 2002, p.30). 
 
3.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The linking of violence and religion was observed in remarks made by then US 
Secretary of States Colin Powell, who identified the ‘terrorists’ as “Muslim-based” 
(‘911 for Australia’, Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.33). Australian Prime Minister 
John Howard blamed religious sentiment for the tragedy (p.32). The magazine carried 
a headline with the religious connotation, ‘Resurrection from the ashes’, describing 
how local people in the handicraft business are dependent on tourism in Bali (Tempo, 
22-28 October 2002, p.38). The magazine did not present any ‘local connection’ 
between Islam and violence in the reporting of this incident. 
 
3.4.1.4 The Victims 
Tempo’s coverage presented foreigners and Indonesians as heroes. The reportage 
included love stories and accounts by eyewitnesses and people injured in the blasts. It 
focused on foreigner victims, particularly Australian, and registered the fact that 
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unidentified victims may have been local motorcycle taxi-drivers, child beggars and 
prostitutes; these people drew little attention in the media.  
 
3.4.2 Insight 
The stories presented in both issues (15-21 October & 22-28 October, 2002) were 
loaded with dramatic appeal: “a sense of anger, sadness and pain” (22-28 October 
2002, p.6). There were gruesome accounts by the writers describing body parts spread 
on trees and on top of houses. Despite presenting a detailed narrative of horror, the 
photos used as illustration were less grisly or shocking than those in other 
publications.  
The overall reason given for the attacks described in the two editions was a “lack 
of cooperation within Indonesian intelligence agencies”. Despite initial reporting on 
the various possible causes of the bombings and who might be the perpetrators, the 
magazine gave space to the claims of the international media that the bombings were 
the work of al-Qaeda. Officials dismissed early speculations that a former army 
officer expert in explosives released from the military could have been involved in the 
bombings by saying that there was “pressure from the top not to spend time 
interviewing military staff” and ‘It would complicate matters’ (Tempo, 22-28 October 
2002, p.30). 
One of the most valuable aspects of the coverage was that it touched on social 
problems in the area of Kuta on Bali where the nightclubs were located, “an area 
popular with motorcycle taxi-drivers, child beggars and prostitutes who loitered 
nearby”(Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.6). The magazine described a series of 
situations in Bali that could have contributed to the local community’s grievances 
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against tourists. This issue was also raised by the New Straits Times (Sharmini, P., 
NST, 15 October 2002, p.4; Rashid, R., NST, 16 October 2002, p.10), which described 
the tourism industry exploiting the Hindu religion by turning temples into tourist 
spots. But Tempo generally portrayed Bali positively as “popular with foreign tourists 
and known as the place where the day never ends” (Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.6).  
The magazine carried stories based on accounts of eyewitnesses, victims and 
police officials; these stories had emotional appeal, such as a description of a “brave 
British man” and a love story involving an Indonesian couple (Fibri, R., Tempo, 22-
28 October 2002, p.38). Tempo also provided readers with tourism data “before and 
after the bombings”, discussing the economic impact of the blasts on the local 
community and the consequences for the country’s economy (pp.38, 39). 
The magazine reported that an American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
team was the first to arrive to probe the sites. It did not raise the issue of whether the 
team was already based in some place in Indonesia or in the region, or how it was 
possible for the team to be first considering the distance between Indonesia and the 
US. Nevertheless, the coverage noted that Indonesia succumbed to Australian and US 
pressure to allow their respective national experts to participate in the investigation of 
the bombings. Probably due to Bali proximity to major Australian cities, Australians 
make up the largest number of visitors to the island. As such, Australia was portrayed 
as if the bombings had been in its backyard.  Thus the reporting was in line with an 
article by the Jakarta Post that said,  
“Many people in Australia, including the media, saw the bombing as targeting 
Australians. And many people also feel that Bali, or the Kuta Beach resort 
where the bombs exploded, was Australians as kangaroos, or Fosters Lager” 
(Bayuni, E.M., JP, 23 October 2002, p.3).  
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Tempo followed the international and JP line of criticism of President Megawati 
and the government’s slowness to react to the attacks. The magazine also endorsed 
foreign government pressure on Indonesia while registering those governments’ 
offers of military training and money to act against terrorism.  
Tempo appealed to the Indonesian government not to jeopardize the international 
community’s trust, and urged the “police to work seriously in tracking the 
perpetrators – not leave the results hanging in the air like the bombing cases in 
Jakarta” (Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.11). Tempo reported on different opinions 
about the measures to counter terrorism, with discussion on the pros and cons of new 
regulations, while emphasizing that anti-terrorism laws did not guarantee success 
(‘Indonesia Issues Antiterrorism Regulations’, Tempo, 22-28 October 2002, p.36). 
The magazine reported on the presence of medical teams from Taiwan, Japan, 
Australia and the Philippines helping the victims in Bali. It published views of 
opponents and proponents of counter-terrorism laws from the perspectives of human 
rights groups and religious groups. It mentioned Time magazine’s allegation about 
Abu Bakar Bashir’s involvement with terrorism, while providing stories about Bashir 
and the disbandment of the radical group Laskar Jihad. Tempo published the opinions 
expressed by the leaders of Australia and the United States saying that JI and Bashir 
were responsible for the attacks and that terrorism is an old problem in Indonesia 
(‘911 for Australia’, Tempo 22-28 October 2002, p.32); this information was followed 
by the disclosure that the US had offered US$50 million to Indonesia to combat 
terrorism (p33). 
The magazine did not sensationalize its headlines or stories as there were no 
gruesome photo illustrations, but there were detailed and grisly accounts of the 
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bombings and their victims. Its coverage was closer to that of the ST in terms of 
providing shocking details than the other newspapers, JP and NST.  
 
3.5 Comparative Analysis 
It is reasonable to argue that the ST promoted fear and anxiety by producing stories on 
tightening security in Singapore, and by saying in reference to Bashir and terrorism 
that if one “lops off a head, another will grow” (Long, S., ST, 20 October 2002, p.29). 
With extensive use of rhetoric, the ST reported that there were many people ready to 
carry out terrorism in the region.  
The ST’s coverage of the Bali bombings was localized to address Singapore’s 
domestic concerns about religion, race and economic development. The ST not only 
analyzed the situation but it also recommended solutions, exercizing public 
diplomacy through a form of journalism that often became confrontational, 
particularly when reporting on the internal affairs of Indonesia (Go, R. ST, 20 October 
2002, p.15; Go, R., ST, 22 October 2002, p.1). 
The ST’s straight accounts of events were frequently followed by other stories 
giving the views of officials, experts and the representatives of institutions in 
Singapore on the ills in Indonesian society. ST presented radical Islam as the reason 
for terrorism. 
The JP was slow to appreciate the immediate consequences of the bombings, 
probably because the explosions happened in the late hours of a Saturday and blasts 
were rather frequent in various parts of the country. Nevertheless, once JP realized 
the impact of the violence, it provided full coverage.  
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The JP’s reporting stressed the failure of Indonesian intelligence agencies, urged 
the quick arrest of the perpetrators and pressed the Indonesian government to accept 
international views on the existence of terrorism in the country, as well as the 
involvement of JI in the bombings. Its initial reporting, however, saw ‘radical groups’ 
and ‘Muslim hard-liners’ as the source of concern for the authorities (‘National 
tragedy’, JP, 14 October 2002, p.6; Nafik M., & Kurniawan H., JP, 17 October 2002, 
p.2; Harsanto D., JP, 18 October 2002, p.1; Kurniawan, Moch. N., JP, 21 October 
2002, p.4)  
As the coverage continued, the JP developed two main themes: criticism of the 
government of President Megawati, and the economic consequences of the bombings. 
In its coverage, the JP failed to address various aspects, such as the conditions of taxi 
drivers, street beggars and prostitutes in Kuta in addition to the tourism industry’s 
exploitation of religious sites and symbols. These were serious omissions, especially 
considering that given its geographic location, the newspaper was in a good position 
to present a broad-ranging view of the bombings instead of following the tendency of 
the international media and foreign governments.  
The NST’s coverage portrayed Malaysia as a safe country and insisted that the 
government can handle the terrorism threat (‘Najib – We can handle terrorism threat’, 
NST, 22 October 2002, p.4), while stressing that the police would take action against 
anyone who represented a threat to national security. It appeared that the NST’s 
emphasis changed over time from exploitation of the entertainment industry in Bali 
(Rashid, R., NST, 16 October 2002, p.10) to a broad discourse on national security 
(‘Dr. Ling advises local port, airport managements to tighten security’, NST, 
21October 2002, p.4), including the threat to racial harmony (‘Be alert at all times, 
advises MB’, NST, 21 October 2002, p.4). The bombings in Bali were also linked to 
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the need to combat criminal acts in parts of Malaysia (‘Police tightening security at 
foreign-owned places’, NST, 16 October 2002, p.15). 
Only three days into the coverage, the incidents in Bali slipped to the inside pages 
and the NST started to focus on terrorism, tourism, investment and threats to 
Malaysian national security, particularly from members of KMM. The newspaper 
reflected foreign officials’ criticism of Indonesia as the weakest link in the fight 
against terror, and praised good governance and the use of the Internal Security Act in 
Malaysia and Singapore. It was not clear what caused this shift in tone, from 
discussing social exploitation and the possibility that the bombings were an act of 
local vengeance to a broad discourse on terrorism and warnings that “soft-peddling 
the terrorism threat in the name of democratic reform and civil liberties would be 
folly” (‘Prevention better than cure’, NST, 15 October 2002, p.10).  
While Malaysian officials were urging the international community to address the 
root causes of terrorism the Malaysian government was stepping up internal security 
and empowering the executive to deal with any threat to racial harmony and national 
security. The NST appears to have ignored this. 
The NST spread its stories around various sections of the newspaper, thus 
avoiding the sense that there was a crisis.  
As a weekly magazine with more time to elaborate on its coverage, Tempo 
provided plenty of information about the recent history of violence in Indonesia in its 
special edition. Tempo was critical of Megawati and attributed the violence to 
‘fundamentalism’. It focused on the impact of the blasts on the country’s economy 
and reproduced different views on counterterrorism laws and the effect on human 
rights and religious groups. The magazine reproduced different analyses of the 
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possible perpetrators and the causes of the blasts. Despite addressing the possible 
involvement of JI in the bombings, the magazine did not produce a discourse on 
religion. It directly addressed various topics that the JP ignored, such as the 
exploitation by the tourism industry of religious sites and symbols in Bali, and took 
into account other victims such as the beggars, prostitutes and taxi drivers ignored by 
the JP.  
The ST coverage of the Bali bombings was the most connected to the official line 
of interpretation of the facts. The NST, normally considered a government 
mouthpiece, demonstrated to have some independence between the official line of 
interpretation of the facts and its editorial. In addition, the newspaper reproduced 
different views from sources within the government.  
In contrast, the JP was keen to stress the weakness of the government of President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and the failure of Indonesia’s intelligence agency. The 
newspaper appears to have followed the international interpretation of the facts. 
Tempo magazine, with time to work on the coverage, produced detailed information 
and gave the stories a local understanding of the situation. 
  123
Chapter Four: Marriott Hotel Bombing 
The JW Marriott Hotel bombing occurred in 5 August 2003. It happened nine months 
after the Bali bombings (12 October 2002) and two days before a court in Jakarta was 
due to deliver its verdict on the first three dozen suspects on trial for bombing the Bali 
nightclubs. In the Marriott Hotel bombing 11 people were killed and 150 injured. 
Initial reports counted 14 people dead, a number reduced to 12 and then 11 in the 
following days.  
 
4.1 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: Straits Times 
The Straits Times (ST) reported on the Marriott Hotel bombing as the result of 
violence and revenge in Indonesia. The headline “14 dead in JI terror strike” already 
attributed blame. Official sources of information and the newspaper described the 
hotel as a prime target for terrorism because foreigners and Americans used the place. 
The initial reporting described the explosion as caused by a car bomb and JI 
‘operatives’ allegedly claimed responsibility (Pereira, D., ST, 6 August 2003, p.1).  
The revenge theory alleged in the stories was based on a message by a JI 
operative telling the ST that, “this is a message for her [Megawati] and all our 
enemies that, if they execute any of our Muslim brothers, we will continue this 
campaign of terror in Indonesia and the region” (Pereira, D. ST, 6 August 2003, p.1; 
Pereira, D., ST, 10 August 2003, p.15).  
The ST then interviewed experts who validate the assumption that JI members 
who escaped a police dragnet could be behind the attack (Rekhi, S., ST, 6 August 
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2003, p.6). While in its initial account the newspaper quoted a JI ‘operative’ as saying 
the attack was a warning to Megawati, it elsewhere expressed less certainty, saying it 
“appears to be a classic JI operation” (Pereira, D., ST, 6 August 2003, p.4). It is 
against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of 
terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between 
violence and religion, and the victims.  
4.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
The newspaper assumed that the bombing was an act of terrorism, specifically of 
revenge, and a warning to the Indonesian government and to the United States over its 
‘war against terror’. 
 
4.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The ST gave the terrorists’ names and background, such as Indonesian Muslim cleric 
Abu Bakar Bashir (alleged leader of JI in Southeast Asia; in prison at the time of the 
attack), Hambali (alleged mastermind of al Qaeda’s campaign of bombings in 
Southeast Asia), Azahari and Noordin (alleged Malaysian bomb experts); the 
extensive list of names included those of Zulkarmen and Dul Matin, who were 
characterized as al-Qaeda and JI ‘operatives’.  
The newspaper used labels such as ‘Muslim extremists’, ‘radicals’, ‘Islamic 
extremists’, ‘Islamic radicals’, ‘bombers’ and ‘Afghan alumni’ (Pereira, D., ST, 8 
August 2003, p.1; Pereira, D., ST, 10 August 2003, p.15; ‘To fight terror’, ST, 11 
August 2003, p.12). The ST introduced a new categorization, ‘foreign infidels, to refer 
to people assumed to have been the target of the attack (Asmarani, D., ST, 9 August 
2003, p. A1).  
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The identification of terrorists was mainly done through official sources of 
information within the Indonesian police and intelligence, while Australian officials 
identified JI as synonymous with terrorism (Associated Press & Agence France 
Presse, World Condemns Attack’, ST, 6 August 2003, p.8).  
 
4.1.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The stories gave the impression that the bombing at the entrance of the Marriott Hotel 
was a reaction to the trial of the Bali bombers and the cleric Bashir. This supposition 
was based on information released by Indonesian police, who cited Amrozi’s 
‘disclosure’ during the confession. Amrozi was one of the three dozens people on trial 
for the Bali bombings.  
The newspaper described the motive for the attack as establishing a Pan-Islamic 
state in the region, while Australian scholars said “JI’s aim was to destabilize 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s government” and “the attack on the hotel is 
clearly aimed at hitting the economy” (Rekhi, S., ST, 6 August 2003,p.6). Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted as saying, “more attacks in Indonesia 
might be imminent” (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 2003, p.1). Since the Bali bombings 
Australian Federal Police had been working with Indonesia in the fight against 
terrorism. The ST reported on a JI ‘operative’ who “called the ST’s office in Jakarta” 
to claim responsibility for the attack (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 2003, p. A1). 
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4.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
Although the attack was linked to JI, the emphasis was put on the cleric Abu Bakar 
Bashir as belonging to a “hardline Muslim group” (Agence France Presse, ‘Hardline 
Muslim group retains Bashir as leader’, ST, 13 August 2003, p. A6) and “the spiritual 
leader of the Jemaah Islamiah [sic] terrorist network.” (Pereira, D., ST, 8 August 
2003, p.1). The attack was linked to religion through the story ‘Radicals losing moral 
ground with moderate Muslim groups’ [sic] (Pereira, D. ST, 8 August 2003, p. A3).  
The connection with religion was also made through photographs of the 
alleged Bali bombers and prisoners Amrozi and Samudra, and a story in which 
Samudra allegedly said, he “I am happy, especially if the perpetrators were Muslims” 
(Associated Press, ST, 7 August 2003, p. A4; ‘Praise from Aussie Press’, ST, 9 
August 2003, p. A6).  
The ST linked religion and violence in its editorial ‘To fight terror’ saying, 
“Muslim extremists do not only target people and hurt fellow Muslims in the process, 
but they also try to sow the seeds of distrust between Muslims and others in South-
east Asia. Religious harmony must be protected from those who are out to destroy a 
fundamental strength of Asean” (To fight terror, ST, 11 August 2003, p.12).  In 
another article, ‘S’poreans know blast not linked to religion, the newspaper 
reproduced the views of a government official saying the terrorist act in Indonesia had 
nothing to do with any religion. The ST quoted the official saying, “the community 
must also do its part to counter the JI’s violent and extremist ideology, which is 
deeply entrenched among its members” (Osman, A., ST, 8 August 2003, p. A5).   
In the ST’s story ‘Abdullah vows zero tolerance for extremist groups’, the 
Malaysian official Abdullah Ahmad Badawi promised to “clamp down hard on 
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terrorism and extremism while promoting Islam as a religion of peace” (Osman, S., 
ST, 9 August 2003, p. A17).  The ST also produced an op-ed story on whether Islam is 
compatible with modernity (Latif, A. ST, 19 August 2003, p.15). 
 
4.1.1.4 The Victims 
The ST newspaper gave extensive coverage to Singaporeans who suffered injuries 
(Mulchand, A, ST, 7August 2003, p.1). The Indonesian survivors were mentioned, but 
the focus was on those who were flown for medical treatment to Singapore; four 
Singaporeans and four foreigners who suffered up to 33 per cent burns were treated at 
Singapore General Hospital (Hooi, A. & Vijayan, K.C., ST, 7 August 2003, pg. A3; 
Hooi, A. ST, 8 August 2003, p. A3). The local angle included a story of how a 




In its editorial ‘Lessons of the blast’, the ST treated at face value the allegation that 
Abu Bakar Bashir was the “ideological head” of JI (ST, 7 August 2003, p.16). It also 
speculated on the speed of recruitment to JI and on how “dangerously driven are these 
people?” (ibid) in a reference to the alleged people associated with Bashir (Agence 
France Presse, ‘Suspect attended Bashir’s school’, ST, 11 August 2003, p.A5; 
Pereira, D., ST, 11 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper reported on the wisdom of eye-
for-an eye retribution in the case of the Islamic militants facing trial and possibly 
execution. 
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The ST referred to a telephone call received by the ST’s Indonesia bureau chief 
Derwin Pereira hours after the Marriott Hotel bombing, apparently from a JI source, 
warning that the group would wage a “campaign of terror in Indonesia and in the 
region” if “Muslim brothers were executed”. In the first person account, the journalist 
disclosed how he convinced a “long-standing and well-placed informant in 
Indonesia”, and how he pressed the “informant to link me up with this elusive JI 
source to call me”, to talk about key leadership changes in JI and plans for new 
attacks in Indonesia and the region (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 2003, p. A1). The 
journalist appears to be exercising a type of investigative journalism, which goes 
beyond the role of a correspondent in a foreign country. 
The Marriott Hotel bombing coverage then turned to public diplomacy with the 
newspaper in its editorial column asking, “what more could be done to anticipate and 
thwart these hits?” In the editorial ‘Lessons of the blast’ the newspaper provided the 
answer by stating, “Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have to find 
new ways to raise the quality of intelligence gathering and sharing”. The ST also 
suggested that the “infiltration of terrorist cells is a new operational demand for which 
the right personnel have to be found” (‘Lessons of the blast’, ST, 7 August 2003, 
p.16).  
The reporting was interlaced with warnings issued by Australian and American 
government officials on new attacks in Indonesia. Indonesian officials, in response to 
international pressure, also cited the possibility of new attacks. But the ST prejudged 
Indonesian initiatives saying, “security stepped up, but authorities not yet ready to 
introduce detention without trial for terrorism suspects” (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 




The ST repeated its call for tough laws in Indonesia to deal with the threats of 
terrorism. The newspaper reproduced the view expressed by Indonesian Coordinating 
Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who said a presidential decree would 
permit detention if national security was at risk and “the lives of innocent persons are 
worth more than the price of human rights”. In an editorial, the newspaper agreed, 
saying, “Indonesia can proceed with a clear conscience, despite its post-Suharto 
liberalising instincts. This is war” (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 2003, p.1; ‘Lessons of 
the blast’, ST, 7August 2003, p.16).  
As with the coverage of the Bali bombings, the newspaper in an attempt to 
transfer values and practices across borders, it said that the “Internal Security Act 
(ISA) used in Singapore and Malaysia allows indefinite detention of suspects deemed 
a threat to national security” (Pereira, D., ST, 12 August 2003, p.1). However, the 
writer, Derwin Pereira, reported on his own prejudgment saying, “Indonesia might not 
be ready as yet for an ISA equivalent. What could be accomplished at this stage 
would be adding teeth to existing laws” (Pereira, D., ST, 19 August 2003, p. A1). The 
journalist is not only adding his views to the story, he is also assuming that Indonesia 
is not ready to have stiff laws to deal with allegedly suspect terrorists while 
suggesting what should be done. 
In its editorial ‘To fight terror’ (ST, 11 August 2003, p.12), the ST reinforced the 
view that the answer to terrorism was to combine prevention with punishment. Then it 
said, “Given terrorism’s reach, prevention is a truly international effort”. It appeared 
that the ST had a campaign not only to transfer values and norms across borders, but 
also to interfere in another country’s policy formulation.  
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The ST admitted that Indonesia’s neighbours had a direct stake in the Indonesian 
anti-terror campaign, saying, “Singapore and Malaysia will welcome any tightening 
of its security structure that would disrupt terrorists plots and recruitments” [sic]. The 
editorial ‘A law for the times’ warned, “There should be safeguards written into the 
statute. The military and the police need to show the law will not be used to silence 
government critics and activists” (‘A law for the times’, ST, 13, August 2003, p.16). It 
is ironic that the ST produced this view, since the ISA is widely used in Singapore for 
various reasons, including political ones, which Amnesty International would not 
have condoned.  
In a morbid story, ‘More Grief on Sunday?’, the newspaper predicted that more 
people would die in possible attacks during Indonesia’s Independence Day 
celebrations. The reporting suggested a list of possible targets. Citing anonymous 
Indonesian police sources, the ST speculated, “the strike might [sic] come not just 
from the Jemaah Islamiah, but also from the Free Aceh Movement”. The Australian 
government was also quoted as warning that “Aug 17 could be the day of another 
terrorist attack” (Asmarani, D., ST, 12 August 2003, p. A1). Despite the fact that one 
cannot report on what has not happened yet, but, subsequently, there were more 
stories on possible further attacks and the threat of terrorists remaining high (Go, R., 
ST, 14 August 2003, p. A3). 
The article was followed by an extensive number of stories on ‘terror in 
Indonesia’, filled with details on a special cell of JI that was responsible for the 
Marriott attack, including the alleged suicide bomber Asmar Latin Sani. 
In relating the blast in Jakarta to the Singapore context, the newspaper published a 
story ‘Calm or resigned to threat of terror?’ reproducing the views of people in the 
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business and tourism sectors. The ST interviewed 50 people in Singapore who “felt 
the explosion would either have no impact or only a marginal impact on the economy 
here”. Singaporeans “felt the chances of a similar attack happening here were remote 
due to its [Singapore’s] tight security measures.” (Wong, K., ST, 7 August 2003, p. 
A2).  
 In contrast, the story ‘Can this happen in Singapore?’ answered the question in its 
title by explaining that Singapore was a major target, not only because of its links 
with the United States but also because of its success against JI. It said, “Singapore 
remains a potential terrorism target not least because of its close links with the United 
States, but also because of its success against Al-Qaeda’s Jemaah Islamiah (JI) 
network here” (Nirmala, M., & Teo, L. ST, 7 August 2003, p.3). It appears the story 
was making reference to the arrest of a group of men suspected of terrorism activities.  
The ST localised the Marriott Hotel bombing turning to national pride and 
patriotism with the “nation puts Sars, terror and economic gloom behind it and 
celebrates” (Tan, W., ST, 10 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper created an 
exaggerated sense of alertness with a focus on security measures taken for the 
National Day parade. It stressed the high level of security in Singapore and the public 
and government leaders’ resolve that life goes on with or without terrorism. The 
newspaper reported on increased security measures at a public housing development 
in Toa Payoh Central, and on alerts in malls, hotels and institutions such as the 
American Chamber of Commerce and international schools.  
The Marriott Hotel blast was also addressed in the context of religion and race in 
Singapore. The ST reported, “Singaporeans know the blast is not linked to religion” 
(Osman, A., ST, 8 August 2003, p. A5). It added that the attack should not turn a 
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spotlight on the Malay/Muslim community, while Singaporeans should not be 
alarmed that a study by the National Institute of Education had found there was a low 
level of interracial mixing in neighbourhood primary schools. But the ST examined 
the Malay community in articles such as ‘Emerging role of religion in Malaysian 
politics’ and discussed the “Arabisation” [sic] of Malay culture”, saying, “ is perhaps 
not surprising, given than more [sic] 100,000 Malaysian Muslims have in recent years 
studied at Middle Eastern and Pakistani religious schools” (Devan, J., ST, 8 August 
2003, p.24).   
The Marriott Hotel bombing gave rise to a variety of stories on subjects such as 
threats to Singapore, Bashir, and the need for strong law in Indonesia, the Jemaah 
Islamiyah special cell, and the capture of Hambali in Thailand. The newspaper 
reported extensively on Singaporeans injured in the blast and on Indonesian victims 
brought to Singapore for medical treatment. The latter reporting was in line with 
Singapore’s plan to become a regional medical hub, as pointed out in chapter five.  
The newspaper also carried emotional accounts by Singaporean and Indonesian 
survivors and eyewitnesses. The newspaper produced the title ‘we miss his laughter” 
in a story about how a Singaporean enjoyed cooking and “now is in an intensive care 
unit in Singapore’ (Hooi, A., ST, 9 August 2003, p. A2). Indonesian casualties were 
absent from the stories, except in the case of a few photographs published.  
 
4.2 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: Jakarta Post 
The bombing in the centre of Jakarta in August 2003 was Indonesia’s second largest 
attack against an international target. It happened less than a year after the Bali 
bombings in October 2002, and occurred in the middle of trials of suspects linked to 
  133
those explosions. Indonesian officials linked the bombing to the Jemaah Islamiyah 
group immediately after the blast while the JP blamed the government for “its laid-
back attitude towards the threat of terrorism” (‘Terrorists strike again’, JP, 6 August 
2003, p.6).  
 
4.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Jakarta Post 
In the coverage of the hotel bombing, the JP conceived of terrorism as a threat to 
national stability and to security, whereas the Bali bombing had only been thought of 
as a threat to the economy. The idea of terrorism was expanded to produce a sense of 
national and patriotic involvement among the public.  
 Terrorism was also conceptualised as inspired in the Osama bin Laden’s brand of 
Islam; to a large extent this relied on labelling provided by the story ‘Al-Qaeda brand 
of terror wins Asian recruits: Experts’, written by Jane Macartney from Reuters news 
agencies (Macartney, J., JP, 9 August 2003, p.3). The JP used Western newswires 
extensively to cover the incident, in addition to its staff writers. Editors argued that 
since the JP subscribes to these wire services, why not use their stories? It is against 
this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ 
are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between religion and 
violence, and the victims. 
 
4.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The images of terrorists became more specific with names of suspects provided by 
police sources appearing in the pages of the JP (Siboro, T., JP, 7 August 2003, p.2; 
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Hakim, Z., & Ntoma, R. KD. JP, 10 August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, D., & Unidjaja, 
F.D., JP, 11 August 2003, p.1; ‘Asmar graduated from Ngruki school’, JP, 11 August 
2003, p.2; Harsanto, D., JP, 13 August 2003, p.1; ‘Police complete preliminary 
reconstruction of Marriott blast’, JP, August 14, 2003, p.2; Harsanto, D., JP, 15 
August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, D., JP, 16 August 2003, p.2).  
 The concept of terrorists had evolved from an abstract concept to a group of 
people to individual faces, e.g., Hambali, Asmar, Azahari, Sani, Tohir and so forth. 
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
also expanded the perception of terrorists by citing the “it [the bombing] could have 
been perpetrated by JI or Acehnese separatists, or other parties, including 
communists” (Siboro, T., JP, 7 August 2003, p.2).  
Government and police officers quickly linked the bombers to JI and later to the 
Bali bombings (Harsanto, D., & Siboro, T., JP, 7 August 2003, p.1; Siboro, T., JP, 7 
August 2003, p.2; Siboro, T., JP, 8 August 2003, p.3), although at first the 
Coordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhono, 
was careful to call the bombers  ‘perpetrators’ (1Govt condemns blast as calls mount 
for immediate action’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.3), making the point that it was not clear 
yet who was responsible for the Marriott Hotel blast.  
The JP was also careful in attributing the responsibility of the bombing. In its 
story ‘Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath’, the newspaper reported on the 
bombers as ‘perpetrators’ (JP, 7 August 2003, p.3). The newspaper also used 
‘perpetrators’ in its editorial (‘Terrorists strike again’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.6), but 
reproduced stories from agencies saying “new warnings from U.S. authorities that 
Islamic extremists were planning new attacks in the region” (‘RI, Australia plan 
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counterterrorism summit- Downer’, JP, 11 August 2003, p.3); the newspaper also 
reproduced one article from the newspaper The New York Times, where terrorists 
were called ‘criminals’ (‘We must fight rampant crimes’, JP, 11 August 2003, p.6). 
However, as the coverage stretched into weeks, the newspaper became less careful 
about assigning blame. 
Once police and government officials determined that JI was behind the blast 
(Harsanto, D., JP, 15 August 2003, p.1), and the police began to arrest people alleged 
to be related to JI (Hakim, Z, & Ntoma, R. KD., JP, 10 August 2003, p.1; Harsanto, 
D., & Unidjaja, F.D., JP, 11 August 2003, p.1), the newspaper did not question 
whether people arrested in the sweep could be innocent, as some later proved to be. In 
the same way, it did not challenge the idea that JI was responsible for the Marriott 
Hotel bombing, instead accepting this as fact.  
 
4.2.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The newspaper not only blamed Megawati’s administration for the attack – “another 
failure of the government’s intelligence”, “the government is at fault for its laid-back 
attitude towards terrorism”, “government has been caught napping” (‘Terrorists strike 
again’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.6) – but also lashed out against her personally in the 
story ‘Megawati breaks Marriott silence, kind of’ (JP, 9 August 2003, p.1). In its 
editorial ‘Only a panic reaction’ the JP said, “the impact of Tuesday’s terrorist 
bombing should not be exaggerated. But complacency and a laid-back attitude, 
expecting that things would automatically become normal again, is not well advised 
either” (‘Only a panic reaction’, JP, 7 August 2003, p.6).  
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The newspaper also published stories based on interviews with analysts and 
legislators criticising the government for not doing enough to fight terror 
(Taufiqurrahman, M. & Suryana, A., JP, 6 August 2003, p.3). The story ‘Making 
Jakarta a home for the wary’, the JP reproduced further criticism: “the central 
problem is not the intelligence agencies, but the government. It’s the government that 
has been caught napping and let these things happen” (Susanti, I, JP, 10 August 2003, 
p.1).  
The newspaper cited Indonesian authorities’ concern that the bombing might be 
related to the trials of the Bali bombing suspects and their spiritual leader Abu Bakar 
Bashir as a way to intimidate the court ahead of the verdict (Siboro, T., JP, 7 August 
2003, p.2; Unidjaja, F.D., & Gunawan, A., JP, 10 August 2003, p.1).  
The blaming game for the failure to prevent the bombing took centre stage in the 
stories, with officials blaming the police, the intelligence agencies or security officers 
(Muninggar, S.S., JP, 9 August 2003, p.2; ‘Opposition grows to government-
proposed draconian security law’, JP, 13 August 2003, p.1; ‘Govt may revise terror 
law’, JP, 14 August 2003, p.1). The newspaper lashed out at the lack of good 
governance and lack of coordination among the various agencies (‘A ‘pansus’ on 
Marriott?’, JP, 12 August 2003, p.2). 
 
4.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
One piece of evidence that the bombing was linked to religion was that the suspects, 
according to official sources, belonged to JI. Another connection of violence with 
faith came from the Australian Prime Minister John Howard who said, “terrorism is 
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as much an enemy of Islam as it is of other religions” (Longmore, M., JP, 11 August 
2003, p.3).  
The newspaper also reproduced allusions to “bin Laden’s brand of Islam” and 
“schooled in Muslim madrassas” (Macartney, J., JP, 9 August 2003, p.3). A Sydney-
datelined story from news agencies said, “Islamic extremists were planning new 
attacks in the region” (‘RI, Australia plan counterterrorism summit: Downer’, JP, 11 
August 2003, p.3). The JP reported on religious leaders’ objections to the use of the 
term “Muslim terrorists” by foreign media and their displeasure with the “increasing 
attempts to equate Islam with terror following the attack on the JW Marriott Hotel” 
(Kurniawan, M., JP, 16 August 2003, p.4).  
Both experts and politicians guided readers to the assumption that there was a link 
between violence and religion. The assumptions were ‘built in’ rather than directly 
stated (Simonov, V., JP, 9 August 2003, p.7; ‘The Jakarta bombing’, JP, 11 August 
2003, p.6; Kurniawan, M. N., JP, 15 August 2003, p.2).  
 
4.2.1.4 The Victims 
The JP had many stories on the victims, who were mostly taxi drivers and security 
guards working at or around the hotel. Eyewitnesses’ accounts were made into 
narratives, together with the views of relatives of the victims, stating their distrust of 
the police and that the Suharto period was better (‘Bringing terrorists to court is waste 
of time’, JP, 7 August 2003, p.8).  
The human stories did not reach the level of sensationalism or melodrama, but 
they were enough to reveal the suffering of ordinary Indonesians caught in the 
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violence. There was only one foreigner among the fatalities in the bombing; the news-
paper reported on this fact without sensationalizing it. Nevertheless, the newspaper 
could have provided a better service by addressing issues such as the fact that the 
Indonesian government would pay for local victims’ hospital expenses (‘My poor 
boy! He had three children’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.1; ‘Compensation for terror 
victims’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.4). It appeared that neither the relatives of the victims 
nor the hospitals’ administrators were aware of the government’s initiative.  
 
4.2.2 Insight 
Many controversial topics appeared in the pages of the newspaper but for reasons that 
remained unclear were not pursued. A number of possible causes of the violence 
appeared in various stories: to challenge the government; to strike against Western 
interests as the Marriott Hotel is an avenue for political and social events held by 
Australians and the Americans in Jakarta; to strike a blow against US interests; 
religious fanaticism; social and political grievances among young Muslims; and social 
and economic inequalities. But the newspaper chose to maintain the line that the 
attack mainly happened because of lack of coordination among the government 
agencies in the fight against terrorism and the ineptitude of the government. 
The explosion was the fifth bombing to rock the capital in 2003 but the only one 
to have wide repercussions since it was the first bomb to claim lives since the Bali 
bombings (Taufiqurrahman, M., & Suryana, A., JP, 6 August 2003, p.3). The JP 
reproduced the opinion of Ivy Susanti that “terrorist bombings have become the 
fashion in Indonesia in the post Soeharto era” (Susanti, I., JP, 10 August 2003, p.1).  
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At least 21 bombs blasts had rocked the country since January 1998, which killed 
21 people and injured more than 250 (Taufiqurrahman, M., & Suryana, A. JP, 6 
August 2003, p.3), excluding the Bali bombings. Despite the chain of blasts, 
rebuilding confidence of the international community became a major public issue 
with the Marriott Hotel explosion (‘Terrorists strike again’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.6; 
‘Only a panic reaction’, JP, 7 August 2003, p.6). The way to build the confidence was 
to quickly arrest the perpetrators (‘Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath’, 
JP, 7 August 7, 2003, p.3).  
The newspaper reproduced and did not challenge the official line that the suspects 
in the Marriott Hotel bombing were linked to the Bali blasts (‘Most Marriott suspects 
linked to Bali blast, other bombings’, JP, 19 August 2003, p.1). Its reporting based on 
information from anonymous police source had the function of consolidating the 
international view of terrorism in Indonesia.  
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono started calling upon the population to participate in the fight against 
terrorism, “public must help police hunt down the perpetrators and pass on 
information to the security authorities” (‘Govt condemns blast as calls mount for 
immediate action’, JP, 6 August 2003, p.3). The JP reproduced the [then] minister’s 
request for “the public to cooperate with the police to maintain security” 
(Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsono, D., JP, 14 August 2003, p.1). A former general 
who served during the Suharto era, the minister argued that human rights became less 
important in the fight against terrorism, “The government will impose these 
restrictions as we are determined to prevent the deaths of more victims. Their lives 
are worth more than the price of human rights” (‘Terrorists strike again’, JP, 6 August 
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2003, p.1). One year later, in 2004, Yudhoyono became the first popularly elected 
president of the Republic of Indonesia.  
Foreign governments helped turn the Marriott Hotel bombing into a case of 
international terrorism by announcing new threats in Indonesia, issuing travel 
warnings and cancelling social functions. In doing so, the US and Australian 
governments demonstrated a lack of confidence in Indonesia even though they were 
collaborating with Indonesian police in the investigations of the Marriott Hotel and 
the Bali bombings (Longmore, M., JP, 11 August 2003, p.3; Taufiqurrahman, M. & 
Muninggar, S.S., JP, 12 August 2003, p.2; ‘Australian military to renew ties with 
Indonesia’s Kopassus’, JP, 12 August 2003, p.3.; Agence France Presse, ‘Another 
terror attack certain, Australia spy chief warns’, JP, 13 August 2003, p.11; 
Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsanto, D., JP, 14 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., JP,15 
August 2003, p.3). 
The Indonesian Head of the Anti-Terror desk at the Office of the Coordinating 
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Insp. Gen. Ansjaad Mbai, said, “we [the 
government] do not mean to create panic, but the people have to realize that their 
families or friends, or even themselves, could become the victims of these acts of 
terror” (Siboro, T., JP, 8 August 2003, p.3).  
The newspaper published stories quoting a variety of people who endorsed and 
reaffirmed such warnings. This technique created anxiety, fear and uncertainty among 
the population but strengthened the authorities’ (military, police, intelligence) efforts 
to pass a “draconian law to pre-empt terrorist strikes” (Kurniawan, H., & Unidjaja, 
F.D., JP, 12 August 2003, p.1; Taufiqurrahman, M., & Harsanto, D., JP, 14 August 
2003, p.1).  
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Amid the criticism of poor coordination between security agencies and their 
failure to prevent the Marriott Hotel bombing, the government announced it would 
give more power to TNI, the Indonesian military, to thwart further attacks and to 
detect and find possible terror threats that needed an immediate response (‘Govt may 
revise terror law’, JP, 14 August 2003, p.1; Muninggar, S., S., JP, 15 August 2003, 
p.1). The government was bringing back the military to the pre-reform era. The 
newspaper did raise some concerns about this, saying  
“it is disturbing to learn that many senior government officials are now calling 
for the introduction of draconian legislation similar to Malaysia’s or 
Singapore’s Internal Security Act as a way of dealing with the threat of 
terrorism. Has it not occurred to them that the problem is not so much the lack 
of legislation, but more the incompetence, probably uncoordinated, work of 
our many intelligence agencies?” (‘A ‘pansus’ on Marriott?’, JP, 12 August 
2003, p.6).  
The Marriott Hotel bombing coverage was combined with stories on the trials of 
the Bali bombers, the arrest in Thailand of the “terrorism mastermind Hambali” (‘Top 
JI operative captured in Thailand’, JP, 16 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F. D., JP, 17 
August 2003, p.1), and links between the Marriott Hotel bombers and the Bali 
suspects (‘Most Marriott suspects linked to Bali blast, other bombings’, JP, 19 
August 2003, p.1). The JP reported on Dow Jones quoting the Los Angeles Times as 
saying, “Indonesian police officials had issued warnings to at least seven US 
companies because their names were found in papers uncovered during a raid on the 
house of suspected JI members in Semarang, Central Java (‘Govt to boost security in 
vital projects’, JP, 14 August 2003, p.13). The JP mentioned the information as part 
of a story but failed to question why Indonesian police apparently provided first-hand 
information to international media and not to local media.  
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Another example involved the ST, which reported that JI had claimed 
responsibility for the Marriott Hotel bombing (Harsanto, D., JP, 7 August 2003, p.1). 
The Jakarta Post did not bother to question how the Singaporean daily obtained the 
information or to verify the information published by the ST. Except for the mention 
of the National Police detective’s chief Inspector Gen. Erwin Mapasseng saying he 
[the inspector] was surprised to learn about the report carried out by Singaporean 
daily, the JP ignored the issue.  
The same kind of attitude was shown when the Australian government announced 
it would renew co-operation with the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) to help 
fight terrorism (‘Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia’s Kopassus’, JP, 12 
August 2003, p.3). The JP’s reporting of the announcement was based on stories from 
foreign news agency that barely mentioned the close ties between the Australian and 
Indonesian armed forces during the 1990s under Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Nor 
did the JP take the opportunity to discuss the close ties between the Indonesian 
military and radical groups in the past.  
The JP reported on the impact of the Marriott Hotel bombing on the economy but 
did not make an issue of it. In fact, economic analysts were reported claiming the 
impact of the bombing was expected to be limited (‘Only a panic reaction’, JP, 7 
August 2003, p.6; Perdana, A.A., JP, 8 August 2003, p.3; Wijaksana, D., JP, 11 
August 2003, p.1; Wijaksana, D., JP, 12 August 2003, p.3). 
 
The JP relied mostly on information provided by politicians, police, Indonesian 
and Australian government officials, international specialists and foreign news 
agencies. It also included eyewitnesses and relatives’ accounts in the stories related to 
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the victims. Although the bombing occurred in Jakarta, where the newspaper is 
located, the JP also used stories related to the bombing from international news 
agencies (e.g. ‘Indonesia gets world support in blast aftermath’, JP, 7 August 2003, 
p.3; ‘Bali verdict raises fears of new attacks’, JP, 8 August 2003, p.11; Macartney, J., 
JP, 9 August 2003, p.3; ‘RI, Australia plan counterterrorism summit: Downer’, JP, 11 
August 2003:3; ‘Australian military to renew ties with Indonesia’s Kopassus’, JP, 12 
August 2003, p.3).  
 
4.3 Coverage of the Marriott Hotel Bombing: New Straits Times 
The NST’s initial coverage of the bombing at the Marriott Hotel assumed as an 
established fact that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack. At the same time, 
reproducing Indonesian official views, the blast was linked to the Bali bombings and 
to JI. The NST’s reporting portrayed the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir as the 
spiritual leader of JI (‘US authorities tracking Hambali since 1995’, NST, 16 August 
2003, p.4), and ‘Hambali, the terrorist mastermind’ as the ‘second-in-command’ 
linking al-Qaeda and JI (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, NST, 16 August 2003, p.1). 
 
4.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
The newspaper reported on the concept of terrorism as a threat to security represented 
by Islamic militants.  Former Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, now 
the Prime Minister, was reported as saying “terrorism would not be terrorism if it did 
not have a political motive” (‘Abdullah – Address political dimension of terrorism’, 
NST, 8 August 2003, p.4). It is against this background that the four main 
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subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots 
of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
4.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The NST reproduced the views of Indonesian officials’ claim that the group JI was 
responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing. A few names were mentioned such as 
Asmar Latin Sani, Sartono Siliwangi, Muhamad Raiz, Abu Bakar Bashir, Azahari 
Hussin, and Hambali as the alleged suspects in the bombing and the masterminds of 
the attack. The newspaper reproduced the labels such as ‘radical Islamists’ (‘The 
beating heart of global terror’, NST, 9 August 2003, p.10), and ‘Islamic militants’ 
(Ahmad, A., NST, 13 August 2003, p.10). 
 
4.3.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The NST took a global view to indicate what is the motivation for the violence. In 
its editorial ‘Jakarta jolt’, it said, “no punitive measure will really be able to stop acts 
of terrorism by militants unless the roots of the problem which foster their mindless 
messianic zeal are addressed” (‘Jakarta jolt’, NST, 7 August 2003, p.12). Throughout 
the reporting, the need for a political solution to the roots of terrorism was repeated 
(Ahmad, A., NST, 13 August 2003, p.10).  
 
The NST reported on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and American 
support of Israel as another cause for international terrorism (‘The beating heart of 
global terror’, NST, 9 August 2003, p.10). The newspaper did not report on any 
  145
particular reason for the Marriott bombing but mentioned that the Jemaah Islamiyah 
group’s ambition is to create a Pan-Islamic state in the region. 
 
4.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The NST described the bombers as Muslims but at the same time recorded the 
observation made by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi that, “terrorist 
activities by Islamic groups have nothing to do with Islam” (‘Abdullah – Address 
political dimension of terrorism’, NST, 8 August 2003, p.4). In its editorial ‘Difficult 
passage’, the newspaper reported on the American visa policies saying, “its basic 
premises is that everyone from Muslim countries is a potential terrorist” (‘Difficult 
passage’, NST, 6 August 2003, p.10).  
 
4.3.1.4 The Victims 
Except for a few stories noting that fewer than five Malaysians were injured in the 
blast while attending a course in the hotel, the newspaper did not report substantially 
on the victims (Joheng, J., NST, 6 August 2003, p.1; ‘Only three Malaysians injured, 
says embassy’, NST, 7 August 2003, p.2; David, A., NST, 8 August 2003, p.2). 
 
4.3.2 Insight 
The NST’s articles emphasized the need to address the roots of terrorism. However, 
the perspective on the roots of the violence was based on international issues, such as 
the Palestinian case, the Iraq invasion and the war in Afghanistan. The newspaper 
reproduced the official views that punitive and military measures alone cannot solve 
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the problem of terrorism. While the NST reproduced official views on the benefits of 
social control and the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in order to fight any 
threat to the country (‘No adverse impact on economy, says PM’, NST, 8 August 
2003, p.2; ‘Najib: Situation here well under control’, NST, 10 August 2003, p.4), the 
newspaper failed to address the extensive use of the Internal Security Act as a 
punitive measure in Malaysia in a number of circumstances.  
The newspaper reported on the increase of security operations and surveillance in 
the country to ensure that “incidents like Jakarta bomb blast did [sic] not occur in 
Malaysia” (‘No adverse impact on economy, says PM’, NST, 8 August 2003, p.2). 
The NST reproduced the official views on the need for increased sharing of 
intelligence in order to prevent crime and protect public safety, though the officials 
insisted that Malaysia is safe, because it has “a great track record in handling terror 
threats” (‘Najib: Situation here well under control’, NST, 10 August 2003, p.4).  
The government’s concern about the possibility of terrorism affecting the tourist 
industry was one of the highlights of the coverage (Ganesan, V., NST, 6 August 2003, 
p.6; ‘Concerned tourism industry players meet to discuss impact of bombing’, NST, 7 
August 2003, p.2). In order to guarantee the tourist and investors confidence the 
newspaper reported on the increased security in ports and residential areas popular 
with foreigners (‘Musa: Police and army on full alert following attack’, NST, 7 
August 2003, p.2; Joheng, J., NST, 10 August 2003, p.2). The NST’s reporting showed 
how authorities were blending measures to fight terrorism with police actions to 
prevent crime, such as “rounds in housing areas in order to determine ways to monitor 
crime activities” (Joheng, J., NST, 10 August 2003, p.2). 
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The newspaper dedicated space to stories reporting on the “atmosphere of 
insecurity” in certain sections of Jakarta, particularly the hospitality areas such as 
McDonald’s, hotels and shopping malls mostly used by the expatriate community 
(‘Life will never be the same for Jakarta after Marriott bombing’, NST, 10 August 
2003, p.8). Superficially, the newspaper reported on the possibility of Indonesia 
considering the introduction of preventative detention laws to combat terrorism.  
While speculating on the possibility of more terrorist strikes in Indonesia, the NST 
revealed but did not elaborate on the fact that Australian forensic experts arrived at 
the Marriott Hotel scene of the attack before Indonesian authorities (‘Indonesia 
bracing for more attacks’, NST, August 10, 2003, p.8).  
The coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing took a new turn with the arrest of 
Hambali, in Thailand. The NST provided detailed information on Hambali and 
reported on him as the ‘de facto’ leader of JI and an al-Qaeda representative in 
Southeast Asia (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, NST, 16 August 2003, p.1; ‘US 
authorities tracking Hambali since 1995’, NST, 16 August 2003, p.4). The newspaper 
published detailed stories from wire services about the “clandestine operation in 
Thailand which saw him being whisked out from the country by the American agents 
to an undisclosed location” (‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, NST, 16 August 2003, 
p.1). 
The NST’s reporting resembled that of the ST and the JP in reproducing officials’ 
calls to tighten security, collect better information, share intelligence and take tough 
action against alleged suspects, as well as governments’ travel warnings.  
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The NST did not use of a glossy style of communication to address the issue of 
terrorism as opposed to ST. The newspaper, however, repeated words and statements 
by the Malaysian authorities a few times. For example,  
“terrorism is not a scourge that is easily wiped out. We can make life very 
difficult for terrorist elements, we can scatter them, we can cut of one head 
here and one tentacle there. But often the beast survives”. The statement was 
published in the editorial “Terrorism’s political motive” (NST, 8 August 2003, 
p.10); the remark was repeated word by word by former Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad in the story “Answer terror with courage” (Ahmad, A. 
NST, 13 August 2003, p.10).  
Officials were the main source of information and details of the bombing itself 
were emphasized less than stories that politicized the attacks within the context of 
international terrorism.  
 
4.4 Coverage of Marriott Hotel Bombing: Tempo 
Tempo magazine reported on the Marriott Hotel bombing with the assumption that JI 
was responsible for the explosion. In its Opinion page the magazine addressed the 
view that the law should be applied to all people without exception including those 
involved in terrorism. The focus of the article was that repressive measures lead 
radical groups to become stronger and more violent (‘August 5, 2003’, Tempo, 12-19 
August 2003, p.9).  
The magazine published an interview with the foreign minister of Malaysia, Syed 
Hamid Albar, who declared, “terrorists cannot stir in Malaysia” since “we are always 
monitoring” and “ because we use preventive law”, in reference to the use of the 
Internal Security Act (ISA), (Tempo, 12-19 August 2003, p.42). Tempo had stories on 
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the trial of the “most infamous Bali bombing suspect Amrozi” (p.44). The reporting 
on the Marriott Hotel bombing extended to the capture of Hambali in the story “Dead 
end for Hambali.”  
 
4.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo 
There was no clear conceptualization of terrorism in the coverage, but Tempo stated 
the radical groups must be viewed in the same way as “the flu; it can never be 
completely wiped out, but we must take steps to prevent the threat of becoming too 
great” (Tempo, 12-19 August 2003, p.9). It is against this background that the four 
main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, 
roots of violence, connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
4.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The images portrayed by the magazine were of members of JI, of Hambali and of 
Free Aceh Movement fighters, exploring the possibility that the latter were involved 
in the bombing. Tempo’s reporting revealed a list of names such as Mustofa, Ali 
Gufron, Abu Farouk, Suyono and so forth as suspected terrorists linked to the JI 
network. Asmar Latin Sani was described as the suicide bomber from a JI wing.  
 
4.4.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The bombing was described as a warning to President Megawati and Indonesian 
police, and as a consequence as a power struggle between competing Indonesian 
security agencies. Tempo reported, “On Tuesday last week, Singapore newspaper The 
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Straits Times received a call from a man claiming to speak for Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). 
He said the blast was a ‘bloody warning’ to President Megawati and the Indonesian 
police” (‘A Bloody Warning to Megawati’, Tempo 12-19 August 2003, p.18). 
 Exploring another possible cause for the violence Tempo cited an unidentified 
source, “A political analyst who requested anonymity said the Marriott bombing was 
only part of a power struggle in Indonesia, linking the blast to the annual session of 
the People’s Consultative Assembly then in progress” (Tempo, 12-10 August 2003, 
p.18). 
 
4.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
Tempo’s reporting on the Marriott Hotel bombing did not make any association 
between violence and religion. The few stances the magazine made reference to 
religion was in the article on Hambali. The magazine stated, “Malaysia police would 
not issue an arrest warrant for Hambali, as [he] Hambali was regarded as a religious 
figure there” (‘Dead End for Hambali’, Tempo, 12-19 August 2003, p.77).  
Another connection with religion in the same story said,   
“The Malaysian Police subsequently changed their position and Mahathir’s 
government started taking a tough stance against the group known as the 
Malaysian Mujahidin Assembly. Many Islamic activists were arrested, 
charged with plotting subversive activities” (‘Dead End for Hambali’, Tempo, 
12-19 August 2003, p.77). 
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4.4.1.4 The Victims 
The magazine published various stories based on eyewitness accounts. The stories 
reported how Miss Indonesia 2002, Angeline Sondakh, had been modelling in front of 
the hotel, but finished her work before the blast; and gave the account of the Lebanese 
ambassador to Indonesia, who had been waiting for his lunch when the blast occurred. 
The story was based on people who escaped unscathed the bombing death. The 
injured did not appear in the reportage. 
 
4.4.2 Insight 
The coverage of the bombing appeared to be condensed from the daily newspapers. 
The difference was in Tempo’s opinion page, where the magazine lamented the death 
of innocent victims while at the same time making an appeal for “consistently 
applying the law to all people without exception including those involved in 
terrorism”. It also made the point that no nation had succeeded in completely 
eradicating terrorism, but nations have been capable of reducing the threats. 
Tempo discussed the bombing as part of a chain of topics; for example, leaders of 
JI prepared explosives to bomb the Marriott Hotel, how a ‘JI suicide brigade’ fit into 
the group, and the relations between alleged bombers and accomplices. The magazine 
quoted Indonesian officials as identifying Asmar Latin Sani as the suspect suicide 
bomber. It did not link the bomber to any religion or faith.  
The coverage touched but did not go deeply into the bombing as “a bloody 
warning to Megawati”. It noted that the ST had reportedly received a call from a man 
claiming to speak for JI and describing the attack as a warning to Megawati and the 
Indonesian police. The magazine suggested that besides JI, the Free Aceh Movement 
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“is another organization said to be involved in the recent rash of bombing attacks in 
Jakarta” (‘A Bloody Warning to Megawati’, 12-19 August 2003, p.18). 
The magazine published lengthy stories on Hambali and the Bali bombing 
suspect, Amrozi. Tempo published the article ‘An ISA for Indonesia?’ with the 
Minister of Defence, Matori Abdu Djalil calling on the government to enact an 
Internal Security Act (ISA). In the same story the Minister of Justice & Human 
Rights, Yusrill Ihza Mahendra was quoted as saying, “we will not imitate Singapore 
and Malaysia”. 
Tempo’s coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing was rich with photo 
illustrations, sketches and comparative data about the Bali and the Marriott Hotel 
bombings. The reporting included grisly descriptions of the victims and details of a 
head claimed to belong to the suspected suicide bomber. It also had illustrations of the 
bombing site with maps of the area affected, and a list of the bomb explosions that 
had occurred in Indonesia in 2003. The magazine gave a gruesome description of the 
devastation caused by the bombing, and reported the possible existence of a coded 
text message about bombers “getting married” (p.17).  
4.5 Comparative Analysis 
The coverage of the Marriott Hotel bombing tilted towards the politicization of the 
event within the discourse on the Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda groups. As a 
consequence, the bombing was linked to the attacks against the nightclubs in Bali in 
the previous year and was described within the context of the global fight against 
terrorism. The newspapers ST, JP and NST and the news magazine Tempo quoted 
official sources as saying JI was behind the violence in Jakarta and in Bali.  
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Nevertheless, each newspaper presented different perspectives on the reasons for 
the bombing. The ST followed the explanation that the attack was part of JI’s drive to 
create a Pan-Islamic state. It also repeated the explanation given by Australian 
officials that the bombing was to destabilize Megawati’s administration (Rekhi, S., 
ST, 6 August 2003, p.6). 
 Meanwhile, the JP blamed the government’s inability to fight terrorism and the 
lack of cooperation between Indonesian agencies (‘Terrorists strike again’, JP, 6 
August 2003, p.6; Taufiqurrahman, M. & Suryana, A., JP, 6 August 2003, p.3; ‘Only 
a panic reaction’, JP, 7 August 2003, p.6). The newspaper was very critical of the 
government of President Megawati, and a determined defender of the need to build 
international confidence.  
The NST produced the view that the cause of the attack was based on the failure to 
address the roots of terrorism, including the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war and the 
Palestinian problem (‘Jakarta jolt’, NST, 7 August 2003, p.12; ‘The beating heart of 
global terror’, NST, 9 August 2003, p.10; Ahmad. A., NST, 13 August 2003, p.10). 
However, the newspaper also focused on the importance of social control as a 
deterrent to terrorism. 
In giving the advice that prevention combined with punishment were the answer 
to terrorism, the ST appeared to export values across Singapore’s border (‘To fight 
terror’, ST, 11 August 2003, p.12). The ST was the only newspaper to publish 
interviews with ‘well-placed’ sources within JI, who discussed the changes in the 
group’s leadership and new plans of attacks (Pereira, D., ST, 7 August 2003, p. A1). 
The ST published extensive stories that kept readers on the alert against terrorist 
attacks and fostered an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. As in its previous coverage on 
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the Bali bombings, the newspaper subtly used the discourse on the victims brought to 
Singapore for medical treatment as a booster for the country’s drive to become a 
regional medical centre. 
Within the discourse of global ‘war on terror’ all the publications produced stories 
on the arrest of Hambali, the man who officials alleged to be the link in Southeast 
Asia between JI and al-Qaeda. There were stories on the reaction of Hambali’s 
mother to the arrest and the possible involvement of Hambali’s wife in terrorist 
activities (Quek, A., ST, 16 August 2003, p.1; Asmarani, D., ST, 22 August 2003, p. 
A4; Associated Press, ‘The perfect family man’, ST, 22 August 2003, p. A4; 
‘Nightmare thwarted’, NST, 13 August 2003, p.10; ‘Hambali caught in Thailand’, 
NST, 16 August 2003, p.1; ‘Top JI operative captured in Thailand’, JP, 16 August 
2003, p.1; ‘Hambali’s wife detained under new ISA’, NST, 19 August 2003, p.7; 
‘They only knew Hambali as a religious teacher’, NST, 21 August 2003, p.4; 
Unidjaja, F. D., JP, 17 August 2003, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., & Kurniawan, M.N., JP,19 
August 2003, p.1; ‘Malaysia detains terror suspect Hambali’s wife under new law’, 
JP, 19 August 2003,  p.2). 
There was no glossy style of communication observed in the JP and NST as there 
was in the ST, which predicted how many people would die in Indonesia during 
Indonesia Independence Day celebrations (Asmarani, D., ST, 12 August 2002, p. A1). 
Statements made in one of the NST’s editorial pieces were also used as part of the 
prime minister’s speech (‘Terrorism’s political motive’, NST, 8 August 2003, p.10; 
Ahmad. A., NST, 13 August 2003, p.10). Tempo used the most gruesome details in its 
stories, while the ST used the most shocking photo illustrations. 
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Overall, the Marriott Hotel bombing received extensive coverage whereas the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing in 13 September 2000, which killed 15 people and 
injured 37, had received less coverage. One possible explanation is that the latter 
bombing was not linked to international terrorism but to local causes of social 
frustration. Tying the Marriott Hotel incident to the current frame of international 
terrorism has the effect of making the event seemed more consequential and more 
terrifying or threatening. 
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Chapter Five: The Australian Embassy Bombing 
The bombing near the building of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 
2004 occurred in a context that influenced how it was covered. Indonesia was 
entering a period of political euphoria with the second round of the first-ever direct 
election for president just days away. Secondly, the bombing happened two days 
before the third anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Thirdly, the case of a single particular pitiable victim of the blast – a five-year old 
Indonesian girl – captured the public’s imagination and became a focus of press 
coverage. Nine people were killed, including the girl’s mother, and 180 people were 
injured in the bombing. 
 
5.1 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: Straits Times 
The ST’s reporting on the bombing stressed the weakness of Indonesia’s legal frame-
work in dealing with terrorists. The reporting was used to remind the ST’s readers that 
the “threat is ever-present in our own backyard” and “Singaporeans should be vigilant 
and look out for suspicious people or objects” (Jacob, P., ST, 11 September 2004, p. 
H17). The ST’s coverage also focused on the medical situation of the five-year-old 
child hurt in the blast, as well as the relationships of the girl’s mother with two 
foreign men (Chieh, L.H., ST, 11 September 2004, p.1). 
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5.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
The stories did not present a clear conceptualization of terrorism. However, reflecting 
the official point of view, the stories portrayed the violence as synonymous with 
terrorism, and as a “clear and present danger in South-east Asia” (‘Terrorism a ‘clear 
and present danger’, ST, 10 September 2004, p.1; Boey, D., ST, 11 September 2004, 
p.3). Terrorism was also identified as a “common threat” (Soh, N., ST, 11 September 
2004, p. A4). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of 
‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, 
connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
5.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists  
Quoting government officials from Singapore, Australia and Indonesia, the ST 
reported that the terrorists were the Malaysians Azahari, Dulmatin and Bashir. The 
alleged terrorists were said to belong to the regional network Jemaah Islamiyah, based 
in Indonesia. Journalists and ‘experts’ introduced new labels such as ‘Jihadi 
militants’, ‘Islamist minds’, ‘jihadist terrorists’, ‘Islamic militants’, ‘jihadi 
Singaporean-born militant’ (Rekhi, S., ST, 11 September 2004, p.29; Pereira, D., ST, 
11 September 2004, p. A1). The coverage focused on Azahari as the ‘bomb-maker’ 
and on Noordin. Both were identified as masterminds of the attack (Pereira, D., ST, 
10 September 2004, p.6).  
 
5.1.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The coverage inferred that the bombing was linked to the anniversary of September 
11, but the ST did not explore this perspective. However there were various stories 
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about terrorist strikes in various parts of the world since the 11 September 2001 
attacks in the United States. The coverage did not elaborate on any single, clear 
explanation of the bombing. 
Various groups interviewed by the newspaper claimed the blast was linked to 
different causes. One of the causes cited was that the blast was intended to influence 
the outcome of the presidential election in Indonesia. Other sources claimed the 
bombing was to influence the election in Australia (‘What now for polls?’, ST, 10 
September 2004, p.4). Another cause of the violence cited by Australian officials and 
reported by the ST was that the blast was in protest against the presence of Australian 
troops in Iraq. The ST also produced the view that the bombing was intended to 
damage ‘Canberra-Jakarta ties’ (Pereira, D., ST, 10 September 2004, p.6; Rekhi, S., 
ST, 10 September 2004, p.6).  
The ST’s journalist Derwin Pereira wrote, “A Muslim radical in touch with JI 
leaders said, “This [bombing] is another warning to them [Australian] after Bali. 
Don’t try and persecute Muslims in Indonesia and around the world’” (Pereira, D., 
ST, 10 September 2004, p.1). 
   
5.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
A number of ST stories were loaded with moral judgments; for example, ST 
reproduced the official stance that Islam is not a religion of violence and Islam is a 
forgiving religion (‘Follow path of mercy, Muslims told’, ST, 12 September 2004, 
p.13; ‘Mercy versus despair’, ST, 13 September 2004, p.13). The ST ran stories on 
Muslims becoming terrorists as well as stories on the roots and causes of Islamic 
fundamentalism (Bradley, J. & Osman, S., ST, 15 September 2004, p.3).  
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 While the coverage did not forthrightly link violence to religion, it contributed to 
the perspective that the bombers were not only militants but also ‘jihads’ (Rekhi, S., 
ST, 11 September 2004, p.29; Silm, B., ST, 15 September 2004, p.14; Agence France 
Presse, ‘Police issue sketches of top 10 suspects in Jakarta blast’, ST, 16 September 
2004, p. A1). The Singapore Straits Times’ journalist Derwin Pereira wrote, “also in 
the terrorist network was a handful of Singaporean Muslim militants on the wanted 
list of the Internal Security Department (ISD)” (Pereira, D., ST, 10 September 2004, 
p.6). 
The editorial ‘Attack on Indonesia’ (ST, 10 September 2004, p.20) made 
reference to a report by the International Crisis Group connecting the bombers to 
militant groups in Indonesia. The report added new labels such as ‘jihadist’ and “a 
radical fringe of a radical fringe”. The Singapore-based terrorist expert Rohan 
Gunaratna added ‘Islamist minds’ to the list of labels (Rekhi, S., ST, 11 September 
2004, p.29).  
 
5.1.1.4 The Victims 
The ST emphasized the human suffering caused by the bombing, especially of 
Singaporeans and Indonesians brought to Singapore for medical treatment. The centre 
of attention was a five-year-old Indonesian girl wounded in the blast, as well as a 
policeman who would have the expense of medical treatment paid by the Australian 
government. The girl’s medical recovery was reported with suspense and drama, 
followed by press frenzy over the fact that two men claimed to be the child’s father. 
The coverage also dwelt on two other people brought to Singapore hospitals 
(Xueying, L., ST, 12 September, p.14; Tan, J., ST, 14 September 2004, p. A6; Tan, J., 
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ST, 15 September, p. A6; Tan, J., ST, 16 September 2004, p. A6). The ST reported on 




Even though the bombing happened in Jakarta, the ST paid much attention to the 
reactions of Australian officials who linked the bombing to JI and to the Muslim 
cleric Abu Bakar Bashir. The Australians reacted as if the attack had been against 
their nation; legally it was, as an embassy constitutes a kind of extra-territorial 
enclave. The Australians official repeated warnings about new attacks in Indonesia. 
Citing Singaporean and Australian officials, the newspaper reported on the weakness 
of law in Indonesia; Australian officials took the lead in providing information to the 
media. The ST largely provided an Australian discourse on the bombing rather than an 
Indonesian one. The approach can be seen as a way to accentuate the fact that 
Indonesian authorities are not doing enough to protect the international community in 
Indonesia. 
One of the clearest perspectives of the coverage was that JI was responsible for 
the explosion, even though officials had not yet conclusively established that fact and 
were only assuming it. Among sources quoted by the ST was “a Muslim radical in 
touch with JI leaders”; he was quoted as saying that the JI network had been targeting 
the Australian Embassy for the last two months (Pereira, D., ST, 10 September 2004, 
p.1).  The ST reported on claims made by the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer that Indonesian police received a SMS warning [‘short message system’, also 
referred to as ‘text message’] about 45 minutes before the attack (Asmarani, D., ST, 
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11 September 2004, p.1). The ST reported on the content of the SMS message 
“Release Abu Bakar Bashir or else Western embassies would be bombed” (Osman, 
S., ST, 11 September 2004, p. A2).  
The newspaper presented the alleged bombing masterminds, Azahari Hussin and 
Noordin Mohammad, as responsible for the blast even though Indonesian police had 
only declared Azahari a suspect. The newspaper reproduced official views that the 
bombers were “newly recruited suicide bombers” and that “10 suicide bombers 
remained at large and ready for new attacks” (Agence France Presse, ‘Police issue 
sketches of top 10 suspects in Jakarta blast’, ST, 16 September 2004, p. A1). 
The ST framed its reporting as a “reminder that the threat of terrorism still lurks 
and is ever-present even in our own backyard and that the Jakarta bombing serves as a 
wake-up call”. As in previous bombings, the newspaper reinforced officials’ calls for 
“Singaporeans to be extra vigilant and to look out for suspicious people or objects” 
(Jacob, P., ST, 11 September 2004, p. H17); it warned that “one cannot take for 
granted that such an explosion will not occur anywhere- even in Singapore” (Soh, N., 
ST, 11 September 2004, p. A4). The newspaper reported on the positive aspect of 
community policing system in Singapore to help fighting against terrorism 
(Nadarajan, B., ST, 17 September 2004, p. H5). 
While it was clear that the ST reflected and reproduced official views, the 
newspaper carried conflicting messages such as, “be vigilant” but “be calm”, and 
“live normal life” but “report on suspicious people and objects”. A commentary piece 
discussed the “need for mental alertness and resilience to fight the terror battle”; it 
compared the situation with the “battle against Sars” and referred to a “20-year-old 
total defence concept unveiled in 1984”, urging people to “ensure enough basic food 
  162
supplies at home, to undertake basic fire fight lessons, to know where to look for 
information” (Boey. D., ST, 14 September 2004, p.15). 
The ST continually repeated near-identical statements by Singaporean government 
and military officials. For example, the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
said, “terrorism is a clear and present danger in South-east Asia” (‘Terrorism a ‘clear 
and present danger’, ST, 10 September 2004, p.1). The Singapore’s chief of defence, 
Lieutenant-General Ng Yat Chung, made the same statement, namely, that “The 
horrific bombing in Jakarta yesterday is yet another grim reminder that terrorism is a 
clear and present danger in this region” (Boey, D., ST, 11 September 2004, p.3). The 
ST acted as a vehicle for the government and military to create a state of mind in the 
population about terrorism and its danger that is called ‘siege mentality’. The 
bombing was also linked to the Chechnya conflict as an example of the dangers of 
terrorism (Rekhi, S., ST, 11 September 2004, p.29).  
As in the coverage of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings, the ST dedicated 
extensive reporting to the blast, and used interpretative and sensational headlines such 
as “Heart of capital like a war zone with bodies and mangled cars”, “stop killing the 
poor” (Go, R., ST, 10 September 2004, p.2). It made emotional appeals by publishing 
stories portraying Indonesians’ “anger at the bombers” and “anger at the police” 
followed by emotional human interest stories and accounts of Indonesians’ reactions 
to the bombing (Osman, S., ST, 11 September 2004, p. A3; Agence France Presse,  
‘Anger at the police’, ST, 11 September 2004, p. A3).  
Regarding the connection between violence and religion, the ST reproduced the 
opinion of the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, and the Minister-
in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yacoob Ibrahim, saying, “there are 2 groups of 
  163
Muslims, those who bring mercy to mankind, and those who bring destruction and 
despair” (‘Mercy versus despair’, ST, 13 September 2004, p.13). However, other 
stories, such as ‘Islamic groups cautious over bombing blame’ (Osman, S., ST, 13 
September 2004, p. A6), and ‘Indonesian Muslim purists don’t engage in terror’ 
(Agence France Presse, ST, 14 September 2004, p. A6), projected different 
perceptions about violence and religion. This story reported on a document written by 
the International Crisis Group as saying, “religion plays just a small part in the rise of 
terror in Indonesia” (ibid).  
The Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng was quoted as saying, “the 
[terrorism] threat came from a few individuals: ‘It has very much to do with 
extremists who espouse certain extremist, radical ideas about religion, not by any 
particular group” (Soh, N., ST, 11 September 2004, p. A4). 
In framing the issue of violence and religion, the ST ran some stories saying Islam 
did not represent violence. But this view was undermined by a story titled ‘Muslims 
turn on terror in name of Islam’ (Bradley, J., & Osman, S., ST, 15 September 2004, 
p.3), which presented an amalgamation of views from experts in many different parts 
of the world speaking about religion and condemning terrorism by Muslims. 
 Terrorism was also linked to religion by another story, ‘Countering terror with an 
amnesty: Why it makes sense’ (Silm, B., ST, 15 September 2004, p.14). The story 
was about Saudi Arabia’s initiative to give amnesty to ‘jihadist terrorists’. It said that, 
“the concept and practice of amnesty is a crucial component of Islam. Muslims are 
encouraged to forgive their enemies. Indeed, they are rewarded for such behaviour.” 
In saying “Muslims to put their houses in order”, the story entangled the term 
‘jihadist’ with terrorism and al-Qaeda and Iraq. The approach was repeated in the op-
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ed piece “Militants hurting the Muslims they claim to fight for” (Hassan, M.H., ST, 
17 September 2004, p.22).  
The article ‘Two Jemaah Islamiah detainees released’ reported that two JI men 
“who were not deeply involved in terrorism-related acts but focused more on 
education activities” have responded well to counselling. It said, “Both had 
undergone counselling, including religious counselling under ISD’s supervision” 
(Nirmala, M., ST, 16 September 2004, p.3). 
The ST printed on its front page a story about a ‘JI plot to attack Mega’ (Pereira, 
D., ST, 12 September 2004, p.1). It said the alleged attack was foiled two months 
earlier. The practice of playing up old news has the potential to mislead readers, 
particularly if the age of the news is not stressed in the story. The article also referred 
to a foiled attack against an Australian-funded school. The story neither made clear 
when the latter occurred nor provided details on the school.  
With combined information from Reuters, Associated Press and Agence France 
Press, the ST reported the discovery of “documents written in Arabic that were 
thrown down a well just before the raid, police said”. By paraphrasing the police, the 
ST connected the home owner, his wife and a third person under the label of 
suspected terrorism; it then reported, “the other three men suspected of having links 
with the JI terrorist network fled the house before the police could catch them” 
(‘Three suspects in Jakarta suicide bombing detained, ST, 17 September 2004, p.3). 
The story assumed that those who fled were members of JI, even though this had not 
been rigorously established. It also suggested that a swearing-in ceremony for suicide 
bombers had taken place in the house. Eventually, the people arrested in this incident 
were released due to lack of evidence of their involvement in terrorism, but the ST did 
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not report on this. The lack of concern to repair the public representations of innocent 
suspects was also observed in the JP and the NST. 
In the sixth day of its coverage of the bombing, the ST turned its attention to 
stories related to security and the presidential election in Indonesia; most follow-up 
stories directly related to the bombing were relegated to the inside pages. But the 
drama of the little girl continued to dominate the main pages. 
The coverage of the five-year-old Indonesian girl hurt in the explosion appeared 
to be a public relations initiative. The information was framed as to promote the 
Singaporean medical team’s excellent abilities and success. It appeared as the ST used 
the story to portray Singapore as a regional medical hub. The ugly side of the 
coverage –seen in the story ‘Manny’s dad: My wife never cheated on me’ - was the 
speculation and assumptions about the relationship between the girl’s dead mother 
and two men, the dispute between the men over fatherhood of the girl, and the dispute 
between the Australian and the Italian families over who would look after the girl 
after she left the hospital (Xueying, Li, ST, 19 September 2004, p.14).  
 
5.2 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: Jakarta Post  
Coverage of the bombing near the Australian Embassy in Jakarta 13 months after the 
Marriott Hotel attack displayed two aspects. It received a shorter period of coverage 
in comparison to the reportage of the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings because 
Indonesia was drowned by electoral enthusiasm. There were just 11 days left before 
the first popular election for the country’s president. It was an historical event in the 
democratization process after decades of authoritarian rule. Secondly, the stories 
appeared to be less politically loaded, even though it was a period of electoral 
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campaigning in Indonesia and Australia, and some candidates apparently wanted to 
exploit the issue. The blast was primarily considered an act of violence within the 
realms of international terrorism, “it happened two days before the anniversary of 
September 11” (‘Blast rocks Jakarta’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.5). The Jakarta Post 
wrote it was the third bomb attack in the capital in 2004 (‘Carnage in Jakarta’, JP, 10 
September 2004, p.1). 
 
5.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Jakarta Post 
In its editorial ‘No panic reaction’, the JP expressed its opinion that terrorism brings 
increased concern about security and safety affairs as the enemy number one against 
investors and tourism in Indonesia” (‘No panic reaction’, JP, 14 September 2004, 
p.6). This perception was very much in line with the newspaper’s coverage of the Bali 
and the Marriott Hotel bombings, which stressed the need for confidence-building in 
order to keep the country’s economic recovery on track. The JP reproduced the views 
that the government has to demonstrate to the international community that it was 
serious in dealing with the threat of terrorism (Amri, P.D., JP, 11 September 2004, 
p.6).  
In fact, the economy performed better than expected after the Bali and Marriott 
Hotel bombings, apparently because the market had already digested risks such as 
terrorism (Wijaksana, D., JP, 10 September 2004, p.3; Wijaksana, D., JP, 11 
September 2004, p.13; Hotland, T., JP, 14 September 2004, p.13; ‘Rupiah to 
stabilize, stocks to soar further, say analysts’, JP, 14 September 2004, p.13). It is 
against this background that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of 
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terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the connection between 
violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
5.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
Just hours after the bombing, the Indonesian police were naming suspects. The JP 
reproduced the official interpretation that the bombing had similarities to the Bali and 
Marriott Hotel bombings (Khalik, A., & Siboro, T., JP, 10 September 2004, p.2). The 
police claimed that Azahari and Noordin “the two Malaysian-born fugitives” were the 
mastermind behind the blast. This piece of information was treated at face-value 
(Khalik, A., & Siboro, T., JP, 10 September 2004, p.2; ‘Fighting an uneven battle’, 
JP, 10 September 2004, p.6; Setiogi, S. P., & Muninggar, S.S., JP, 12 September 
2004, p.1; Khalik, A., & Nugroho, I. D., JP, 16 September 2004, p1.).  
Citing police information based on confessions by prisoners, the JP reported, “at 
least 10 newly suicide bombers – recruited by Malaysian fugitive bomb experts 
Azahari and Noordin- remained at large” (Setiogi, S. P. , & Muninggar, S., S., JP, 12 
September 2004, p.1; Unidjaja, F.D., & Khalik, A., JP, 14 September 2004, p.1; 
Khalik, A., & Nugroho, I.D., JP, 16 September 2004, p.1).  The JP did not question 
whether there was alternative evidence or explanations for the bombing.  
A series of names of suspected terrorists appeared in the stories. Some names 
were followed by characterization such as “they arrested Saifuddin alias Abu Fida, a 
Muslim cleric believed to be a new recruit” (Khalik, A. & Siboro, T., JP, 10 
September, 2004, p.2). In other cases, only the name or nickname was used, e.g., 
“National Police chief of detectives Comr. Gen. Suyitno Landung Sudjono identified 
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the three bombing suspects as Akbar, Kobra and Sudadi” (Khalik, A., JP, 15 
September 2004, p.1).  
The police claimed a number of the victims were responsible for the blast, only to 
admit later that the blast was carried out by a “lone suicide bomber” (Khalik, A., JP, 
20 September 2004, p.2). Police said funding of the attack came from outside the 
country, from the same source that paid for the Marriott Hotel blast (‘Source of 
embassy bomb funding same as Marriott: Police’, JP, 21 September 2004, p.5).  
 
5.2.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The impression given by the coverage was that the bombing occurred partly because 
of poor coordination among Indonesian intelligence and security agencies (‘The ties 
that bind’, JP, 11 September 2004, p.6; Hari, K., JP, 11 September 2004, p.2; 
‘Intelligence failure?’, JP, 16 September 2004, p.6), as well as the weak functioning 
of the anti-terror centre established in September 2003 (Harsanto, D., JP, 11 
September 2004, p.8). So while the police blamed Azahari, Noordin and other people 
alleged to be suspects linked to JI, the newspaper to a large degree blamed Indonesian 
government agencies.  
 
5.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The bombing apparently had no relation to religion except by the coincidence that the 
bombers were Muslims and the assumption by the Indonesian authorities and foreign 
governments that the perpetrators were members of JI. Nonetheless, the JP ran stories 
quoting religious leaders as condemning the attack, with many saying, “the latest 
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terror attack would further tarnish the predominantly Muslim country’s image” 
(‘Religious leaders condemn bombing, call for unity’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.3). 
The religious leaders warned against the linking the bombing with any religion. 
The JP also ran a story in which religious scholars urged moderate Muslims to 
play a role in helping prevent radicalism spreading further in the country (‘Muslims 
told to curb radicalism’, JP, 16 September 2004, p.4). Thus even though the blast was 
not necessarily connected to religion, the stories provided readers with the 
understanding that the act of violence tarnished the image of Muslims, and that 
radicalism could be one of the causes of terrorism.  
 
5.2.1.4 The Victims 
More than 180 people were injured in the blast near the Australian Embassy, but only 
the case of the five-year-old girl received intensive, continued coverage. Other 
human-interest stories also made it into the JP, but not with the same prominence. 
The stories about the little girl ranged from her medical condition, transfer to hospital 
in Singapore and the death of her mother in the blast, to the dispute over who was her 
father, the relationship of the girl’s mother to the two men, the nationality and 
citizenship of the girl, and possible reasons why mother and daughter were at the gate 
of the embassy at the time of the bombing (Mariani, E., JP, 10 September 2004, p.1; 
Aurora, L., & Fidrus, M., JP, 11 September 2004, p.1; Fidrus, M., JP, 12 September 
2004, p.1; Ng, Ansley, JP,14 September 2004, p.2; ‘5-year-old blast victim wakes up 
crying’, JP, 15 September 2004, p.2). 
Other injured people were flown to Singapore, as reported by the Straits Times 
(Tan, J., ST, 16 September 2004, p. A6), but did not make it onto the JP’s front pages. 
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In fact, they were sometimes just named in the last paragraph of a story (Khalik, A., 
JP, 20 September 2004, p.2). A number of human-interest stories based on accounts 
from eyewitnesses and relatives of the victims made it onto the JP’s inside pages 
(Khalik, A., JP, 10 September 2004, p.2; Hudiono, U., JP, 11 September 2004, p.2; 
Aurora, L., JP, 11 September 2004, p.2; Aurora, L., JP, 15 September 2004, p.2).  
The most tragic aspect involving victims was the case of some families of people 
who had died in the blast having their loved ones characterized as suspected terrorists, 
only to have police admit later that they were victims of the explosion. For days the 
police claimed, and the media reported, that the body parts of three people belonged 
to suspected terrorists (‘Footage shows suicide car: Police’, JP, 11 September 2004, 
p. 1; Siboro, T., & Setiogi, S. P., JP, 15 September 2004, p.2). This kind of 
presumption was not particular to the families of the three victims. Dozens of people 
were rounded up only to be released due to lack of evidence. Some of the names of 
the alleged suspects were provided by the police and published by the media (‘Police 
arrest eight over embassy bombing’, JP, 17 September 2004, p.1; ‘Police inch closer 
to Azahari’s inner circle’, JP, 18 September 2004, p.1; Setiogi, S. P., JP, 19 
September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., JP, 20 September 2004, p.2).  This approach creates 
stigmatization. Thus the JP failed to see its role in creating disillusioned and 
disgruntled people. The newspaper could have addressed the cases more attentively, 
not merely reporting what the police said but recognizing that incorrect naming of 
suspects could damage people’s lives and ultimately be a dynamic in the recruitment 




One interesting aspect of the JP’s coverage was that in the initial reporting, the blast 
was said to be near the Australian Embassy, implying it was not necessarily directed 
against the embassy. Only days later was it reported that the blast specifically targeted 
the embassy. The building across from the Australian Embassy, the Plaza 89, which 
houses the Jakarta offices of mining firm PT Freeport Indonesia as well as the Greek 
Embassy, suffered a lot of damage.  
The JP’s initial stories described the event as a “bombing”, while the Australian 
authorities described it as “terrorism”. This distinction was not maintained in JP’s 
editorial, which referred to the bomb attack as “terrorism” (‘Fighting an uneven 
battle’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.6). 
The Australian authorities reacted quickly to the bombing. Within hours of the 
blast the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, was visiting the 
site and giving a press conference. A string of Australian officials including Prime 
Minister John Howard and forensic and police teams flew to Jakarta to inspect the 
damage and help to probe the attack. None of the 14 people killed was Australian. 
President Megawati immediately travelled back to Indonesia from Brunei, where she 
was attending a royal wedding ceremony.  
The perception from the coverage was that the Australians took the lead in 
addressing the bombing (‘Carnage in Jakarta’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.1). The 
Prime Minister provided the media with strong, dramatic statements, such as  
“the Australian and the Indonesian governments will hunt down terrorists until 
we catch every single one of them and the more they attack us the more determined 
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we are to find them and to hunt them down” (‘Blast victims fund set up’, JP, 11 
September 2004, p.1). 
      The Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said, “you would have to 
conclude that it was directed towards Australia” (‘Australians shaken, but go on 
despite bombing’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.2). Australia was also in a period of 
electoral campaigning. The Prime Minister John Howard was re-elected in October 
2004. 
The occurrence of the bombing days prior to the election in Indonesia helped to 
heighten the anxiety, with official alerts about “more possible attacks” (Setiogi, S.P., 
& Muninggar, S.S., JP, 12 September 2004, p.1; Khalik, A., JP, 16 September 2004, 
p.4; ‘Police inch closer to Azahari’s inner circle’, JP, 18 September 2004, p.1; ‘Police 
brace for terrorist activity ahead of presidential polls’, JP, 19 September 2004, p.2). 
As in the previous bombings (Bali and Marriott Hotel), security was reinforced in 
most parts of the country and the exploitation of fear entered the discourse of the 
political campaign.  
The bombing prompted the Indonesian President to call upon the population “to 
stay united in fighting terrorism”, to remain calm but alert and, “please watch over 
your own neighborhood and inform the authorities should you find something 
suspicious” (‘Mega appeals for calm’, JP, 10 September 2004, p.1; Unidjaja, F. D., & 
Khalik A., JP, 14 September 2004, p.1). The governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, followed 
up the appeal with call on “chiefs of neighborhood and community units to monitor 
visitors and new residents” (Harsanto, D., JP, 11 September 2004, p.8; Nurbianto, B., 
JP, 14 September 2004, p.8). The approach was commonly used by the Suharto 
regime. This kind of official appeal tends to encourage certain types of social 
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behaviour in which the public participates in the policing of society (Purba, K., JP, 14 
September 2004, p.6; ‘Spying on neighbors?’, JP, 18 September 2004, p.6). It also 
provides some encouragement to citizens to accept pre-emptive policies taken by the 
government (Muhibat, S.F., JP, 11 September 2004, p.6).  
One aspect worthy of note was that the JP chose not to challenge the allegations 
by the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Prime Minister John 
Howard that Indonesian police had received an instant telephone message warning 
about an attack in Jakarta 45 minutes before the blast occurred (Unidjaja, F.D., & 
Siboro, T., JP, September 11, 2004,p.3). The JP did not treat this claim with nearly as 
much scepticism as it treated the contentions of some Indonesian officials. In this 
respect it behaved similarly to the ST, which treated the reported message as an 
established fact: “an SMS sent 45 minutes before the blast – it proved to be no empty 
threat” (Asmarani, D., ST, 11 September 2004, p.1). The Indonesian police 
consistently denied the existence of the message. The Jakarta Post website 
reproduced the story from Reuters about the existence of the message; the newspaper 
print edition did not ran the article (Reuters, ‘Jakarta had warning of Western 
embassy attack: Downer’, The Jakarta Post.com, 10 September 2004). 
When Australian officials backed away from the claim that was made 
immediately after the blasts neither the JP nor the ST reported this with the same 
emphasis seen when they criticized Indonesian agencies. The Sydney datelined story 
‘Australia backs away from SMS claim over Jakarta bombing’ from Deutsche Presse 
Agentur (DPA), was published on the JP’s website on September 13, 2004, but it did 
not appear in the print edition.  
  174
However, the New Straits Times dedicated one-third of a page to the SMS issue in 
a story filled by the Agence France Presse (‘Aussie PM under fire again’, NST, 14 
September 2004, p.27). Since the allegation had been made by senior officials and 
thus further tainted the image of Indonesian police, the Jakarta Post should have 
taken pains to clarify the issue. It appeared that the JP reported on the relations 
between Australia and Indonesia with some care, probably because the bad economic 
consequences to Indonesia as a result of Australians leaving the country and the 
newspaper did not want to lose training and travel opportunities provided by the 
Australian government and other organizations (‘Blast victims fund set up’, JP, 11 
September 2004, p.1; ‘The ties that bind’, JP, 11 September 2004, p.6).  
Regarding the economy, as in its coverage of the two Bali and Marriott Hotel 
bombings, the JP called for urgency to quickly solve the bombing and catch the 
masterminds (‘No panic reaction’, JP, 14 September 2004, p.6) in order to boost 
investors’ and tourists’ confidence in the country. However, it appeared that 
economic issues were not the focus of the coverage. One reason could be the positive 
reaction from the stock market and business sector as reported by the Associated 
Press (‘Megawati hails business sector as markets weather bomb blast’, The Jakarta 
Post.com, 12 September 2004).  
 
5.3 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: New Straits Times 
The initial accounts of the Australian Embassy bombing by NST were ‘straight news’. 
But as the number of victims increased and the authorities in Indonesia started 
pointing towards the suspects, the stories became increasingly political. Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard visited Indonesia in the aftermath of the blast while 
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Indonesian President Megawati returned from a wedding in Brunei to attend to the 
attack. Both used the blast to boost their political campaigns. The same happened 
with the main Indonesian opposition candidate for the presidency, the retired general 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who visited the injured in the hospitals. Both Megawati 
and Yudhoyono addressed the bombing by putting security at the top of their political 
agenda with appeals for tough laws to combat terrorism (Associated Press, ‘Megawati 
fumbles during TV debate’, NST, 16 September 2004, p.7). 
 
5.3.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
The conceptualization of terrorism the NST presented was one of Islamic extremism. 
Reflecting government officials, the newspaper used the word ‘terrorism’ to refer to 
the bombing and reproduced the immediate views of Australian and Indonesian 
officials in blaming JI. It is against this background that the four main subcategories 
of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, 
the connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
5.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The images of terrorists were based on Azahari and Noordin, on “religious militants” 
and ‘religious extremists”. The reporting reflected the fact that Indonesian officials 
identified the Malaysian Azahari as the suspect in carrying out the attack (Chew, A., 
NST, 10 September 2004, p.1). The NST reproduced a claim made by the Malaysian 
Foreign Minister Syed Hamid that “the two were members of a deviant Islamic group 
which was misusing religion” (‘Which one is the real Azahari?’, NST, 17 September 
2004, p.4).  
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5.3.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The NST reproduced the view that the main cause of the bombing was Australia’s 
general election. The Indonesian election campaign received less attention as a reason 
for the bombing (Neild, Barry, NST, 13 September 2004, p.19). Like the ST, the NST 
gave considerable space to Australian authorities’ reactions to the bombing, blaming 
it on JI while linking the attack to the election campaign in Australia where, 
according to the stories, security had been a key issue. 
 
5.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The NST emphasized in an editorial the positive aspects of coercive measures against 
the threat of ‘religious extremists’, in an allusion to the Malaysian government’s 
unapologetic record in the use of the Internal Security Act (‘Tracking the deadly 
bombers’, NST, 15 September 2004, p.18). The editorial distinguished between 
“religious militants” and “terrorists” but lumped them together and equated them with 
communists, while at the same time portraying positively the harsh approach of the 
government in the fight against communists.  
The connection between violence and religion was most strikingly expressed 
by the Indonesian police chief D’ai Bachtiar that, “the bombers do not understand 
their religion” (‘Police looking for second van with explosives’, NST, 16 September 
2004, p.4). The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid was quoted as saying, “the 
two [Azahari and Noordin] were members of a deviant Islamic group which was 




5.3.1.4 The Victims 
The NST devoted space to the five-year-old child’s plight while paying little attention 
to the Indonesian heroes who had carried out their duties despite injuries. As in the 
case of the ST, the spotlight was on the girl injured in the blast (Associated Press, 
‘Girl hurt in bombing flown to Singapore’, NST, 11 September 2004, p.6), 
particularly the drama over the dispute about the child’s custody between her 
biological father and the partner of the girl’s mother. The NST combined a story from 
the Associated Press and the Malaysia’s official news agency, Bernama that, ‘DNA 
test proves Australian is biological father’ (NST, 15 September 2004, p.4). Stories 
also dealt with the “triangle relationship” of the mother, exploiting the tragic situation 
as salacious entertainment (Reuters, ‘Doctors say Manny may be partially paralysed’, 
NST, 14 September 2004, p.28; Associated Press, ‘Manny progressing after 
recovering from coma’, NST, 16 September 2004, p.29). The other 180 injured were 
mostly absent from the coverage. 
 
5.3.2 Insight 
At the time of the bombing, the NST was changing its style from broadsheet to tabloid 
format. In the first days of the change, which coincided with the bombing, the 
publisher issued two versions of the paper: one tabloid and one in broadsheet. It 
appeared that some stories related to the bombing found in the broadsheet did not 
make into the tabloid edition, for example: ‘National Security supersedes individual 
rights’, NST, 10 September 2004, p.8; ‘Malaysian fugitive bomber main suspect’, 
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NST, 10 September 2004, p.18; ‘Police looking for second van with explosives’, NST, 
16 September 2004, p.4. I have analysed the tabloid because the broadsheet was 
quickly disappearing from the stands in parts of Kuala Lumpur, where I had someone 
collecting the newspapers for me. 
In the reporting Australian officials blamed JI straight after the attack, whereas 
Indonesian officials took a few hours before pointing at JI and the two Malaysians at 
large, Azahari and Noordin. The NST quoted Australian officials describing their 
“premonition” of a “second attack” and speculation about a second van loaded with 
explosives (‘Police looking for second van with explosives’, NST, 16 September 
2004, p.4).  
The NST did not bother to address, or preferred to ignore, the perceptible dispute 
over which government officials were in charge of the situation. Indonesia’s President 
was largely absent from the stories. The reporting concentrated on government 
officials from Australia saying their country was the target of the bombing, whereas 
Indonesian officials at the scene of the blast reportedly said the attack should not be 
portrayed as an attack on any one country. International news agencies Reuters and 
Agence France Presse reported on the Indonesian officials’ interpretation, whereas 
none of the publications studied made reference to the observation (‘Not an attack on 
one country: Indonesia.’, 9 September 2004, Sidney Morning Herald.com.au). 
The NST was the only newspaper to emphasise the controversy over Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard’s remarks about an SMS (‘short message system’, often 
referred to as ‘text message’), warning the Indonesian police had received 45 minutes 
before the blast (Agence France Presse, ‘Aussie PM under fire again’, NST, 14 
September 2004, p.27). Neither the JP nor the ST took pains to report on the false 
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claim, even though the Australian Prime Minister later clarified that he was just 
repeating information provided by a top police officer, who ultimately admitted that 
the message never existed (ibid).  
Like the ST, the NST repeated officials’ allegations that terrorists had failed in 
attempts to kill Megawati on two occasions in the past. The difference is that the NST 
made it clear that the information came from the Australian ambassador to Indonesia. 
However, the NST did not elaborate or preferred to ignore the reason why an 
Australian official was giving the information to journalists and not to the Indonesian 
police or government officials, or why the information was only being released now 
when the failed plots had occurred months earlier (Agence France Presse, ‘Several 
plots to kill Megawati’, NST, 13 September 2004, p.28). 
The NST reported on the arrest of seven people suspected of involvement with 
Azahari and the bombing, and who were later released for lack of evidence. 
Nevertheless, the newspaper did not comment on the fact that the names of people 
identified by the police were released to the media and consequently publicly 
stigmatized. The same stance was seen in the ST and the JP’s reporting (‘Three 
suspects in Jakarta suicide bombing detained’, ST, 17 September 2004, p.3; ‘Police 
arrest eight over embassy bombing’, JP, 17 September 2004, p.1; Setiogi, S.P., JP, 19 
September 2004, p.1; Chew, A., NST, 11 September 2004, p.6; Chew, A., NST, 14 
September 2004, p.29). 
The NST reproduced favourable rhetoric of US officials in Kuala Lumpur in the 
story ‘Malaysia is now an excellent role model in war on terror’ (Pollard, R., NST, 11 
September 2004, p.20; ‘US Praises PM’s leadership’, NST, 12 September 2004, p.4). 
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The newspaper did not raise questions about the use of the ISA against political 
opponents who had been jailed and labelled as terrorists since January 2002. 
In its news production, the NST did not sensationalize the stories or use a slick 
style of communication, but it used many of the same wire service stories as the other 
two newspapers. This resulted in a kind of ‘standardization’ of the information and 
official remarks. To a much lesser extent in comparison to the Bali and the Marriott 
Hotel bombings’ coverage, the NST used its own correspondents in Jakarta in the 
initial leading stories. The newspaper also ran a few stories from the official 
Malaysian news agency Bernama. In overall, the NST’s reporting was irrelevant; but 
on the other hand it indicates the newspapers in the region are heading towards the 
use of journalists with knowledge of the local culture and the use of ‘standardized’ 
information provided by global players. An increasing number of journalists with 
knowledge of the local culture are joining the wire services. Nevertheless, the wire 
services (global players) tend to prevail in news coverage.  
 
5.4 Coverage of the Australian Embassy Bombing: Tempo 
The bombing ‘at the perimeter’ of the Australian Embassy in September 2004 did not 
receive extensive coverage in Tempo, perhaps because the 2004 Presidential election 
was just days away. Nevertheless, a photo illustration of the 5 year-old girl injured in 
the blast made the cover of the magazine’s special issue. Tempo’s stories took at face 
value a claimed connection between the Bali bombings in 2002, the Marriott Hotel 
explosion in 2003 and, the Australian Embassy bombing. The coverage of the 
Australian Embassy bombing was published in the special edition of Tempo dedicated 
to the 2004 presidential election (September 14-20).  
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5.4.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo  
The idea of terrorism was equated with ‘carnage’. The reportage spoke of “limbs and 
other human remains hurled almost fifty meters from the center of the explosion”, “a 
hand lay in the street in front of Graha Binakarsa, two blocks from the embassy. 
Human intestines landed in the building’s front lot” (‘Carnage at Kuningan’, Tempo, 
14-20 September 2004, p.12). 
 
5.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
Azahari was the centre of the reporting. Tempo’s stories used mostly terms such as 
the “bomb dokter” and the “bomb maker” to refer to Azahari, who at this stage was 
portrayed as responsible for the blast. Tempo did not speculate on other names as 
possible suspects in the bombing. 
 
5.4.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The motivation behind the bombing was said to be that “the perpetrators of the 
explosion wanted to humiliate Indonesian security officials” (p.14). Tempo noted that 
at the time of the blast, the national police chief was with members of the law 
commission of the House of Representatives, briefing them on security for the second 
round of the presidential election. 
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5.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The reporting did not make any connection between the alleged perpetrators’ religion 
and the violence, or between the bombing and religion.  As in the reporting on the 
Bali and Marriott bombings religious conviction was not as an issue. However, the 
magazine used religion as faith to report on the victims and their relatives. 
 
5.4.1.4 The Victims 
The magazine described relatives’ memories of family members who perished in the 
blast. Using emotional appeals, the story was about the strength and religiosity of 
those who survived and their families, while at the same time it portrayed the good 
qualities of those who died. The magazine reported on the family of the 5-year-old 
girl’s mother, but did not seek to entertain its readership with an account of the 
mother’s relationship with two foreign men. Tempo also gave attention to a security 
guard at the embassy who suffered injuries but helped the victims. 
 
5.4.2 Insight 
Tempo (14-20 September 2004) was the only one of the four publications analyzed to 
refer to the explosion as being ‘at the perimeter of the Australian Embassy’ or at the 
‘Kuningan’. Kuningan is the district in Jakarta where most of the embassies and 
international companies are located. It is considered the ‘golden triangle’ of 
businesses (p.12). The newspapers reported that the blast had been ‘at the embassy’ or 
‘against the embassy’. This differentiation was also observed in the reporting of the 
Bali blasts. Tempo preferred to refer to the attacks as having happened in ‘Kuta’, the 
specific place in Bali where the bombings occurred, whereas the newspapers mainly 
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used the word Bali. Probably the difference was because Tempo wanted to connect to 
local readers. 
Tempo followed the newspapers’ lead in reporting that “Dr. Azahari” was behind 
the Marriott Hotel and embassy bombings: “terrorists Azahari, Noordin and Dulmatin 
are the masterminds of the Bali, Marriott and Kuningan bombings”. It did not justify 
its assertion. In fact, the magazine had already in its previous issue explored the 
connection between Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda. 
The magazine also reported on the “innocent victims [who] perished as a result of 
the bombing”, with accounts of what their families remembered about them; it 
appeared to be a form of posthumous homage to all affected by the incident. But the 
magazine gave greater focus to Azahari than the bombing itself or the victims.  
The magazine’s opinion page stated, “the police were painting a rosy picture of 
security and how they were actively hunting down terrorist ringleaders” when 
“everything changed on account of the horrifying explosion”. In this sarcastic tone, 
the magazine noted, “many will immediately lay the blame on the police and the 
intelligence apparatus for failing to detect the bombing in time.” The opinion article, 
‘Targeting Whom?’ called for “more surveillance measures: metal detectors, video 
monitors on every corner, bag and body searches at every entry point” (p.9), and 
criticized “this government’s denial of terrorism given the number of terrorist leaders 
in Indonesia”. There was no slick or sensationalist style of communication in the 
coverage. 
5.5 Comparative Analysis 
The atmosphere of the presidential election in Indonesia obfuscated the coverage of 
the bombing, as did the Australian political campaign; Australian police and 
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government representatives including Prime Minister Howard quickly travelled to 
Indonesia and visited the scene of the blast.  
Overall, the coverage in the four publications focused on Australia as the victim 
and Australian officials giving press conferences and information to the media. The 
reporting was also characterized by the excessive emphasis the four publications gave 
to the plight of the Indonesian girl caught in the blast and the drama involving her 
mother. The ST, JP and NST built up the story with abundant details. Nonetheless, in 
many cases their sources were news wire agencies. When the girl was brought to 
Singapore for medical treatment, the ST capitalized on this to reinforce the image of 
Singapore as a regional medical hub as promoted since 2003 by the Singapore 
Tourism Board. 
Regarding the SMS warning of the attack the NST was the only publication to 
give emphasis to the Australian Prime Minister’s disclosure that the message in fact 
never existed. Both the ST and the JP strongly criticized Indonesia for not heeding the 
warning, despite continued denials by Indonesian police that they ever received such 
a message.  
The rhetoric of terrorism as a real threat was found in all the publications, either in 
quotes from the ruling elite of each country or in editorials about the need for laws to 
counter terrorism. The ST addressed the weakness of the law in Indonesia while the 
NST praised the positive aspect of coercive measures against “religious extremists” in 
a reference to the use of the Internal Security Act. The JP blamed the lack of 
coordination among the security agencies for the attacks. Tempo stuck to the view that 
the bombing was intended to humiliate the police and intelligence agencies. The 
publications all emphasized different motives for the bombing. But in the last stance, 
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they all structured their reporting within the international discourse of terrorism 
associated with Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda.  
The ST used the reporting to give the tragedy domestic significance by reminding 
the population that the threat of terrorism was “in our own backyard”. The JP used 
the same rhetoric on the need “to monitor visitors and new residents”, whereas the 
NST focused on how well Malaysia was doing as a role model in the fight “against 
terror”. Therefore, all the publications in one way or the other emphasized the need 
for surveillance and social control to deal with terrorism and criminal acts, probably a 
reflection of corporate and government-influenced media.  
One aspect clear in the three newspapers was the extensive use of news wire 
services. Considering the geographic proximity between Jakarta, Singapore and 
Malaysia, it could have been expected that local journalists would be at the scene and 
able to follow up the story. The tendency to give preference to international news 
wire services suggests that the domestic newspapers were inadequately staffed, or that 
their journalists were not properly trained. The newspapers may also have wanted to 
save money, feeling that since they were already paying for the wire services, why not 
make use of them. The result was that the newspapers mostly carried the same stories.  




Chapter Six: Bali Bombings in 2005 – ‘Bali 2’ 
The Indonesian resort island of Bali was again rocked by explosions just days before 
the third anniversary of the deadliest terrorist attack in the country. The three blasts, 
which occurred almost simultaneously, left a death toll of 23 people and more than 
120 injured. The worst of the three blasts occurred at a restaurant by the beach in the 
Kuta in the same area and surroundings where explosions had killed more than 200 
people in 2002.  
The coverage of the 1st.October 2005, bombings has been included in this study 
as an acknowledgment of the event since the dissertation was already in its final 
phase. For this reason, only the research questions and the more important 
observations have been taken into consideration. Moreover, except for the Straits 
Times, the other newspapers and Tempo magazine provided only brief coverage of the 
event. One of the reasons for the reduced coverage could be the South Asian 
earthquake in Pakistan just days after the 2005 Bali bombings taking precedence; 
another possibility is that the majority of the victims were Indonesian nationals rather 
than foreign tourists. Early media reports did however indicate that 20 Australians, 
four Americans, eight South Koreans, three Japanese, one French and one German 
were included among the injured. Other possibilities not considered here could have 
influenced the limited coverage in comparison to the previous bombings’ reportages.  
It is worth noting that between the August 2004 Australian Embassy bombing and 
the 2005 Bali bombings, there were other attacks in parts of Indonesia that did not 
receive as much national and international media attention. For example, on 13 
November 2004 an explosion near a police station in the eastern part of the island of 




Sulawesi killed 5 people, and on 28 May 2005 two bombs ripped through a busy 
market in Tentena, Central Sulawesi, killing 21 people. 
 
6.1 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: Straits Times 
The ST started its front-page coverage of the bombings with straight information. The 
article ‘Oh No, Not again’ (Asmarani, D., ST, 2 October 2005, p.1), did not link the 
blasts in a popular outdoor eating area to any particular group. The association 
between the bombings and the JI group was reported in the inside pages (Rekhi, S., 
ST, 2 October 2005, p.4). Reporting from Bali, the ST’s journalist Salim Osman 
described in detail the information released by the police on how the three suicide 
bombers detonated their explosives (Osman, S., ST, 3 October 2005, p.1). The Prime 
Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong met Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono in Bali to offer Singapore’s full support in the fight against terrorism. A 
six-man Singapore Armed Forces medical team flew with the Prime Minister into 
Bali to provide help at hospitals (Koh, L., ST, 4 October 2005, p.1),  
 
6.1.1  Conceptualization of Terrorism: Straits Times 
The Straits Times’s conceptualization of terrorism was essentially one of ‘jihadism’, 
‘jihadist-anarchists’ and ‘Islamic extremism’. Examples were found in its editorial 
‘Indonesia coping well’ (ST, 5 October 2005, p.20), and in its op-ed piece 
‘Democracy is not enough’ (Atran, S., ST, 6 October 2005, p.26). Violence was also 
equated to terrorism as observed in one of the Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s 
statements that, “Terrorism is damaging the social order and slowing down the 




economy” (Associated Press, ‘Military called on to stamp out terror’, ST, 6 October 
2005, p.6). It is against this background that the four main subcategories of 
‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, the 
connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
6.1.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The terrorists were described as suicide bombers, members of JI, ‘jihadists’, ‘fringe 
fanatics’ and ‘religious extremists’. They were variously named as Azahari, Noordin 
and Dulmatin, a name that popped up continuously in the ST’s stories during the 
coverage of the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah suspects but had not been in the headlines 
for some time. Azahari and Noordin were reported as being the masterminds of the 
attacks. 
 
6.1.1.2 Roots of Violence  
The root of the violence was described as a desire to destabilize a moderate 
government in a Muslim country. The Australian Prime Minister John Howard said, 
“the militants saw President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a threat. He is the 
democratic, moderate face of Islam. The terrorists know that, and they want to 
undermine him” (Maynard, R., ST, 3 October 2005, p.5). 
 




6.1.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The connection was made through the claim by the Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard that the terrorists wanted to undermine President Yudhoyono’s moderate face 
of Islam (Maynard, R., ST, 3 October 2005, p5); the connection was made in stories 
such as ‘Fear and anger in Indonesia’, where “Muslim leaders joined the chorus of 
public condemnation”, and “ the [religious] leaders denied that religion played a part 
in the attacks” (Asmarani, D. ST, 4 October 2005, p.9). The link was also established 
in a story with information provided by the Associated Press and Reuters, in which 
the Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla was reported as asking religious leaders to 
preach against suicide bombings  (Associated Press, ‘Islamic leaders urged to slam 
terrorism’, ST, 8 October 2005, p.8).  
 Another connection between violence and religion was observed in the article 
‘Bali’s Day of Prayer’ where the writer mentioned about the “Ramadan austerities” 
and how the Hindu rituals and tourism are being affected by the bombings (Fong, T., 
ST, 6 October 2005, p.9); and in the op-ed story entitled ‘Confronting the terrorists 
within’ in which the Singapore’s former Prime Minister, Minister Mentor (MM) Lee 
Kuan Yew, made suggestions on how Europe and the US should “discredit extremist 
ideology, which takes Quranic passages out of context, preaches hatred against non-
Muslims and seeks to spread Islam through violence” (Yew, L.K., ST, 10 October 
2005, p.20). The ST published commentaries calling for the Indonesian President to 
remove “the kid gloves” to deal with religious hardliners (McBeth, J., ST, 8 October 
2005, p. S14). In the same edition, the ST reported on the increasing number of people 
converting to Islam in Russia (Shlapentokh, D., ST, 8 October 2005, p. S16). 




6.1.1.4 The Victims 
The reporting on the victims of the bombings had grisly photo illustrations and 
gruesome accounts (Ho, C.Kong, & Ng, S., ST, 2 October 2005, p.3; Nadarajan, B., 
ST, 3 October 2005, p.3). The newspaper followed its trend to use emotional appeal 
while using the reporting to boost Singapore as a regional medical centre (Srinivas, 
S., ST, 3 October 2005, p.6). A front page photo illustration of the two smiling 
leaders, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
visiting wounded patients at the Sanglah Hospital in Bali was published (‘Get well 
soon’, ST, 5 October 2005, p.1) The role of the Singapore Armed Forces medical 
team in Bali also entered the pages of the Straits Times with a photo illustration of a 
Singaporean military paramedic checking on a blast victim (‘Joint Effort’, ST, 5 
October 2005, p.6). 
 
6.1.2 Insight 
As with the previous bombings, the ST portrayed its understanding that Singapore is 
taking precautions against possible attacks in the country (Huei, P. S., & Koh, L., ST, 
3 October 2005, p.1), in addition to running stories speculating on the possibility of 
attacks in Singapore and whether or not the population is prepared (Lim, L., ST, 7 
October 2005, p.33; Fernandez, W., ST, 8 October 2005, p. S13). The paper used 
information and illustrations extracted from Google Earth over the Internet to produce 
a story on how terrorists could obtain detailed information of potential targets in the 
country and elsewhere (Ho, C. Kong, ST, 9 October 2005, p.4), without placing the 
issue within the local context in which the taking of photos of some government 
buildings and certain locations in the country is banned. 




In a story entitled ‘National pride hindering anti-terror war’ (Eyal, J., ST, 3 
October 2005, p.5), the ST criticized  Indonesia for not having taken up international 
efforts to improve cooperation with the Indonesian military and its security agencies 
to combat ‘terrorists’. However, the public disapproval was softer than it had been 
towards former president Megawati Sukarnoputri in its coverage of the previous 
attacks. In fact the reporting was more favourable with stories such as ‘PM Lee 
confident of Indonesian resolve’ (Koh, L., ST, 5 October 2005, p.6), and ‘PM gives 
full backing to Jakarta’ (Koh, L., ST, 4 October 2005, p.1). 
In essence, the ST had not changed its reporting style or its use of resources but 
presented a lighter criticism of the government of President Yudhoyono, yet still 
combined with messages of public diplomacy. A strong government in Indonesia 
would guarantee social stability and maintain investors’ confidence. Singapore is 
reported to be the top foreign investor in Indonesia with a total investment of US$ 
2.08 billion in 84 projects, mainly in telecommunications (Osman, S., ST, 7 October 
2005, p.8). The JP published that Singapore’s investment in Indonesia amount to US$ 
12.1 billion (Boedhiwardhana, W., JP, 4 October 2005, p.3). 
The ST referred to extracts from a letter by JI dated November 26, 2004 “obtained 
from an underground extremist group in Sumatra” (‘JI operative’s letter warned of 
bombing this year’, ST, 2 October 2005, p.4). Once again, the ST demonstrated that in 
comparison to the other publications it had greater access to intelligence and 
information about terrorists than it printed in its pages.  
 




6.2 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: Jakarta Post 
The bombings in Bali 2 occurred when Indonesia was in turmoil with violent protests 
across the country and a nationwide public transportation driver’s strike because the 
government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had increased fuel prices by an 
average of 126 percent.  In less than one hour after the incident on a Saturday 
evening, President Yudhoyono held a press conference in which he condemned the 
blasts as terrorist attacks.  
While President Yudhoyono ordered more vigilance across the country, the JP 
in its editorial “Terrorists among us” stated, “someone should be held accountable for 
this latest intelligence lapse”, and  “the President, and his security advisers, must do 
more to ensure that this is the last terrorist outrage in this country” (‘Terrorists among 
us’, JP, 3 October 2005, p.6). The editorial, however, observed that the President had 
cautioned the public of possible terrorist attacks in September or October, but 
“government officials were saying that the threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), blamed 
for most of the terrorist attacks in Indonesia in recent years, had been brought under 
control.” Consequently, President Yudhoyono called upon the Indonesian Military 
(TNI) to be active in the fight against terrorism (Siboro, T., & Komandjaja, E.C., JP, 
6 October 2005, p.1). 
6.2.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism: Jakarta Post  
The Jakarta Post reproduced the Indonesian President’s definition that “terrorism was 
[sic] a crime against humanity as it kills people no matter who they are or what they 
are”. (Siboro, T, & Komandjaja, E.C., JP, 6 October 2005, p.1). On the other hand, 
the JP reported on terrorism as an enemy that security intelligence service can defeat 
(‘Intelligence failure’, 5 October 2005, p.6). It is against this background that the four 




main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are drawn: images of terrorists, 
roots of violence, the connection between violence and religion, and the victims. 
 
6.2.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The JP’s reporting centred on the figures of Azahari and Noordin, the two Malaysian 
fugitives, JI and suicide bombers. The newspaper reproduced official views that the 
masterminds of the attacks were Azahari and Noordin. (‘Police hot on trail of Bali 
blast masterminds’, JP, 5 October 2005, p.2). 
 
6.2.1.2 Roots of Violence 
The violence was said to have occurred as a result of an intelligence failure. In the 
editorial titled ‘Terrorists among us’ the JP pointed to “the ineffectiveness of our 
intelligence institutions and our police” (JP, 3 October 2005, p.6). 
 
6.2.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The connection between violence and religion was made through articles on aspects 
of Islam and editorials. The JP linked the blast to religion in its editorial entitled ‘A 
Ramadhan of Jihad’ where it asked the question, “have Indonesia’s mainstream 
Muslims allowed radical elements to hijack the representation of Islam?” (‘A 
Ramadhan of Jihad’, JP, 4 October 2005, p.6). In the story ‘Islam’s leaders condemn 
Bali blasts’ the newspaper reproduced the opinions of Muslim leaders appealing to 
authorities to avoid hastily linking the attacks with Islam (‘Islam’s leaders condemn 




Bali blasts’, JP, 3 October 2005, p.4). Furthermore, the newspaper reproduced the 
views of sociologist Nur Syam as saying, “the country [Indonesia] will be seriously 
impaired by religious radicalism if moderate Muslims do not strive to balance the 
beliefs of hard-liners” (Nugroho, ID, JP, 3 October 2005, p.4). 
6.2.1.4 The Victims 
The newspaper did not report extensively on any particular individual as the victim. 
Nor did it recount any family’s story on how they either survived the blasts or lost a 
family member. The JP reported on the death toll and on the many missing persons as 
factual news without exaggeration or emotional appeals.  
 
6.2.2 Insight 
The Jakarta Post’s coverage of the 2005 Bali bombings was to the point. It did touch 
most of the immediate concerns consequential to the bombings, such as economic 
aspects, tourism, and human-interest stories, without exploiting the event with 
emotional or sensationalist stories. The newspaper did not use gruesome photo 
illustration or grisly details in its reportage. 
 The main topic of the coverage was the reactions to the reinstallation of military 
territorial command and its possible consequences due to the history of human rights 
abuse by the Indonesian Military (TNI) during the military regime of Suharto 
(Rukmantara, A., JP, 7 October 2005, p.1; Siboro, T., JP, 8 October 2005, p.2; 
Atmanta, D., JP, 8 October 2005, p.3; Suryana, A., JP, 8 October 2005, p.2). 
The President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a four-star retired army general, 
summoned the military to help fight terrorism days after Bali 2. The TNI’s 




intelligence system was widely used during the authoritarian regime of Suharto and 
scrapped after his fall in 1998. Under the system, non-commissioned officers known 
as ‘Babinsa’ carried out surveillance work for the government. The ‘Babinsa’ did not 
have the authority to make arrests but they acted as the government’s eyes and ears at 
village level looking for suspicious activities. The TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto 
was quoted as saying he would restore the military territorial command (Siboro, T. & 
Komandjaja, E. C., JP, 6 October 2005, p.1). General Endriartono Sutarto said 37,000 
non-commissioned military officers, including 1,700 in the Great Jakarta area, were 
ready to take part in the intelligence system called ‘koter’ across Indonesia (‘Military 
officers deployed to villages’, JP, 8 November 2005, p.1).  
 The JP reported on the different views about the possibility of the involvement of 
Indonesian Military’s (TNI) in the fight against terrorism and the failure of 
Indonesian intelligence agencies to prevent terrorist attacks. According to the Jakarta 
Post,  
“Indonesia has four national-level intelligence units – the National Intelligence 
Agency (BIN), which coordinates all intelligence operations in the country, 
the Military Strategic Intelligence, the Police Intelligence Unit and an 
intelligence unit connected to the Attorney General’s Office. There are also 
numerous regional-level intelligence units connected with the military and the 
police” (‘Intelligence failure’, JP, 5 October 2005, p.6).  
Throughout the coverage of the previous bombings the JP has been strong in 
expressing its views that the terrorist acts occurred due to intelligence failure. In 
various editorials the newspaper advocated the need for more surveillance, including 
community surveillance, and effective measures to combat terrorism. Now that 
President Yudhoyono has called on the military the newspaper raised the issue that 




the country could witness a return of militarism. The newspaper pointed out that 
while TNI could play a decisive role in the war against terrorism, militarism might 
occur if the armed forces were to be allowed to resume a dominant role in domestic 
security and politics.  In its editorial ‘Stay in the barracks’ it said, “ True, the internal 
security acts in Singapore and Malaysia are effective in the short term, but at what 
cost to civil society?” (‘Stay in the barracks’, JP, 10 October 2005, p.6). 
The TNI started to help the country’s intelligence agencies in the fight against 
terrorism by urging the people to inform security officers about suspected terrorist 
activities in their neighborhoods (Siboro, T., JP, 4 October 2005, p.4). One of the 
worrying aspects of community surveillance was observed in a news story reporting 
on late night police inspections of residents’ documents and searches inside houses in 
parts of Jakarta (Khalik, A., JP, 8 October 2005, p.1). This kind of security approach, 
endorsed by the newspaper, can lead to abuses either by elements of the police or by 
individuals pretending to belong to the police force.  
 
6.3  Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: New Straits Times 
The New Straits Times scarcely fulfilled its function of informing the readers about 
the bombings in Bali. It published short articles and most of them were from news 
services. The newspaper had the shortest coverage period in comparison with the 
three newspapers. One of the reasons could be the new format of the tabloid that is 
compact, besides there were other major events competing for coverage such as the 
spread of avian flu, the earthquake in Pakistan and issues that are of concern for the 
local readers, such as the case of Bank Islam suffering a big loss, political rivalry, and 
local crime.  




6.3.1  Conceptualization of Terrorism: New Straits Times 
The NST conceptualized the bombings as an act of violence by Islamic militants with 
a history stretching back to Indonesia’s fight for independence. The newspaper stated 
that too much external scrutiny on how Indonesia is engaged in the global war on 
terror risks crimping the country’s sovereignty and is weakening the resolve of its 
security agencies to go after the extremists (‘Defeating the terror within, NST, 4 
October 2005, p.20). 
 
6.3.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
The image of terrorists was developed around Azahari, Noordin, suicide bombers and 
militants. Official source of information identified Azahari and Noordin as the 
masterminds of the attacks. The newspaper reproduced the photo illustration of the 
severed head of the three suspected suicide bombers (Chew, A., NST, 4 October 2005, 
p.8). The Indonesian authorities were counting on the parents or relatives of the 
bombers to come forward to help police identify them. The newspaper reproduced the 
views of Indonesian police chief, Made Mangku Pastika, saying the bombers could 
belong to existing “unknown terrorists cells” (Chew, A., NST, 8 October 2005, p.32). 
 
6.3.1.2 Roots of Violence 
An interpretation of the cause of the violence was not clearly detectable in the NST’s 
reportage but the editorial entitled ‘Defeating the terror within’ said that, “it is an 
Indonesian problem, a homegrown problem, not an import from the wilds of 
Afghanistan”, (NST, 4 October 2005, p.20). The NST published the op-ed ‘Along with 




democracy, Jakarta needs resolve’ in which the author wrote, “Muslim governments 
must address the often frustrated aspirations of their bulging youth populations” 
(Atran, S., NST, 10 October 2005, p.19). The suicide bombers were reportedly said to 
be around 20 and 25 years old (Chew, A., NST, 8 October 2005, p.32).  
 
6.3.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The connection between violence and religion was made by pointing to the origins of 
Islamic militancy in Indonesia through editorials such as those entitled ‘Defeating the 
terror within’ (NST, 4 October 2005, p.20); the op-ed entitled ‘Who pulls the strings 
of the bombers?’ discusses how Muslims should be charitable in their actions, words 
and thoughts (Arifin, Z., NST, 5 October 2005, p.19). 
 
6.3.1.4    The Victims 
The newspaper hardly reported on any of the more than 120 injured in the blasts. 
There were a few photo illustrations on wounded victims being taken to the hospital 
and the photo of a girl who reportedly lost her mother. The newspaper published a 
story on how five Malaysian saved their lives (Augustin, S, & Singh, D., NST, 3 
October 2005, p.8). 
 
6.3.2 Insight 
As in its coverage of the 2002 Bali bombings, the Marriott Hotel and the Australian 
embassy bombings the NST reflected the views of Malaysian authorities saying 




“Malaysia’s security situation is under control and there are no active terrorist cells in 
the country” (‘Work of three suicide bombers’, NST, 3 October 2005, p.6). 
Nevertheless, Malaysia tightened border security to prevent the two terrorist suspects 
Azahari and Noordin from trying to return; Malaysia also increased police patrols 
around embassies and tourist attractions (Associated Press, ‘Region on alert, security 
stepped up’, NST, 4 October 2005, p.28). 
While it is fair to say that the newspaper reported on the blasts in Indonesia, it is 
also correct to say that there was no sensationalism, no speculations, and no use of 
glossy style of communication. In fact the coverage was almost dry in comparison to 
NST’s own coverage of previous bombings. The reporting was mostly based on 
stories provided by agency news services.  
 
6.4 Coverage of the Bali 2 Bombings in 2005: Tempo  
Tempo’s coverage resembled the material from the daily newspapers. The two pages 
reportage, in the edition of 4-10 October 2005, seemed to have been prepared in a 
rush to meet a deadline before the publication hit the streets. The magazine’s main 
topic was the decision President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had taken to increase 
the fuel price.  It was against this background that Tempo reported on the Bali 2 
bombings. 
 
6.4.1  Conceptualization of Terrorism: Tempo 
The magazine reproduced Indonesian officials calling the bombings ‘an act of 
terrorism’. Tempo also referred to the incident as a ‘tragedy’. The reporting linked the 




bombing to the Darul Islam group, identified in the story as a ‘hard-line Islamic 
group’ (‘Another Bali tragedy’, Tempo, 4-10 October 2005, p.13). It is within this 
framework that the four main subcategories of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ are 
drawn: images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and 
religion, and the victims. 
 
6.4.1.1 Images of Terrorists 
Tempo was the only medium to state that the brain behind the latest attacks was the 
suspected terrorist Zulkarmen, with Noordin and Azahari functioning only as his 
operatives. Officials in Indonesia pointed the group JI as responsible for the 
bombings. Without providing further information, the magazine quoted anonymous 
intelligence sources implicating members of the group Darul Islam in the attacks.  
 
6.4.1.2 Roots of Violence 
In its reports, Tempo presumed “that as long as people like Zulkarnaen remain free, 
terrorism will continue”. Tempo referred to anonymous intelligence sources, 
disclosing “the existence of documents written in Arabic about recruiting volunteers 
to carry the bombs”. The reportage stated that “the objective of the terrorists: [is] to 
spread fear”.  
 




6.4.1.3 Connection between Violence and Religion 
The reportage’s connection between violence and religion came from ‘intelligence 
sources’ saying, “the bomb carriers were recruited from the Darul Islam group, a 
hard-line Islamic group whose aim is to form an Islamic state in Indonesia”. 
 
6.4.1.4 The Victims 
The magazine reported on the ‘scenes of hysteria and panic’ with people running 
around ‘screaming’ and ‘sobbing’. The reporting described the ‘chaotic situation’ but 
did not run a single paragraph on the victims. The magazine had photo illustrations, 
without captions, showing the general destruction where the blasts occurred and a few 
body bags in shelves. 
 
6.4.2  Insight 
The 4-10 October 2005 Tempo magazine edition was very effective in including the 
Bali 2 bombings in its edition released just days after the blasts. The two pages of 
coverage addressed the incident itself and had a story on the background of suspect 
terrorist Zulkarmen as the mastermind of the attacks (‘Zulkarnaen: the Commander 
from Sragen.’). The magazine repeated official calls on the public to be more alert 
with regards to newcomers in their neighborhoods. It was not clear from the reporting 
the reason why the Darul Islam group was directly connected to the violence this time 
but not in the 2002 Bali bombings, the Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy 
bombings. Tempo used information provided by “a former JI leader who insisted on 
remaining nameless for security reasons”. 





6.5 Comparative Analysis 
The three newspapers (ST, JP and NST) based their perception of terrorists on Azahari 
and Noordin, the same two persons who had dominated the news in the previous 
bombings. Tempo (a news magazine) was the only one of the four publications 
investigated in this study to quote Zulkarmen, a name that had not been in the media 
for years, as the brains behind the attacks, with Azahari and Noordin named as mere 
‘operatives’. Tempo was at the same time the only medium to report on anonymous 
intelligence source that implicated the Darul Islam group.  
The connection between violence and religion presented in the four publications 
was made through stories particularly in their op-ed sections and in editorials. The 
same approach was observed in their coverage of the earlier bombings. 
The root of violence was perceived differently. The ST reported on it as the goal 
to destabilize a moderate Muslim government. The JP reported on it as another failure 
of the intelligence agencies but with a difference, namely, that the agencies worked 
well after the bombings but were incapable of preventing the attacks. The JP did not 
mention – or preferred not to mention – the participation of international teams 
working with Indonesian agencies in the hunt for terrorists in the country. The NST 
described the root of violence as being an old problem in Indonesia; that is Islamic 
militants fighting to create an Islamic state. Tempo said the terrorists wanted to spread 
fear among the population.  
In news production, based on the journalistic routine of objectivity criteria 
(Cohen-Almagor, 2001; McNair, 1998), the JP presented a more professional kind of 




journalism, which implies that despite its small circulation and its writers coming 
from a variety of backgrounds, the newspaper can present serious, good, straight news 
stories without burdening the reader with assumptions and over-generalizations. The 
JP also published a balanced set of human-interest stories without playing with its 
readers’ feelings and the victims’ suffering.  
The NST’s coverage of the Bali 2005 bombings was not much different from its 
coverage of previous bombings, although its stories were shorter in length. It did not 
come as a surprise to observe the portrayal of Malaysia as a safe country, a news 
framing process in which the feeling of national belonging is given relevance 
(Schudson, 1995; Navasky, 2002; Neuman: 2005). As with the previous bombings, 
the newspaper did not publish human-interest stories. Again, the NST diluted the 
impact of the attacks by allocating the articles to respective sections, e.g. in the pages 
dedicated to ASEAN stories, the pages dedicated to World stories and the Prime 
News pages.   
The ST had its most significant example of a good piece in its initial story on the 
bombings by Devi Asmarani, its Indonesia correspondent in Jakarta (Asmarani, D., 
ST, 2 October 2005.p.1). However, the story was followed by an upsetting photo 
illustration and an unimaginative title ‘Oh no, not again’. The ST’s human-interest 
stories had less emotional appeal in comparison to its coverage of previous bombings, 
but the newspaper continued to use photos that could provoke strong emotional 
reactions. The ST speculated on about possible sites for terrorists’ attacks in 
Singapore and on the population’s preparedness to cope in such situations. The 
newspaper was using the ‘chauvinistic’ media patriotism frame that contributes to 
intensify anxiety in the population (Waisbord, 2004:389).  




Tempo was quick in inserting coverage of the bombings in its latest issue, even if 
it only ran to two pages. The magazine was due to be distributed less than three days 
after the attacks. While in terms of publishing this was an achievement, the report was 
poor in content.  
After the first three days of coverage of the 2005 Bali bombings the reportage 
evolved to other related issues. The ST dedicated its reportage to aspects of 
international terrorism whereas the JP focused on the possible return of TNI and the 
need for community surveillance; the NST did not present a particular topic in its 
reporting.  
All the publications relied heavily on the authorities for information and the use of 




Chapter Seven: Comparison and Discussion 
It has become clear to me during the course of the research that any media study on 
terrorism has to take into consideration the contextual coverage: the inter-related sub 
topics reported in the publications. These sub-topics are expected to throw light on [or 
cloud] the understanding of the terrorist events. That is when the framing of the news, 
where some aspects are emphasized more than others, provide the window that set the 
parameters in which citizens discuss the events (Tuchman, 1978; Entman, 1993). The 
broad contextual coverage the ST, JP, NST and Tempo produced has revealed that 
terrorist events cannot be properly understood without exploring the real or perceived 
grievances of groups or individuals who resort to violence to defend their causes 
(Nacos, 2006). The study reveals the influence of media-government relationships, in 
which regulations and informal techniques shape the news. Media ownership and its 
ties with centres of power also affect how news is reported. The study shows how 
news content varies over subject matter and over time (Rivers, Miller & Gandy, 1975; 
Curran 2002). 
 A comparison of the four publications investigated and a discussion constitute 
the first part of this chapter, while observations on aspects of news production in the 
framing of the media’s reporting on terrorism constitute the second part.  
 
7.1 Similarities in Construction of News on Terrorism 
Within the macro frame of ‘war on terror’ the publications in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore revealed more similarities than differences in framing, particularly in 
addressing the various Islamic militant groups in the same breath as radicalism and 
  206
terrorism. However, within each socio-cultural system, each publication demonstrated 
how political and economic interests played an important part in shaping the 
discussion of public issues.  
 
7.1.1 Definition and Labelling of ‘Terrorists’ 
The main similarity in the four publications’ reporting lies in the immediate 
identification of JI as being responsible for the bombings. JI was linked to al-Qaeda, 
which was asserted as fact, a connection made automatically that was never 
questioned. However, there were some variations on how official sources made the 
link and how the newspapers and the news magazine reflected the link in their news 
stories. The NST linked KMM with JI and al-Qaeda, whereas the JP implicated 
radical Muslim groups. The ST linked Jemaah Islamiyah with al-Qaeda in its 
characterization of terrorists.  
From JI to Abu Bakar Bashir and to Hambali, the four publications uncritically 
repeated a long list of names of suspected terrorists provided by government officials. 
Since the Marriott Hotel bombing the newspapers turned their focus on two 
Malaysian alleged bomb experts, Azahari and Noordin. The discourses on Bashir and 
others appeared to be a transnational agenda, with the newspapers publishing very 
similar stories. The limited variation in the reporting was tailored to fit each country’s 
interests yet, to create a general consensus of opinion (Rusciano, 2003). 
Journalists did not question how the identification of the ‘terrorists’ started to 
appear in the press. For one, Jane’s Intelligence Review (December 2001) reported 
that al-Qaeda had plans to attack US targets in Singapore. The disclosure was made at 
  207
the same time as a UPI (United Press International) report revealed that there were 
cells of al-Qaeda in Singapore (UPI, 28 December 2001). This was followed by the 
story ‘Is there an Al-Qaeda connection in Indonesia?’ in the Straits Times (Pereira, 
D., ST, 20 January 2002), citing a Washington Post article that said Abu Bakar Bashir 
had written letters to militants in Malaysia and Indonesia to prepare for jihad against 
the Americans. In February 2002, Time magazine released information from the CIA 
that Hambali was connected with the hijackers of 9/11 (Tempo, 19-25 February 2002, 
p.4; Pereira, B., & Go, R. ST, 17 September 2002, p. A1). In addition, there was “a tip 
from a Singaporean that led to investigation of Al-Qaeda terrorism activities in 
Singapore” (‘No US tip-off before ISA arrests’, ST, 19 January 2002). It became 
apparent that the process of identifying suspects started with international 
publications. Journalists took uncritically the increasing number of names and 
allegations about family members and acquaintances said to be involved in the 
bombings. Journalists did not raise the possibility of alternative culpability for the 
bombings, but internalized and transmitted the information and interpretation 
provided by official sources. Journalists did not pursue questions of whether or not 
renegade elements within Indonesia’s armed forces could be responsible for the Bali 
bombings (Chalk, 2005). Except for an Indonesian official who had speculated on the 
possibility of Acehnese separatists’ involvement in the bombings, the publications 
provided the readers with a ‘standardization’ of offenders. 
Journalists failed to make analogies with the rapid identification of a villain in the 
case of TWA Flight 800 that crashed in the sea not far from New York in 1996. The 
blaming of Muslim terrorists for the TWA crash persisted for more than a year. The 
media linked the crash to the trial of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoall, two 
men seized in Pakistan and accused of involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center 
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bombing. However, 16 months after the crash, the FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) agents admitted that there was no evidence of criminal action behind 
the TWA crash (IPS-Inter Press Service, 16 November 1997: Factiva).  
The defining and the labelling of terrorism appeared to be a rhetorical act (Tuman, 
2003), even more so when the reporting on the bombings slipped to give space to a 
broader political context and other sub-topic issues. Brummett suggests that 
“whosoever constructs can also be influenced to construct differently” (2003:25); 
therefore, journalists writing about a ‘reality’ are re-presenting the event. A reality, 
Brummett argues, is what happens, is what is when a blast occurs, a plane crashes. It 
was difficult to seize the ‘reality’ of JI arrests since it was constructed in news 
narratives based on something that had been said and already interpreted. There was 
no porthole to allow any direct observation of the arrests (reality), which happened 
‘some time ago’.  
With the JI arrests, stereotyping and labelling were attributed to the ‘deviants’. 
Spitzer (1996) pointed out that “interpretations of deviance are often ideological in 
their assumptions and implications”, and in capitalist society the process of deviance 
results from a process in “which populations are structurally generated, as well as 
shaped, channelled into, and manipulated” (pp.170, 173). Campbell (1995) is of the 
opinion that very often governments need ‘deviant’ groups or ‘myths’ to re-establish 
power and gain support for further control policies. Campbell (1995) observes that in 
contemporary mythology, race and class appear to contribute to the social order by 
establishing who participates and who does not (p.15). In The Social Construction of 
Drug Scares, Reinarman (1996) observes that the ‘drug scare’ of the 1960s was about 
the use of drugs by particular groups of people who were already perceived by the 
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powerful groups as some kind of threat. Van Dijk (1989:202) notes that the media 
contribute, often indirectly and subtly, to the building of “mental models of ethnic 
situations and generalize negative attitudes or prejudices that embody people’s basic 
opinion about particular ethnic groups” and, consequently, “the media tacitly provide 
the legitimization of those in power”.  
 
7.1.2 Images of Terrorists 
The framing of ‘terrorists’ provided a narrow set of options in addition to a similar set 
of characterizations. The four publications studied as well as official sources 
concentrated on the alleged al-Qaeda-cum-JI terrorists and described those assumed 
to be responsible for the bombings as ‘Islamists’, ‘Islamic radicals’, ‘religious 
militants’ and ‘radical Islamic groups’. None of those named in the reporting as 
suspected terrorists were actually the bombers, except for the Marriott Hotel blast, in 
which the Indonesian authorities identified Asmar as the suicide bomber and 
automatically linked him with the JI group. The four publications reported on Asmar 
as if a verdict had already been reached. In the case of JI, Singapore authorities 
justified the arrests on the ground that the accused were masterminds, therefore, 
terrorists.  
In the case of the blasts, Indonesian authorities defined the arrested alleged 
bombers or those suspected of involvement in the attacks as terrorists. Their 
confessions were obtained during interrogation. Journalists did not question under 
what conditions prisoners admitted to involvement in terrorist activities. The media in 
the three countries concerned suffer from shortsightedness towards reporting on 
human rights issues when judged by Western standards. Lawrence (2004) wrote that 
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in Indonesia “police used excessive and sometimes deadly force in arresting suspects 
and often used torture, in attempting to obtain information or a confession” (p.69), 
whereas in Malaysia, “the government acknowledged that it restricted certain political 
and civil rights in order to maintain social harmony and political stability” (p.93). 
 In the case of Singapore, Lawrence (2004) wrote, 
 “There were no substantiated instances of police abuse of detainees. Caning, 
in addition to imprisonment, was a routine punishment for numerous offences. 
The Government continued to rely on preventive detentions to deal with 
espionage, terrorism, threats to racial and religious harmony, and subversion” 
(p.125).   
As Xiaoge (2005:21) argues, citing Hitam, 1996, Asian cultures give “greater 
emphasis to the rights of the community over those of the individual, and the rights of 
the individual are to be sacrificed for the greater good of the community”. 
In the 1950s and the 1960s the transgressors in Malaysia and Singapore were 
defined as ‘revolutionary elements’, ‘left-wings’ and ‘communists’. Sahr (1993:159) 
argues that the dominant definition offered by those in leadership positions in 
business and government affect how specific individuals or groups are viewed in 
society and presented to the media. Sederberg (1989:29) notes that “terrorist is the tag 
we attach, too uncritically, to those who resort to terrorism” and once adopted, “the 
characterization implies conviction” (p.30). 
The reporting on the arrests of JI members in Singapore and Malaysia was at one 
level exaggerated and distorted and at another level ambiguous due to the confused 
nature of the situation. The level of ‘deviance’ attributed to those arrested in 
Singapore was portrayed as high and examined to such an extent that new 
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government policies were introduced in Singapore ‘to improve’ race and religious 
relations, such as teachers of Islam having to register with the government-linked 
organization MUIS (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore). In addition, there were 
calls for reforms in the teaching of Islam, in what Cohen (1972) calls societal control. 
The ST spin on the aims of JI members arrested can be understood as the newspaper’s 
attempt to convey the message to the public that those with ‘bad’ ideas threaten the 
interest of public safety, peace and good order, and deserved to be detained (Hor, 
2002). 
Malaysia used the enforcement of law (Edelman, 1974) against the Malaysian 
Mujahideen Movement, also known as Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). This 
group was reported to be a threat to the government and allegedly linked to the Pan 
Malaysian Islamic Party, also known as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), which is the 
leading challenger of the United Malay National Organization’s (UMNO) secularist 
approach to governing Malaysia. The PAS has proposed the establishment of an 
Islamic state based on Muslim religious law. UMNO, which dominates the Barisan 
Nasional (National Front), formed by the three conservative, ethnically-based parties 
– the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – has ruled Malaysia 
since the country’s independence from being a British colony in 1957. Former US 
ambassador Ronald Palmer wrote that, “concerned by Islamic threats to UMNO 
secularism, Mahathir began a wide-ranging campaign to associate PAS with Muslim 
extremists” (Palmer, 2004:129).  
Still under the banner of the ‘global fight on terror’, Malaysia reported the need 
for police patrols in housing areas to curb urban crimes allegedly associated with 
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terrorism. Malaysia also called for reforms in the teachings of Islam in madrassahs in 
certain parts of the country. The NST did not publish information on government 
initiatives to control the schools, but even before the 9/11 attacks in the United States, 
the Malaysian government saw the growth of religious militancy in the country as a 
serious threat (Noor, 2004).  
The teaching of Islam was not a subject of discourse in the JP until the Bali 
bombings, and radical Islam was understood in the public sphere as not being 
anything new. Following the first Bali attacks, the JP portrayed Indonesia as a 
moderate Muslim country that just happened to have a few culprits. The JP did not 
discuss certain historical facts, for example, that in the past the military had been the 
source of terrorism in the country and radical Muslim groups were used to spread 
violence in various parts of the archipelago (Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002) or that 
“mob vigilant action and religious groups purporting to uphold public morality 
continued to dispense street justice” (Lawrence, 2004:68). 
None of the publications drew any parallel between the circumstances 
surrounding the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah members and the case of the Singapore 
People’s Liberation Organization exposed in 1982 as planning unrest in Singapore by 
exploiting religious and racial issues with the objective of overthrowing the 
government by violent means16.  
A variety of sub-topics associated with Jemaah Islamiyah were developed into 
discourses of religion, race, societal control, economic development, tourism and 
Islamic teaching, culminating in one of the most persuasive political symbols, i.e., a 
                                                 
16 The information was extracted from the home page of Singapore’s Internal Security Department, 
Ministry of Home Affairs: http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/isd/newsisd_earlyyears.html 
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threat to national security. Edelman (1977) observes that through the evocation of 
threats against the nation, people are induced to accept sacrifices and become 
susceptible to appeals for support. The securing of power by governments or 
dominant classes is helped by the role of the media (van Dijk, 1989). However, 
observations have shown that many of the discourses produced appear to mirror the 
inner problems in each society (Edelman, 1974). Newspapers externalize such 
problems while shaping the public’s perception of threats (Cohen, 1972). For 
Brummett (2003:26), “perception is constructed in an active process that links 
‘things’ to each other”. The newspapers reported on the arrests within a frame that 
best fitted the interests of those they represent: their governments in the case of the ST 
and the NST, and business interests in the case of the JP. 
The alleged terrorist bombings in Indonesia, blamed on JI, lost their relevance to 
the discourse on terrorism in Southeast Asia within days of the blasts, except for the 
first Bali bombings, which occupied most of the pages of the ST and the JP and two 
editions of Tempo. The NST slipped the coverage of the first Bali bombings to inside 
pages after the third day of the coverage. The Marriott Hotel bombing lost relevance 
around the 10th day of reporting due to the arrest of the alleged terrorist Hambali in 
Thailand. The Australian Embassy bombing had a much less period of coverage 
probably due to the climate created by the presidential election in Indonesia and the 
‘soap opera’ reporting of one 5-year old victim. The 2005 Bali bombings had the least 
period of coverage. The ST had the most extensive coverage of all events, perhaps 
because it is a large newspaper with over one hundred pages and better resources.  
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7.1.3 Roots of Violence 
Different assessments of the roots of violence reflected that there is no simple answer 
to the problem. Government officials and experts provided the alleged reasons for the 
bombings, while the publications failed to produce balanced stories about other 
potential root causes such as ideological differences, the bombers’ alienation from 
those in power, social grievances, etc. It is important to make clear that government 
officials in Malaysia and Singapore in addition to other experts were responsible for 
the claims that the root of violence is to create an Islamic state enveloping various 
countries in the region.  
 
7.1.3.1 JI and the creation of an Islamic caliphate 
The predominant way in which the roots of violence were framed in the news was the 
creation of an Islamic state, especially regarding the arrests of JI members. The ST 
blamed the Indonesian government’s inertia against Islamic militants. The paper also 
reported on the anniversaries of the attack against the US warship Cole in Yemen and 
of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington as the reasons for radicals to plan 
assaults against US targets. 
In the second round of arrests, the ST presented the motives of violence as (i) to 
incite religious-ethnic conflict between Malaysia and Singapore, (ii) to create an 
Islamic state and (iii) attacks against Western interests.  
The JP’s reporting touched on the possibility of militancy committed by 
disenchanted people due to inequality and corruption in Indonesia. In the second 
round of arrests, the JP reported on signs of a frustrated population, but did not 
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pursue the topic of social issues as a reason for militancy. In addition, the JP also 
reported on allegations by the Australian authorities that JI had plans to kill President 
Megawati. 
The NST reported on the roots of violence as lying in a desire by some people to 
overthrow the Malaysian government in order to establish an Islamic state, and to 
undermine democracy. Tempo mostly repeated the causes presented by ST.  
 
7.1.3.2 The roots of violence in the context of the bombings 
In the case of the bombings the newspapers framed the motives of violence in a wide 
range of social and political issues. In every bombing the newspapers reported 
different sets of reasons but ultimately linking the violence to the creation of an 
Islamic state.  
In the Bali bombings, the ST’s reporting ranged from condemning Indonesian 
intelligence as weak, pin-pointing rivalry among Indonesian agencies, accusing 
Indonesian authorities for not heeding international warnings on the existence of 
terrorists in the country, to implying the bombing was a reprisal for the Iraq invasion.  
The JP blamed the Bali bombings on the lack of law enforcement in Indonesia 
and on weak government. The NST said the attacks could have had domestic 
implications, as found in racial discrimination in Bali between Muslims and Hindus 
and between locals and Westerners. About 92% of Bali’s population of 3 million 
people adhere to Hinduism while 5% follow Islam (World Fact Book). Therefore, it 
can hardly be referred to as ‘racial discrimination’ or ‘religious discrimination’. 
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Tempo did not produce a reason for the Bali bombings but mentioned the exploitation 
of Hindu temples and religious symbols by the tourist industry on the island.  
In the case of the Marriott Hotel bombing, the ST’s reporting framed the trial of 
the Bali bombers in terms of their aim to establish a Pan-Islamic state. The NST 
stressed the Malaysian authorities’ views that the bombing was fuelled by JI’s 
objective to create an Islamic state in the region. The JP framed the Marriott Hotel 
bombing in terms of its alleged intent to influence the court decision in the trials of 
the Bali bombers; to target national and international political elites who often met at 
the hotel; to distract people from the annual parliamentary session; and to challenge 
the government. Tempo mostly repeated the reasons presented by the JP and the ST.  
In its coverage of the Australian embassy bombing, the ST considered the third 
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks as one of the motivations for the bombing; to influence 
the outcome of the Indonesian presidential election as another; and to protest against 
the presence of Australian troops in Iraq as a third. The JP and Tempo reported that 
‘terrorists’ wanted to humiliate Indonesian intelligence officials. The NST’s coverage 
did not produce a clear motivation.  
The publications did not address why JI allegedly only started making headlines 
as a group of terrorists after the 9/11 events. It is well documented that for decades 
groups of militants had been trying to install an Islamic state (Kingsbury, 2001; Tan, 
2003; Thayer, 2004). It remains to be explained why the Bali, Marriott Hotel and the 
Australian embassy bombings were linked to global terrorism when Indonesia has 
been a victim of a series of bombings and ethnic and religious violence since long 
before 9/11.  
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In the views of Zachary Abuza (2005:49), “terrorist attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah 
had been carried out around the region since the year 2000 but neither regional 
security services nor journalists nor academics ever linked the attacks to JI or 
terrorism”. Thus, the approach confirms the perspective embraced by Mohammad17 
(1999) that if violence is against foreigner targets or if there are foreigners among the 
victims, then it is labelled terrorism. The four publications in question did not address 
such issues but followed uncritically the discourse of ‘global terrorism’ offered by 
official sources and terrorism experts. In other words, it appeared that the root of 
violence was defined within the context of national interests. By comparison, one 
could argue that even though the London (July 2005) and Madrid bombings (March 
2004) were not against foreigners, the reporting of those bombings was nevertheless 
framed within the ‘global war on terror’ discourse. However, the 2006 bombing at a 
parking garage at Madrid’s international airport was framed within the ETA (Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty) discourse. The group acknowledged responsibility. ETA aims 
to create an independent Basque state. It was formed in 1959 in reaction to the 
dictator Franco’s suppression of the Basque language and culture.   
 
7.1.4 Violence and Religion 
The acts of violence were framed within the discourse of international pressure on 
Indonesia to arrest radical Muslim groups, the implication being that radical Islam 
breeds terrorists and thus the need to reform Islamic teaching. In such a context, the 
ST presented Indonesia in an ‘Orientalist’ discourse (Said, 1978) as its ‘Other’, where 
radicals are irrational. The ST repeated the idea that al-Qaeda shaped Jemaah 
                                                 
17 The weaknesses or strengths of Mohammd’s argument are contestable, as a reviewer has pointed it 
out. 
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Islamiyah ideology (Chalk, 2002). In addition, the perpetrators were referred to by 
their religion. Some critics would argue that there is nothing wrong with calling the 
‘terrorists’ Muslims. However, characterizing the perpetrator by his/her religion runs 
the risk of generalization (Picard, 1991).  
The newspapers equated Islamic extremists with terrorists, and this equation tends 
to obstruct the public’s ability to distinguish between religion and the action of 
extremists (Esposito, 1987, 2003). This tendency confirms Thayer’s (2005:92,93) 
suggestion that international terrorism experts and regional security analysts pieced 
together all militant Islamic groups without differentiating between political terrorism 
and Islamic militancy, with the latter being a broad-based, diverse movement.  
The connection between violence and religion was reinforced by stories on ‘good’ 
Muslims and ‘bad’ Muslims, ‘moderate’ Muslims and ‘radical’ Muslims. The inter-
pretations given by the newspapers on what constitutes a bad or a good, a moderate or 
a radical Muslim derived from the social values dominating in each society (van Dijk, 
1989). These values were reproduced in the news stories as injunctions: do not 
challenge the government, do not disturb the social order, do not incite racial discord, 
do not interrupt economic development, do not commit violence, greet your neigh-
bour, watch over your neighbour.  
The ST was the most active in reporting on a variety of sub-topics concerning 
Islam. These ranged from how Islam is not a religion of violence to aspects of 
forgiveness of the religion, and on how some individuals exploit the religion. By 
tying a positive image of Islam with what Islam is not about in its op-ed and 
commentary articles, the ST reinforced the perception of deviance among Muslims, 
but not among other religions in Singapore’s multi-cultural society. Therefore, 
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Muslims were put in the spotlight. The ST persistently quoted Singaporean authorities 
on the need for moderate Muslims to condemn these acts of violence and to speak out 
against radicals. In this way, the ST was constructing a deeper social divide by 
encouraging some Muslims to take a stand against other Muslims. However, one 
could argue that the newspaper was pointing out the need to break the equation of 
‘Muslim terrorist’ in the public mind. 
The JP did the least of the three newspapers to contextualize violence within a 
discourse on Islam. Nevertheless, the JP followed the line of official sources by 
identifying the perpetrators by their names and to link them to ‘JI’. In most instances, 
the JP reproduced and paraphrased the authorities’ use of religious categorizations to 
refer to the bombers and touched lightly on the issues of the madrassahs and the 
teaching of Islam. It appeared that the JP safeguarded one of its commercial interests 
(Bayuni, 1996), and opted not to emphasize a discourse on religion. One reason for 
this could be concerns with provoking possible assaults against the newspaper’s 
installations. Mob attacks against media organizations and journalists have happened 
in parts of Indonesia since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, 
particularly when radicals regarded the reporting as unacceptable (Koike18, 2003; 
Romano, 2003). Another reason, as was pointed out to the researcher in conversation 
with the editor Endy Bayuni, is JP’s recognition that madrassahs have an important 
role in providing education in Indonesia because of the government’s failure in this 
area. 
The NST constructed the discourse of religion around the framework of radicals 
with political intentions in Malaysia. Despite op-ed articles defending Islam as a 
                                                 
18 International Institute for Asian Studies, the Netherlands, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/30/index/html 
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religion of peace, more often than not Malaysian authorities referred to the bombers 
as Muslims. The ‘Other’ (Said, 1978) in Malaysia’s Orientalist discourse was the 
radical group KMM. The NST reflected the Malaysian authorities’ concerns with the 
teachings of Islam in parts of the country but did not make an issue out of this matter. 
Tempo did not present a discourse on religion. One explanation could be that the 
magazine did not associate the acts of violence with faith. 
As Sederberg (1989:29) observes, “placing terrorism in a wider web of social and 
political relations contributes to more muted denunciation”. Risakotta19 (2003) 
observes that the connection between religion and violence in Indonesia has become 
ubiquitous since the events of 11 September 2001. Risakotta considers that “violence 
also includes profound cultural elements that are embedded in the tradition, stories, 
rituals, adat (traditional law) that are part of the identity of the people”. Thus, the 
association of the bombings with Islamic militancy and Islam as religion in the 
reporting can be understood as filling in the tapestry with a variety of sub-topics 
purposely linked (Ghanem, 1997). What was awkward about this was that the 
characterization of the bombers was mainly attributable to official sources and was 
found in a large number of articles on aspects of Islam. Some of the op-ed stories on 
Islam had no relevance to the reporting of the bombings. However, a construction that 
connects one topic to another serves to reinforce a particular position, in Sederberg’s 
(1989:44) view “what we see to be the facts of a problem affects how we think about 
it”. Yet, as Nacos (2006) pointed out, “terrorism originated with religious and 
pseudoreligious sects and that the adherents of the major religions, among them the 
                                                 
19 International Institute for Asian Studies, the Netherlands, http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/30/index/html 
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Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Sikhs, resorted to political violence in the 
name of God” (p.38). 
 
7.2 Main Differences in News Construction of Terrorism 
The major dissimilarity between the publications appeared to lie in their 
conceptualization of terrorism in each of the bombings and in the arrests of JI 




7.2.1 Main Differences in the Conceptualization of Terrorism 
The overall concept of terrorism was framed within a constellation of co-related 
issues and sub-topics. These topics were based on historical events and nation 
building principles to preserve economic development (Menon, 1994) and the 
safeguarding of the political and ideological status quo. The newspapers reported on 
them as highly concrete and relevant.  
This confirms Edelman’s (2001) argument that various interpretations of terrorism 
appear to serve the interests of those the newspapers represent. In the case of 
Singapore and Malaysia, both the ST and the NST are government influenced 
newspapers and are therefore likely to have agendas that are at least in part defined by 
government. By contrast, the JP is linked to a conglomerate of business groups and 
the newspaper’s and the state interests might not coincide. As part of the Kompas-
Gramedia media empire, the Jakarta Post with its “prized readership” made up from 
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“affluent, educated, English-literate readership of foreign and domestic business 
leaders, political opinion-makers and the diplomatic community” (Sen & Hill, 
2000:60), certainly interpreted the events within its group’s interests. Such influence 
could be the reason for JP’s sharp criticism of former President Megawati 
Sukarnoputry’s government and her inability to fight terrorism, a style of media 
behaviour unthinkable in the ST and NST in relation to their countries’ leaders. 
 
7.2.1.1 Conceptualization of Terrorism in the context of the JI arrests 
The news on the JI arrests was framed as plots to attack US targets in Singapore, to 
promote anarchy in Indonesia, and to exemplify jihad in Malaysia. In the second 
round of arrests, the idea of terrorism had evolved to represent a threat to Singapore’s 
national security and racial harmony while Indonesian authorities were in denial of 
the existence of terrorist cells in the country. The JP was calling for an investigation 
into Singapore’s allegations.  
In Malaysia, terrorism was framed as anarchy with the aim of overthrowing the 
government in a reference to the KMM militant group linked to the opposition party 
PAS (Chalk, 2005).  
 
7.2.1.2 Conceptualization of Terrorism in the context of the Bombings 
In the case of the bombings, terrorism was interpreted as abstract threats: to national 
security, to racial harmony and as revenge against the arrest of alleged terrorists. The 
ST framed terrorism as a threat to national security and racial harmony as a problem 
of crisis proportions. It also made the violence in Indonesia “our own” with great 
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emotional engagement appeals (Taylor, 2000). The JP framed terrorism as a threat to 
the country’s economy and national stability. The NST portrayed terrorism as related 
to threats from Islamic militants to overthrow the government and a threat to racial 
harmony between people of different races and religions in Malaysia and in 
Singapore. 
These varied interpretations confirm scholarly discussions that terrorism means 
different things to different people (Sederberg 1989; Atkins, 1992; Held, 1997; 
Nacos, 2000; Sorel, 2003; Tuman, 2003; Venkat, 2004).  
In Singapore the view that terrorism represented a threat to racial harmony reflects 
the understanding described by Kuo (1983; 1999) as “the potential conflict between 
loyalty to one’s ethnic community and loyalty to the wider national community”. The 
multi-ethnic structure of Singapore comprises 77% Chinese, 15% Malays, 6% Indians 
and 2% other smaller ethnic groups (Kuo, 1983, 1999; Kassim, 2002). The three main 
ethnic groups are encouraged to see themselves as having separate ethnic and cultural 
identities and, at the same time, as members of a unified nation (Kitley & Mules, 
2000:88). The most recent initiative to define group identity was undertaken by MUIS 
to understand the process and challenges of forming the Singaporean Muslim identity 
(Salleh, M., Today, 21 September 2005, p.3).  
Singapore has a pro-active stance to the formation of the nation identity with foci 
on secure economic growth and harmonious ethnic ties. In 1988 then cabinet minister 
Lee Hsien Loong, addressing journalists at the Singapore Press Club said, “You must 
educate Singaporeans – not just with facts, but also in terms of national education and 
values. The press moulds the perception of Singaporeans. It should do so 
constructively – both supporting national campaigns and also day to day, in the way 
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news is presented, analysed, organized” (Loo, 2000:217). Lee Hsien Loong became 
Singapore’s third prime minister in August 2004. He replaced Go Chok Tong, who 
stepped down after 14 years in power. 
In order to strengthen the construction of a national identity, the media in 
Singapore “tends to use narrative frameworks and subjects that stress civic inter-
pretations that emphasise tolerance, solidarity and compassion as nation values to 
provide a common core around political order and social stability” (Kluver &Weber, 
2003, citing Kluver and Powers, 1999; Waisbord, 2004). In the past Singapore has 
witnessed instability caused by racial tensions, as for example in December 1950, 
again in May 1955 and in September 1964 (Nair, 1989; Tan, 1991; Kluver & Weber 
2003). This kind of narrative about social instability in the past and the need for 
tolerance tend to create fear of instability in the society. 
The NST’s construction of terrorism as a threat to racial harmony reflects claims 
by the Malaysian government that JI members wanted to incite ethnic discord. The 
Malays comprise 60% of the population while Chinese and Indians comprise 24% and 
7% respectively. The two groups of ‘minorities’ (Chinese and Indian) traditionally 
dominate the local economy (Reardon, 2005). It appears that the framing of terrorism 
in this case is based on historical events. It is believed that since the race riots in 13 
May 1969, the Malaysian media have the role to maintain racial harmony and 
political stability (Loo, 2000:210). Sederberg explains that, “within dominant systems 
of values, some positions may be defined as ‘extreme’ or ‘utopian’, and thus are 
easily ignored rather than fairly debated” (1989:9). Quasthoff (1989), van Dijk 
(1989), and Campbell (1995), argue that claims of threats to racial harmony based on 
perceptions of social prejudice in terms of wealth, social recognition and community 
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position is a resource for the use of political power. Semetko (2004:358) calls this 
kind of claim a “frame of political opportunity”.  
Appendices A (p.289), A.1 (p.290), A.2 (p.291) and A.3 (p.292), provide a visual 
of ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ and the subcategories drawn from the study: 
images of terrorists, roots of violence, connection between violence and religion. The 
fourth subcategory, the victims, has not been included.  
 I believe the media coverage of the victims deserves a full and independent 
investigation. The real victims of the bombings just happened to be at the wrong place 
at the time and they were involuntary players in the production of massive news 
reporting, especially in the case of 2002 Bali bombings. In the other bombings the 
victims were largely ignored while attention was given to the targets: the JW Marriott 
Hotel and the Australian Embassy. Other buildings badly affected by the explosions 
were not mentioned in the stories. Another aspect is that extraordinary media 
attention to the victims compels governments to take actions in order to prevent 
terrorist acts. Governments can take advantage of the situation and implement social 
policies that tend to curb civil liberties. In places where freedom of expression and 
civil liberties are taken for granted, people tend to compromise some restraints 
immediately after terrorist acts (Nacos, 2006), but in places where freedom of 
expression is regulated and civil liberties a façade, more control can have diverse 
consequences. 
On the other hand, emotion-laden human-interest stories are high on most 
newspapers’ agendas. These stories have the potential to increase the drama and its 
news value either for commercial or political reasons – but this was not the case with 
the News Straits Times; the newspaper hardly reported on the victims. The role of the 
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NST can be seen to be twofold: one that the newspaper was not giving the terrorists 
any distinction for conducting their atrocities; the second, that the new format of the 
newspaper does not provide space for extraordinary media coverage, but only to 
report on the events.  
 
7.3 The Framing of News and its Implications 
The social and political consequences of the framing of terrorism in the news 
reflected an understanding that national unity, quality of life and wealth were at risk. 
McLeod and Hertog (1999), argue that “the media are linked to the social power 
structure, including political, business, educational and religious institutions”, and 
“these ties shape the nature of mass-mediated control messages” (p.309). In order to 
guarantee national security and to maintain civic order and continuous economic 
development, it became necessary to introduce new public policies to promote social 
control with the view to deterring terrorist related activities. These initiatives were 
widely reproduced in the publications’ coverage.  McLeod and Hertog (1999) argue 
that “mechanisms” of social control embedded within the media messages include 
story framing, reliance on official sources and depictions of protest groups’ 
deligitimation. (p.305); the approach tends to create homogeneity in media portrayals 
of events and accentuate public support for the status quo. 
The comparison of news coverage in representative publications of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore has allowed a number of dominant hypotheses in the 
sociology of news such as homogenization narrative, partisan tones, and a high 
proportion of interpretation and opinion mixed with factual reporting (Benson & 




7.3.1 Straits Times 
The ST’s broad range of themes included calls for increased surveillance by citizens, 
the need to manage relations between races and religions and encouragements issued 
to Malays to be moderate. The framing of terrorism also promoted Singapore as a 
medical hub in the region, especially serving Indonesia. The ST portrayed Singapore 
as a good neighbour with offers to help fighting radicals and suggestions on counter-
terrorism measures; in addition, it emphasized how charitable Singaporeans were. The 
latter theme tended to demonstrate a loving, caring people that are not driven by 
materialistic purposes. 
 
7.3.2 Jakarta Post 
The JP framed terrorism in relation to Indonesia’s economic interests, usually 
expressed in terms of the need for the government to maintain foreign investors’ 
confidence in Indonesia and to maintain tourism as a source of revenue. The JP 
framed violence as ‘normal’, historical and committed by a few culprits. In its 
reportage of the latest bombings, the JP framed terrorism with the view to encourage 
community surveillance and the monitoring of residents. One of the results could 
mean the return of the kind of abuses committed during the Suharto regime against 
the population, when the military had a free hand to act against alleged individuals 
who could represent a threat to the nation. The framing of news concerned with 
terrorism appeared to have been delineated by Indonesia’s rich neighbours, Singapore 
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and Australia. Both countries are among major investors in Indonesia’s economy, 
along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, 
China, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The news in the JP became drowned 
out by the ‘global war on terrorism’ and Australian interests. Indonesia started 
adopting counter-terrorism measures in answer to international pressure. 
7.3.3 New Straits Times 
The NST constructed terrorism within a frame of political power as a threat from the 
opposition. Terrorism was also framed so as to make it possible to combat violent 
crimes and to stop the teaching of radical Islam. A domestic audience was the target. 
As result, the framing suggested that the government was not to accept political 
challenges and any disturbance of civic order. Security was increased to protect the 
population against gangs and crimes that could be associated with terrorism. The use 
of the Internal Security Act was framed as a measure for making Malaysia safe and 
something that should be adopted by Indonesia.  
The publications tailored and contextualised the framing of terrorism within 
historical and prevailing interests in each country. Nevertheless, the global discourse 
on ‘the war on terror’ provided a larger frame for the reporting that constructed a 
perceived emergence of terrorism by Islamic militants as a problem of crisis 
proportions. International and local interests set the agenda for the coverage. The ST, 
the JP and the NST uncritically subscribed to the official lines, resulting in the 
endorsement and reinforcement of dominant power structures. 
Figure (1) shows an overview of the claims and consequences of news framing as 
addressed in the newspapers.  
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7.4 News Production: Resources Utilized in the Framing of Terrorism 
Schudson (1995) argues that there are three conditions under which the ideal of 
objectivity is suspended: tragedy, danger and a threat to national security. Cohen-
Almagor (2001), however, believes that objective reporting is often rather wishful 
thinking because journalists cannot help being subjective. In the cases of the 
publications studied, it is relevant to bear in mind that the relationships of the media 
with the centres of power determined particular media biases.  
Considering that in Malaysia, media should be “constructive, consensual and 
development-orientated” (Loo, 2000:218), in Singapore, “the mainstream press is 
ideologically aligned with the state” (George, 2006: 49), and in Indonesia, where the 
press is still “a member of the development team” (Romano, 2000:55)18, certain 
aspects of the coverage were emphasized more than others through the use of news 
framing. Some of the frames focused on patriotism or foreign policy, along with other 
news production resources that included the use of headlines to convey messages, 
interviews with suspected terrorists, and stories based on intelligence information. 
 
7.4.1 Media Patriotism 
When a traumatic event like the Bali bombings happens, the media show their true 
colours by losing objectivity in reporting and toeing the official line (Schudson, 1995; 
Navasky, 2002: xiv, xv; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The ST and the NST’s reporting 
presented different levels of discourse on patriotism, a characteristic not observed in 
either the JP’s or Tempo’s reporting. One explanation could be the historical fact that 
                                                 
18 The author claims that the quote refers to the media’s situation during Suharto, and not to describe 
the media’s conditions that exist after Suharto’s 1998 resignation from the presidency. 
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the press in Malaysia and Singapore has been used to foster national unity and 
identity. 
The ST’s reporting had represented nation building (Anderson, 1996), and racial 
harmony. It contributed to heightening anxiety by framing Singapore as a nation at 
risk (Norris, et al., 2003) in what Waisbord (2002, 2004) calls ‘chauvinist’ media 
patriotism. Waisbord (2004:389) describes ‘chauvinist’ media patriotism as being the 
role of the media in “heightening anxiety about foreign risks to the nation; the 
demonization of the ‘others’, coverage of moral panics affecting the nation”.  
The NST’s patriotic discourse was based on how well the country had done in 
dealing with threats from ‘Islamic militants’, and how investors know that Malaysia is 
not a country at risk. 
Media patriotism follows the adage ‘think correctly’ and ‘act correctly’, often 
telling stories of tasks accomplished well under difficult and harsh conditions (Yu, 
1963:260).  
Media patriotism is a constant feature in the ST. Examples can be found in its 
reporting of viral epidemics, such as the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 
crisis and the threat of dengue fever, where Singaporeans were exhorted to be united 
against such a malaise (Lewis, 2006:62). The NST’s patriotic reporting is evident in 
its coverage of illegal migrants from Indonesia in Malaysia and of disputes with 
Singapore, such as that over water supply. 
The ST used extensively the news framing of mood creation in its coverage of the 
bombings with emotional appeals to fear and tragedy, and with a sense of anger and 
distrust (Edelman, 1977; Rajecki 1990; Glassner, 1999). One of the peculiarities of 
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the ST’s reporting was its ‘domestication’ or localization of news. ‘Domestication’, 
the process of ‘bringing information home’, occurs when far-away events are framed 
in a ‘relevant’ form to appeal to domestic audiences (Clausen, 2003:15, citing 
Gurevitch, Levy and Roeh, 1991; Louw, 2005:263). In the ST’s reporting the 
bombings were framed not if but when it might happen ‘here’. This shows that the ST 
created the mood of “threatening situations then promise salvation, contingent on 
people’s continued support” (Graber, 1981:209; 1993).  
Abel (2005) argues that the “discourse of crisis is one of the main strategies 
adopted by the Singapore government to maintain its ideology of control, anchor its 
people to the nation and create a climate of domestic uncertainty about the fragility of 
the state and the economy” (Abel, 2005:92). By contrast, the NST maintained the line 
that the country was doing well in fighting terrorism and the government had 
confidence that investors recognized that Malaysia was a country not in danger of acts 
of terrorism. Thus the NST presented a more positive image of the country. But on the 
other hand, in the reports of the bombings the NST presented a ‘generic vagueness’ in 
comparison with the ST and the JP. The reason can be either because most of its 
coverage was sourced to news agencies or because it did not want to create an 
atmosphere of domestic crisis. The ST on the other hand provided saturation coverage 
with stories on a wide-range of topics. One could argue the ST’s extensive and 
detailed reporting functioned to make the accounts more authentic and plausible 
(Potter, 1996). The ST’s reportage showed strong traits of communal mass 
communication and its relationship with nationalism (Pye, 1963:20). This tendency 
was observed in its frequent messages about unity; its appeals for public support; its 
claims of how ‘bad’ they [‘Other’] are and of how well ‘we’ are doing; and its 
systematic repetition of information. In sum, the media patriotism used in the ST and 
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the NST was in support of their own governments whereas the JP undermined support 
for Indonesia’s political leaders and in people’s trust in government institutions 
(Brewer, Aday & Gross, 2003). 
 
7.4.2 Use of Headlines to Convey Interpretations 
The ST mostly used particular headlines to convey messages and sometimes opinions. 
The practice was not applied all the time. As Reah (2002) and Silverblatt (2001) 
observe, headlines are the window to a news story. Their function is to inform the 
reader about the story, to condense the story in a few words and to attract attention. 
But Reah (2002:32) argues that, “in the attempt to attract readers to a story, headlines 
can be ambiguous, confusing or still be used as an opinion manipulator”. Examples of 
this are the following: ‘Is that my brother?’ (ST, 15 October 2002, p.8); ‘Top 
politicians going soft on Bashir’ (Go, R., ST, 22 October 2002, p.1); ‘Bashir may be 
arrested but Hambali still directs JI’ (ST, 23 October 2002p.A6); ‘More grief on 
Sunday?’ (Asmarani, D., ST, 12 August 2003, p. A1); ‘Can this happen in 
Singapore?’ (Nirmala, M., Laurel Teo, L., ST, 7 August 2003, p.3); ‘Singaporeans 
must unite against common threat’ (Soh, N., ST, 11 September 2004, p. A4); 
‘Manny’s dad: My wife never cheated on me’ (Xueying, L. ST, 19 September 2004, 
p.14).  
The NST used leading headlines to portray a positive view of Malaysia. For 
example, ‘Najib: Situation here well under control’ (NST, 10 August 2003, p.: 4); 
‘Malaysia is now an excellent role model in war on terror’ (Pollard, R., NST, 11 
September 2004, p.20). The JP was the newspaper with the least headlines providing 
or anchoring interpretations, despite a few cases of sensationalism, for example, ‘Two 
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fathers of 5-year-old-Jakarta blast victim’ (Ng, A., JP, 14 September 2004, p.2), in 
addition to titles critical to the President, ‘Mega’s poor leadership hurts nation’ 
(Nafik, M., JP, 29 October 2002, p.2). 
 
7.4.3 JI ‘Official’ Gives Interview 
The ST was the only newspaper to present information obtained from a ‘JI official’. 
The ST’s strategy can be interpreted as, firstly, seeking a balanced approach with 
information provided by terrorists, presenting both sides of the story, and secondly, 
the ‘relationship’ between ST and JI as conferring respectability to JI’s representative 
(Nacos, 2000; 2002). One could argue that the second point was hardly part of the 
ST’s strategy, but instead it was an outcome that perhaps the newspaper anticipated 
but was not concerned about it. 
 
7.4.4 Faceless Source of Information 
Faceless information providers, such as ‘eyewitnesses’, ‘a police guard’, ‘hospital 
officials’ and particularly ‘intelligence sources’, were observed to various degrees in 
all four publications. The problem with ‘intelligence sources’ is that their accounts are 
based on intelligence information and is therefore not verifiable. Willis (1990) argues 
that anonymity and confidentiality robs the reader and editors of the chance to judge 
the veracity of the information. 
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7.4.5 Leak of Information 
Public authorities are the prime producers of data and information. However, the ST 
demonstrated not only to have ‘certified’ relationship with sources within the JI group 
but also to be the favoured newspaper to receive and be permitted to publish secret 
official documents provided by intelligence sources. Tiffen (1989) argues that leaks 
are used with the intention to affect policy changes, to dramatize a problem and to 
force a government to take action, but it is not clear when it is legitimate to use 
confidential sources or secret documents as the basis for news stories. The ST 
published ‘secret documents’ with the intention to produce drama and to mobilize a 
reaction against the militants while putting pressure on Indonesian authorities to act 
against the alleged suspects. 
 
7.4.6 Foreign Policy Frame 
Media diplomacy is not new in some countries in Southeast Asia. Throughout Flor 
Contemplacion’s affair and her execution, there were fierce exchange of ‘messages’ 
between Singapore and the Philippines (Kitley & Mules, 2000). A Singaporen court 
convicted Contemplacion, a Filipina maid, of killing another Filipina maid and the 
three years old Singaporean son of her employer on 4 May 1991. Flor Contemplacion 
was hanged on 17 March 1995. The execution caused major media and diplomatic 
row between Singapore and the Philippines, after Singapore rejected an appeal from 
the Philippines President, Fidel Ramos.  
Singapore and Malaysia are constantly exchanging messages through their 
newspapers. More recently the practice has been observed between Australia and 
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Singapore in the case of the hanging of an Australian citizen, Nguyen Tuong Van. 
The situation is no different between Indonesia and Singapore.  
O’Heffernan (1993) observes that media influence foreign policy decisions both 
by what they report and how they report, particularly by giving overall political 
salience. The ST and the NST used their coverage of the JI arrests in Singapore and 
the bombings to convey messages demanding that Indonesia act against radical 
Muslims. In turn, the JP and Tempo conveyed messages demanding that Singapore 
should prove there were terrorists in Indonesia. 
Gilboa (2002:740,741) argues that, “international mediation by journalists may 
raise difficult ethical and professional problems”. The fact that in the Cold War era 
leaders used media diplomacy because there were no adequate direct channels of 
communication does not apply to Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, one 
of the implications of media diplomacy between these countries is that ASEAN’s 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) fundamental principle of non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs is observed less than it seems since the newspapers 
work as unofficial mouthpieces of their governments or of organizations they 
represent (Menon 1994).  
 
7.4.7 ‘Standardization’ of Sources of Information 
The publications used standard sources. The journalists used the same group of 
informants, particularly elite sources who occupied positions of power within 
government organizations. High prestige sources and government officials usually 
provide the authoritative and trustworthy criteria journalists look for in a source of 
  237
information (Tuchman 1978; Borquez, 1993; Sahr, 1993; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The 
publications also drew on the same wire services. This is a paradox since the elites, 
particularly in Malaysia, regularly censure the international media. It was not clear, 
however, whether journalists had approached sources with views that did not fit the 
common line (Ambrosio de Nelson, 2004). Strentz (1989) argue that government and 
institutionalized informants are ‘conventional sources’ that perpetuate the status quo. 
Therefore, at least three understandings become clear: one, that the media is passive 
to the elite sources of information; secondly, that the use of mainly official sources in 
the coverage reveals the extent to which media and state are associated; and thirdly, 
that agency newswire are providing the kind of content the publications want. 
While the ST used institutionalized sources and models of propaganda (Pye, 
1963), the NST published views from institutionalized sources in addition to some 
differences of opinion within government sources.  
News stories on public reaction to the bombings were absent from the NST’s 
reporting. The ST and JP journalists made extensive use of ‘experts’ but failed to 
describe the experts’ connections to the various intelligence agencies and 
governments. Nevertheless, as Sahr (1993) argues, journalists do not simply select 
experts randomly, “governments and persons in authoritative positions certify the 
sources” (p.160). 
 
7.5 Role of Journalists in their Social Context 
Journalists are constantly under various pressures. There is no time for carefully 
crafted stories. A newspaper article must go through a process of production: from the 
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reporter to the copy editor, to managing editor, to the headline writer before it appears 
in print. In the process, messages may contain unintended layers of meanings, that is, 
some of the social conditions of the journalist and the newsgroup may affect the final 
product and the embedded cultural and attitudes values can appear in the stories.  
In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the media’s role is to promote nation 
building. Their function is to disseminate a set of practices and values in what 
Benedict Anderson has identified as “culturally coordinated” communities (Anderson, 
1983, 1996). In Indonesia it remains to be seen what direction the media will be 
allowed to develop within the process of democratization under the leadership of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general under Suharto’s New Order 
regime that was in power from 1965 to 1998. The stepping down of Suharto paved the 
way for a more liberal media. Despite the flourishing of publications and the exercise 
of a measured freedom, the laws regulating the media in Indonesia are still in place. 
In addition, there are controversial changes to the criminal code being drafted by the 
government that threaten the initial flurry of press freedom seen after Suharto’s 32-




Chapter Eight: Inter-relationships of theories  
 
 
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 
New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the ‘war on terror’ and the high 
profile bombings in Indonesia were engulfed in the spectre of ‘global terrorism’.  
The 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian 
Embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombings were reported within the same 
breath as Western media reported on other attacks in other parts of the world such 
as in London, Madrid and New York. 
 
     The ‘war on terror’ is a rich current framing case, argues Reese (2007), saying 
that it is likely to be the most important of our time, and illustrates some challenges 
for researchers (p.152). Reese also argues that the ‘war on terror’ has been elevated 
to a macro-framework that comes closer to ideology, with political debates taking 
place within the boundaries set by the frame and general acceptance of the 
assumption built into it (ibid). The ‘war on terror’ frame appears to have played an 
important part in the shaping of press coverage in a manner similar to the anti-
communism narrative of the Cold War. The solution to deal with the ‘war on terror’ 
emanates  from this framework with calls for a ‘war’ on dissents, militant groups, 
management of race, the management of Islamic studies, etc.  
 
     The  media spectacle produced by the publications studied reinforce Van der 
Veer’s (2004) proposal about the inter-connectedness of national and global issues 
and media performance to the [mis] understanding of acts of violence. However, to 
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look into Indonesian issues through a global lens may result in shortcomings and 
serious limitations (Sidel, 2006).  
 
     Different conflicts or acts of violence need to be assessed and defined on an 
individual basis. However, Cole (2006:3) points out that such an exercise poses a 
challenge for the media, particularly in circumstances in which the act of violence is 
enveloped in a macro frame such as the ‘war on terror’. In Cole’s view, this macro 
frame is one of the effects of globalization when local groups seeking specific 
national objectives are bound together and become listed as international terrorist 
organizations, as has been the case of some groups in the Philippines19 
 
     The transformation of violent actions into terrorism requires an agent to explain 
the political, moral or discursive frames through which events are understood; 
therefore, questions on what are the motivations for the presentation of the facts 
have to be asked (Slocum, 2005:12). This study has demonstrated how the 
representations of acts of violence were construed in the media coverage. The 
publications’ representations of the bombings have revealed the salience granted to 
certain aspects of the news and issues (and not others); the representations were 
institutionalised with strong reliance on sources from the authorities and their 
definitions of the circumstances (Dobkin, 2005). These representations have shown 
how some groups were stereotyped and positioned as deviant, and how others were 
granted legitimacy, as was the case of the Laskar Jihad20 when it disbanded its 
members. In summary, it is fair to suggest that the news coverage was revealed as 
being rather stereotypical (Cottle, 2006). 
                                                 
19 See page 77. 
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     It is crucial to recognise the historical and cultural specificity of violent actions. 
Slocum (2005) points out that an appreciation of specific contexts and histories is 
often neglected in the construction and perception of a given act of violence. In the 
context of Malaysia, Cole (2006) claims there are several issues that could 
potentially contribute to the growth of militancy in the country. He points out 
matters such as corruption within the government, the control of the media and 
judiciary, the use of Internal Security Act, the unwillingness to let the opposition 
political party PAS implement Sharya law in Kelantan and so forth; issues that one 
way or the other have emerged in this study. Cole claims that the suggested 
problems are not fostering a growth in militancy (p.39); however he does not 
elaborate on the matters. Similarly, Woodier (2006) suggests that a number of 
possible motives for unrest or terrorism exist in Malaysia, although he neither 
enumerates nor elaborates on them. Hopefully, the examples drawn from the stories 
analysed in this project may provide a better understanding of the complexity of 
historical and cultural specifics and shift understanding away from the global 
discourse on the ‘war on terror’.  
 
     The findings in this study confirm the observation made by Dennis Pluchinsky 
(2006:53) that one of the “by-product of the 9/11 attacks has been the way 
governments have used the terrorist attacks as an excuse to suppress opposition 
elements by designating them as terrorists, and in some cases, if they are Muslims, 
linking them to al-Qaeda”. Woodier (2006:42) similarly advances his views that, 
                                                                                                                                           
20 JP 16 October 2002 p.1; JP 18 October 2002 p.2 
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“across the Asia Pacific region, governments are using the pretext of the ‘war on 
terror’ to curb basic freedoms or crack down on their domestic opponents”. 
 
     The ‘war on terror’ has placed the construction of Islam in a homogenised 
representation that does not make the distinction between Islamic traditions and the 
individual attachment to the faith. This global frame of Islam as portrayed in 
President George W. Bush’s interpretation of the events following 9/11 pointed to 
the inference that the attacks were carried out by Islamic fundamentalists, and that 
retaliatory measures would take place against the supporters of Islamic militancy 
(Spencer, 2005: 147, 148). This representation can affect how other non-Muslims 
view Islam. Thussu (2006:9) suggests that the U.S. and the British discourse on 
Islam have the tendency to present the world’s one billion Muslims as potential 
terrorists. In the case of the three countries studied, the publications tilt heavily 
towards the Eurocentric’s standpoint and reported on the perpetrators of the 
bombings in Indonesia within the global frame on radical Muslims. Even though the 
number of ‘terrorists’ in the news stories appeared to be limited,  all groups with 
different social or political agendas were swallowed up in the ‘war on terror’ 
discourse. 
  
     The stance reflects the argument made by Karim (2004) that calls attention to the 
assumption that despite the journalistic principle of objectivity, the Western 
coverage of events in Muslim majority countries generically follows the framework 
set by powerful Western governments and Western media agencies.  The result of 
the analysis confirms Karim’s claim in two areas: (i) Muslim majority countries 
(Indonesia and Malaysia) demonstrated to have uncritically and widely used the 
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production of Western newswire agencies; (ii) the local publications used the 
framework of the ‘war on terror’ to report on the high profile bombings in 
Indonesia.  
 
     The various news frames emerging from this thesis provide clarity about the 
game of politics, from the public acceptance of a fear-driven ‘war on terror’ to the 
election of a former general as the president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, and the re-election of Prime Minister John Howard in Australia in 
2004, to the management of race and Islamic studies: the management of 
impressions. As Woodward (2007) suggests, “to manage an event is not to escape 
politics or its hard choices but to invite assessment of the event’s meaning in terms 
of known facts and the credibility of its authors” (p.4). 
 
     However, no journalist will admit that ideological forces shape their reporting. 
Yet, the study shows a homogenised reporting tendency in favour of specific angles. 
One reason could be that journalists are not critical enough to provide dissenting 
takes. Another possible rationale may be due to information management that is so 
effective that it disallows any other legitimate approach. One more cause can be that 
journalists ascribe to closely the ideological stance of their newspapers. 
 
     Kavoori (2006) argues that it is necessary to recognize the role the media plays in 
nationalism and public responsibility.  The publications in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore have legitimised the capitalist system and deligitimised dissent and 
opposition. This finding confirms the political economy perspective, particularly the 
“manufacturing of consent” paradigm, which holds that the media privileges 
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dominant views and values and marginalizes the opposition voices (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988).  
 
     A comparison of the news coverage in representative publications from each 
country allows us to assess a number of the dominant assumptions in the sociology of 
news, as presented in chapter seven. The density of issues and problems uncovered in 
the study suggests that critical social theory needs to accommodate models that 
account for complexity and the historical roots of contemporary problems (Kellner, 
2006:164). Altheide (2006) similarly proposes that social scientists and journalists 
must work together to provide theoretical understanding about how news practices are 
reflective of power, particularly in the reporting of conflicts in which dominant power 
has interest.  
 
       This thesis show that it is possible to demonstrate rigorously how the availability 
of some information and the lack of other information can result in depictions of a 
concerted, tightly-organized, transnational ‘jihadist’ conspiracy in Southeast Asia that 
might not exist or did not exist. As one could argue, if it does exist now, it could well 
be an unintended consequence of developments in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and 
the role of al-Qaeda. And this would bear out Thayer’s (2005) line of reasoning that 
militancy in Southeast Asia is routinely equated with terrorism (p.92) and 
international and regional experts link local groups with the  al-Qaeda’s network. As 
observed in the news stories, the complex issues were addressed from within a 
framework of political interests (Spencer, 2005). In Singapore, the media relationship 
with the state’s agenda is predictable. In Malaysia, NST follows the agenda of the 
ruling party UMNO; nevertheless there are alternate voices of dissenting media in 
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Malaysia, something unheard of in Singapore.   In Indonesia, despite the flourishing 
of media outlets it is still not clear what the state’s agenda is. As Woodier (2006:59) 
says, political elites are making effort to regain central control over the flow of 
information and new alliances between political and business groups are 
materializing. State power as ‘primary definer’ varied little from a scenario of 
controlled media in a transition to democratic society (Indonesia) or in semi- 
democratic system (Malaysia and Singapore). The press in Malaysia and Singapore 
demonstrated itself to be more attuned to ideology, whereas the Indonesian print 
media appears to be more critical of government institutions but not necessary 
adversarial. The Malaysian and Singaporean press coverage are more consonant with 
state agendas. 
 
     The publications’ use of narratives on fear and anxiety contribute to authoritarian 
causes, as were the cases of Malaysia and Singapore. Giroux’s (2006) has shown how 
the media markets fear and anxiety. He suggests that this is a new kind of politics 
used by state and corporate news to hype violence and to create the politics of fear. 
Giroux claims that, “the culture of fear combined with the spectacle of terrorism 
substitutes a sense of compassion and caring for the other with a concern for one’s 
personal security and a deep distrust of others, especially if those others are Arab or 
Muslims” (p.11).  Spencer (2005), on the other hand, suggests that “fear engenders 
hatred and fosters dependence on authority” (p.94). As a result, the politics of fear 
influences social routines and social interactions and these effects can reduce critical 
thinking and awareness about social changes and the implications of blanket 
adjustments in security and policy (Altheide, 2006:220).  
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     The literature on media studies in Southeast Asia deals mostly with issues on press 
freedom and government and media relationships in the region. The literature on 
politics in Southeast Asia deals with dissenting voices and local conflicts, whereas the 
literature on sociology studies the social problems that could explain some of the 
conflicts. The broad literature on media and terrorism is in essence divided into 
popular culture, new media and thirdly on politics including security. There is an 
abundance of literature on terrorism published after 9/11 that deals with the new 
media’s (e.g. the television news, television imaging, Internet) representation of 
terrorism in various parts of the world, but mainly confined within the Eurocentric’s 
perspective and specifically with illustration focusing on the U.S. sphere of influence. 
Examples can be observed in recent literature put forward by Ben-Shaul (2006), 
Giroux (2006), Kellner (2005) and Martin and Petro (2006); however, it seems that an 
interdisciplinary literature connecting simultaneously the media, sociology and 
politics in Southeast Asia is limited or practically non-existent.  
 
     The strength of my work is that it brings together a multidisciplinary approach and 
therefore, a contribution to the theory of press study in the area of terrorism in 
selected countries of Southeast Asia. However, while trying to examine the news 
coverage of the events and to provide a regional perception on how the media in the 
selected countries reported on terrorism, the very act of theorizing the findings had to 
be set against Western theories due to a shortage of literature with a regional 
perspective.   
 
     One common aspect observed in the literature is the neglect of the victims in the 
aftermath of the violence (Farid 2006); when the victims stop being newsworthy they 
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tumble away from the public discourse and rarely enter into the scholarly discussion 
of media and terrorism. In various instances the publications analysed reported on the 
victims and witnesses in the days following the bombings. The stories were towards 
entertainment rather than concern with those affected by the attacks. Stories narrated 
by the victims or their families could help to understand the social and historical 
causes of the violence itself and probably contribute to different aspects of theoretical 
understanding of the media and terrorism.. In that way, the media may perform a 
more productive role in the social pacification of violence by giving vent to feelings 
of grief and publicly examining the arguments for and opposing interests and the 
identities involved in acts of violence (Cottle, 2006:165). 
 
     Theoretically, the study contradicts the view that terrorist groups become stronger 
with media coverage (Nacos, 2000). In the case of the three countries studied, the 
military, the police and institutions became stronger with the media cheering in 
support for tactics and policies for counter-terrorism. Furthermore, as White (1991) 
proposes, the coverage of terrorism is not helpful to terrorist groups because the 
media focus on violence rather on the causes for the attacks (p.259). In the cases 
studied the coverage did not present a discourse on the political motivations of the 
group; the alleged reasons for the bombings were advanced by official sources; and, 
there was no sympathetic angle in the reporting of the attacks. 
 
     Simply put, in order to consolidate a scholarly understanding of media coverage of 
acts of violence defined as terrorism in Southeast Asia, future research could include 
media aspects, political aspects, social background and comparison between media 
coverage of past and contemporary conflicts taken together. Until such research is 
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undertaken, our understanding of conflict and media will remain partial and subject to 
competing claims and controversy. In such a context, this study represents a valuable 
insight into contemporary news reporting in the region. 




Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
The complexity of terrorism goes far beyond any possible given definition. 
Intertwined by criminal acts that are never reported as criminal, by political interests 
that are never stated, partnerships that are never really explained, and media frenzy, 
terrorism becomes a world of its own. But it is not that simple: politics feed on 
terrorism for policies while terrorism feeds on politics for radicalism. The media on 
the other hand feed on them both and create its own form of terrorism with the 
spreading of fear while giving the illusion of public participation. The reporting on 
violence becomes a content commodity. The readers are treated as consumers. The 
journalists are treated as tools. The product, news coverage, is crafted within the 
rationale of the relationships between media and the groups they are engaged with. 
The events, defined and described within ideological frames, are accepted 
unquestionably, at least in the case of the publications which have been studied here. 
 This study has shown that the media’s reporting on terrorism in Southeast Asia 
has been highly tailored and politicised. Regional and national interests played 
significant roles in the way the publications reported on the events. The series of 
bombings in Indonesia analysed in this project and the arrests of suspected terrorists 
in Singapore were largely reported within the context of the global ‘war on terror’, 
which precludes a deeper understanding of terrorism and Islamic militancy in 
Indonesia. 
 The news coverage of the Straits Times, the Jakarta Post, the New Straits Times 
and Tempo magazine has demonstrated that journalists and officials were mutually 




dependent on each other. There was no challenge to the official interpretation of the 
events. Probably that confirms one of the main beliefs in journalism regarding the 
silent but powerful choice of editors and selection of journalists. 
The reporting in the four publications stressed the maintenance of economic 
development and civic order. Social values and the stability of the state were reported 
as being threatened by Islamic militants. The generalization has the effect of limiting 
tolerance and stimulating antagonism.  Moreover, the ‘conceptualization of terrorism’ 
and the ‘image of terrorists’ were constructed and transmitted at face value. The 
group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was contextualized more as a threat to society and less as 
a threat to state integrity within their alleged desire to create an Islamic caliphate. 
Suspected members of the group were personified as deviant and dangerous. The 
name of Jemaah Islamiyah became synonymous with terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
This was a simplistic framework which the publications relied upon to make sense of 
events such as the 2002 Bali bombings and the rise of militant tendencies in 
Indonesia.  
The media construction of terrorism and religion had a far-reaching connection, 
mainly because frequently the sources of information (government officials and 
experts) advanced the reason for the bombings as to create an Islamic state or to 
install the sharyah law, the Islamic law; however, the empirical analysis demonstrated 
differently. Newspapers’ editorials followed the same line. The terrorist acts were 
contextualized within the discourse of international pressure on Indonesia to arrest 
radical Muslims, with the alleged implication that radical Islam breeds terrorism; 
thus, the teaching of Islam in the madrassahs needs to be reformed. In such a context 
it is overwhelming to observe how the so-called ‘moderate’ Muslims (whatever that 




means) has embraced the ‘war on terror’ and has also used the media to embarked on 
a path of justifications. However, the publications failed to report on the lack of a 
forum for political dissents, radicals or militants to express their views. The 
newspapers overlooked issues such as poverty, injustice, and other real or perceived 
grievances as being contributory factors towards the bombings.  
There was a notable contrast between the way in which foreign and Indonesian 
victims were reported: the latter were to a large degree ignored. By concentrating on 
the foreign casualties, the publications encouraged readers to see the bombings as part 
of the global ‘war on terror’, rather than as events which had specific domestic causes 
that needed to be analysed and addressed independently of the global situation. 
Causation will always be an issue in such studies. To some degree, the publications 
may simply be reflecting and catering to the views of their readership rather than 
helping to form those views. But the current study makes clear that the tone and 
design of the media in the countries studied probably has a substantial effect in 
shaping the public’s views about terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
Some of the social and political consequences of the news framing of the 
bombings and the arrests were that to guarantee national security, to maintain civic 
order and continuous economic development new public policies were necessary 
along with the engagement of the population in surveillances. To me it is not clear 
whether surveillance by citizens can reduce the risk of terrorist acts or if it just 
functions as a tool for breeding distrust among people. Equally, the introduction of 
regulations on race relations and religious issues cannot guarantee that terrorist acts 
will not happen. Nevertheless, the publications were arguably performing a role that 
they had played since their countries became independent: that of fostering stability 




and national development, and continuity of state dominance. However, one could 
argue that while state authorities might control the flow over of information, on the 
grounds of national security or on-going information, they cannot fully control what 
others, e.g. journalists and the reading public make of this information or non-
information.  
Aside from the criminal act that the bombings represent and the killing of 
innocent people terrorism can fall within any definition conceivably possible, as long 
as it fulfils the objectives of those who define what is terrorism.  
Doubtlessly, terrorism creates fears in most people, but the mass media do not 
help allay those fears if they adopt institutions’ agendas. Time exposes those agendas 
to be based on particularistic rather than national interests. The Bush administration 
waged a war against Iraq on the pretext of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, 
but these were nowhere to be found. The July 7 2005 bombings in London which 
killed 52 people are now acknowledged as an incident with no al Qaeda link (Agence 
France Presse, ‘A modest, simple, plot’, Today, 10 April 2006, p.14). It is tempting 
to associate bombings in Southeast Asia to the Jemaah Islamiyah group or some 
readily hated group. Unless we have diverse views and alternative representations, the 
news media in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will continue to propagate 
hegemonic, perhaps dangerously, erroneous, ideas about terrorism. The value of this 
thesis is that it shows how press reporting and state authorities’ interventions cannot 
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Appendix A    
     
 Conceptualization of Terrorism  
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Appendix A.1    
     
  Images of Terrorists  
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Appendix A.2    
     
   Roots of violence   
     
  ST JP NST Tempo 
JI I 
Indonesia government 
inertia, Pan Islamic 
region, anniversary of 
9.11, militants free to 
operate after Suharto's 
fall, extremist 
ideology, US targets. 
Militants fighting for 
Islamic state in 
Indonesia, 
disenchanted people 




government in order 
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and S'pore, to create 
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Islamic state in the 
region, trial of Bali 
bombers, trial of 
Bashir. 
Trials of Bali 
suspects, to intimidate 
the court, venue for 
political elite, to 
distract people from 
MPR annual session, 
challenging the 
government. 
Militancy fuelled by 
unrelenting 
grievance, Bashir 
wants Islamic state 
in Indonesia; JI 
wants Islamic state 











Third anniversary of 
9.11; to influence 
outcome of Indonesian 
presidential election; 
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troops in Iraq; a Pan 
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coordination among 
security officials. 









Appendix A.3    
     
 Connection between Violence and Religion  
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